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Location-based policies are widely used across the world in the hope of stim-
ulating particular local economies. This dissertation consists of three chapters of
empirical studies that evaluate the efficacy and efficiency of three different location-
based government policy interventions. The first chapter studies the impacts of
military personnel contractions on various aspects of the economies of counties in
the United States. The second chapter estimates the causal effect of international
aid on economic growth of recipient developing countries. The third chapter stud-
ies a large-scale industrial buildup in China and its impact on long-run regional
economic development.
Chapter 1: The Local Economic Impacts of Military Personnel Contractions
The main challenges to comprehensive evaluations of the effects of local busi-
nesses on other parts of the local economy are to establish causality and to calculate
the welfare impacts in a unified framework. In the first chapter, I study the ef-
fects on county economies of the large military personnel contractions in the United
States in the 1990s. To establish causal estimates, I propose a new identification
strategy that combines the synthetic control method and the instrumental variable
estimator. I then put the estimated effects in a spatial general equilibrium model
and calculate the welfare impacts on different agents of the local economy. I find
that military personnel contractions significantly reduced local employment levels,
but as people migrate, the incidence of welfare impacts was mainly on landowners,
not on workers.
Chapter 2: The Effect of Aid on Growth: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment
(with Sebastian Galiani, Steve Knack, and L. Colin Xu)
Whether foreign aid promotes economic growth in recipient countries is one of
the most important yet most debated questions in the study of economic growth.
The second chapter studies the causal effect of foreign aid on economic growth by
exploiting the large discontinuous reduction in aid that occurs as a country passes
an exogenously-given income threshold. We find a positive and sizable causal effect
of foreign aid: a one percentage point increase in the aid-to-GNI ratio raises annual
economic growth by 0.35 percentage point.
Chapter 3: Industrializing from Scratch: the Persistent Effects of China’s
“Third Front Movement" (with Jingting Fan)
The third chapter studies the effect of a large-scale industrialization effort in
China known as the “Third Front Movement” on long-run development of regional
economies. The Movement provides a unique policy experiment to study the impor-
tant question of whether temporary government subsidies in the nascent industrial
sector can permanently push a rural economy into a new development path. We
find that decades after the Movement ended, industrialization and urbanization lev-
els remained much higher in local economies that received large subsidies from the
Movement, and the effects are mainly driven by the fast-growing non-state sector.
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1 Introduction
Economic conditions vary greatly across locations. In December, 2014, the unem-
ployment rate in Gary, Indiana was 10.5%. Thirty miles away, the unemployment
rate in Chicago was 6.2%. In 2011, the state of West Virginia had the second lowest
median household income in the United States, while its neighbor Maryland had
a median household income that was about 80% higher, and was the highest in
the country. In developing countries, regional economic disparities are even greater.
The richest province in China has a per capita GDP that is more than 3 times that
of the poorest province.
Many factors affect economic differences across space, from locational fun-
damental characteristics such as geography, to transitory factors such as weather
shocks. Due to these factors, it is unrealistic that the local economies will be ex-
actly the same across space, nor should spatial economic differences necessarily be a
concern. As long as people can move to different places at no cost, spatial economic
disparity as measured by income or population simply reflects the heterogeneous
choices of people: a farmer chooses to live in an agricultural state over an indus-
trial center; a person who has an idiosyncratical preference for variety and a small
disutility from congestion chooses to live in crowded cities.
However, people face various restrictions to arbitrage geographic economic
differences. Migration is costly; information on different locations is often limited. In
fact, controlling for demographic characteristics, residents in economically depressed
regions still work fewer hours and earn less than their counterparts in locations with
better economic conditions. A local economy may also fail to reach its production
potential for various reasons. For example, in some developing countries, some
(local) economies may be stuck in bad equilibria due to lack of basic infrastructure
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).
The idea that market forces may not generate desirable local economic out-
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comes have motivated various location-based government policies. By targeting
residents and businesses within certain geographic areas, these policies aim at pro-
moting local economies and benefiting their residents (Gottlieb and Glaeser, 2008).
These policies, often in the form of tax credits for local businesses, employee subsi-
dies, or infrastructure investment, are widespread across the world. In the United
States, it is estimated that in 2011, state and local governments spent more than 80
billion dollars on tax incentives alone in order to attract or retain local businesses
(Story et al., 2012). Chapter 1 of this dissertation studies the local economic impacts
of the removal of employers from the local economy. Internationally, bilateral and
multilateral donors donate 140 billion dollars each year in the form of development
aid in the hope of pulling developing countries out of income traps and promoting
economic growth (Chapter 2). Throughout history, governments launch large-scale
comprehensive development policies aiming at fundamentally changing regional eco-
nomic landscape. Examples of these policies include the Tennessee Valley Authority
in the United States, China’s massive industrialization campaign in its hinterland
(Chapter 3), and the development of Northeast Brazil.
The efficacy and efficiency of these policies depend on the objectives of these
policies, and how agents respond to incentives. Thus the evaluation of these policies
may well be different from case to case. This dissertation consists of three studies
of different government interventions in local economies, at the county, region, and
country level. All three chapters estimate causal impacts of the policies on local
economic conditions and discuss the mechanisms behind the impacts. . The first
chapter, titled “The Local Economic Impacts of Military Personnel Contractions”,
studies the impacts on various aspects of the county economies of military person-
nel contractions that took place in the United States in the 1990s, and the welfare
impacts on local economic stakeholders such as workers, landowners, and business
owners. The second chapter, titled “The Effect of Aid on Growth: Evidence from
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a Quasi-Experiment”, estimates the causal effect of international aid on economic
growth of recipient developing countries by proposing and estimating a novel instru-
mental variable. The third chapter, titled “Industrializing from Scratch: the Per-
sistent Effects of China’s “Third Front Movement”, studies a large-scale industrial
buildup in China and its impact on the long-run regional economic development.
The first chapter focuses on a period between 1988 and 2000, during which
the number of military personnel stationed in the United States shrank by 30 per-
cent, and hundreds of local economies with military bases were affected. As military
personnel pull out of a locale, demands for local labor, housing, and locally-traded
goods decline. In this chapter, I jointly estimate the impacts of this personnel reduc-
tion on the equilibrium quantities and prices of local labor markets, local housing
markets, and local product markets. In order to establish causal identification, this
chapter proposes and estimates a two-step empirical model combining synthetic con-
trol and instrumental variables methods. I find sizable effects of military personnel
contractions on civilian employment levels and the numbers of private businesses.
But this employment reduction translates into out-migration of local civilian resi-
dents to other jurisdictions, resulting in a drop in rental prices that is larger than
the drop in wages. Then I build a simple spatial equilibrium model that describes
the equilibrium conditions and derives expressions for welfare calculation. Relating
them to my econometric estimates, I show that the welfare cost on workers is small
while that on landowners is sizable.
Whether foreign aid promotes economic growth in recicipient countries is one
of the most important and most debated questions in the study of economic growth.
However, the literature on aid and growth has not found a convincing method for
identifying the causal effects of aid. The second chapter of this dissertation secures
a causal estimate by using a new instrumental variable. The instrumental variable is
based on the fact that since 1987, eligibility for aid from the International Develop-
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ment Association (IDA) has been based partly on whether or not a country is below
a certain threshold of per capita income. We find evidence that other donors tend
to reinforce rather than compensate for reductions in IDA aid following threshold
crossings. Overall, aid as a share of gross national income (GNI) drops about 59
percent on average after countries cross the threshold. Focusing on the 35 coun-
tries that have crossed the income threshold from below between 1987 and 2010,
this chapter finds a positive, statistically significant, and economically sizable effect
of aid on growth. A one percentage point increase in the aid to GNI ratio from
the sample mean raises annual real per capita growth in gross domestic product
by approximately 0.35 percentage points. We further show that the main channel
through which aid promotes growth is by increasing physical investment.
In poor economies with low levels of industrialization, can temporary govern-
ment subsidies on the industrial sector promote long-run economic development?
The evaluations of government subsidies on industries are often confounded by the
fact that subsidies often go to sectors or locations that are selected based on par-
ticular expectations of economic returns to the subsidies. The third chapter of
this dissertation sheds light on this important yet difficult question by studying a
large-scale industrialization campaign in China known as the “Third Front Move-
ment”. The Movement, initiated in the mid-1960s and ended in the late 1970s,
involved establishing large-scale industrial plants in the remote and mountainous
regions in western China. It was motivated by national defense considerations, and
these industrial plants were scattered in places with small existing industrial pres-
ences. The Movement provides a unique policy experiment to study the important
question of whether temporary government subsidies can permanently push a local
economy into a new equilibrium development level. We find that decades after the
Movement ended, industrialization and urbanization levels remained much higher
in local economies that received large subsidies from the Movement. The effects are
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stronger when the subsidy went to advanced manufacturing industries.
These three essays focus on studying government policies aimed at local economies.
They develop econometric approaches that are suitable for evaluating each of these
policies, and use conceptual frameworks that take into account the rational responses
of economic agents to these policy interventions. In combination, this dissertation
contributes to our current understanding of local economies and location-based poli-
cies.
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2 CHAPTER 1: THE LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MILITARY PER-
SONNEL CONTRACTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Economic activities in a local geographic area interact with each other: shocks
to one sector have direct and indirect effects on other agents in the local econ-
omy. Economists have long been interested in identifying the size of local economic
spillover effects and the mechanisms through which these effects work.1 The findings
of studies on spillover effects have important policy implications as governments at
all levels across the world spend billions of dollars on various place-based policies
aiming at promoting economic opportunities in certain localities.
In order to fully capture the total impacts on the various stakeholders of the
local economy, it is important to simultaneously model and estimate the behavior
and interactions of many agents. Most existing studies focusing on local labor
market outcomes, usually in terms of the number of jobs created or lost, are likely
to miss important parts of the story.2 Fewer job opportunities depress employment
and wages but also make housing and local services more affordable. Restricting
attention to the local labor market overlooks this compensating effect. Moreover,
the effects of decreased job opportunies on workers’ levels of economic activity may
also differ from the effects on welfare: if displaced workers are freely mobile and
can easily find jobs elsewhere with competitive wages, their welfare losses are likely
to be small. Finally, local shocks also affect the welfare of landowners and the
profitability of local firms. The welfare incidence matters for policy. A progressive
government, for example, may care more about the welfare of the workers than that
of the landowners.
This chapter studies the local economic impacts of the contractions of a special
industry – the US military – on workers, landowners and firms. I focus on the post-
1Adam Smith (1776) notes that local economic links help workers and firms to specialize. Mar-
shall (1890) remarks that co-location of related industries promote productivity through economic
linkages. Recent studies on local economic spillover effects date back to the economic downturn in
the early 1980s when there were large demand shocks to the manufacturing industry in the United
States (Topel, 1986; Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000).
2Many existing studies estimate a local job multiplier, the additional jobs created or lost due
to exogenous changes in employment in one sector (e.g., Bartik, 1991; Blanchard and Katz, 1992;
Black et al., 2005; Moretti, 2010b).
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Reagan military personnel cuts between 1988 and 2000, a period during which the
size of the US military shrank by 30 percent.3 The bulk of the cuts took place in
locations hosting major military bases. Declining military presence reduces demand
for housing and local non-tradable goods, which drives down local housing prices
and the price of the non-tradable goods. Some non-tradable sector firms go out of
business. Meanwhile, an over-supply of workers relative to job opportunities drives
down local wages, and some households choose to leave the local economy in favor
of better economic opportunities. The relative strengths and net effects of these
intertwined channels depend on the parameters of the local economy and are the
interests of this empirical study.
There are two challenges to establishing the causal effect: the problems of
omitted variables and simultaneity. The omitted variables problem means that
there might be location-specific secular trends driven by local fundamentals that
may confound with military contractions. For example, if large military bases are
frequently located in places with faster economic growth, the effects of military
contractions will be under-estimated if the underlying economic trajectories are not
taken into consideration. Simultaneity would occur if, in deciding the size of military
contraction in each place, the Department of Defense (DoD) avoided large cuts in
places with unfavorable transitory shocks in order to minimize negative economic
impacts. Failing to correct for this simultaneity problem would also make the OLS
estimate biased downward.
I propose a shift-share instrumental variable to address the simultaneity prob-
lem. This type of instrument, also known as a Bartik instrument (Bartik, 1991), is
widely used in the related literature. The instrumental variable is the interaction
between the location’s historical military presence and the contemporaneous na-
tionwide contraction in military personnel. The instrument solves the simultaneity
problem as long as the national change is not driven by local idiosyncratic shocks
and historical military presence is uncorrelated with the transitory shocks. However,
this instrument does not solve the omitted variable problem because the historical
military presence and the secular trend are both functions of local fundamentals:
places with some unobserved advantages are likely to attract large military bases
3In a typical year without major wars, the Department of Defense (DoD) spends about 40
percent of its budget on compensation for military personnel, 30 percent on procurement, and the
rest on operational costs. During this period, all these components declined substantially. Section
2.7.2 uses variations in procurement as a robustness check.
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and have better trajectories of economic development. Therefore, the identification
of the causal effect using the shift-share instrument hinges on partialling out the
secular trend.
I use two different approaches to partial out the secular trend. In the first
approach, I include a host of pre-determined county characteristics as covariates.
This conventional approach is easy to implement but imposes restrictive parametric
assumptions and has the risk of mis-specifying the secular trend. In the second
approach, I use a non-parametric method similar to the synthetic control approach
used in Alberto Abadie and Hainmueller (2009). From a large pool of counties
without military bases that serve as potential comparisons, I construct for each
county with military bases a “synthetic control” that best matches the outcome
trajectories in the pre-treatment period. I use the synthetic control’s post-treatment
trajectories of the outcomes as the counterfactuals for counties with military bases.
This approach allows me to account for flexible secular trends without knowing their
exact functional forms.
The identification can be thought of as having two steps. The first involves
partialling out the secular trends, and the second estimates the partial equation
using the Bartik instrument. Potential mis-specification in the parametric approach
in the first step may still invalidate the Bartik instrument. I show in a simulation
exercise how mis-specified parametric models could lead to substantially biased es-
timates, while the synthetic control approach obtains estimates close to the true
value.
I find sizable effects of military personnel contractions on the levels of local
economic activities. I find that, over the 12-year period, cutting one military worker
results in the loss of 1.2 civilian jobs and 32,000 dollars in civilian earnings. The
effects are concentrated in the non-tradable sectors while the tradable sectors are
barely affected, a result often found in the related literature (e.g., Black et al., 2005).
I find a large migration response: on average 2.4 civilians leave the local economy for
every civilian job loss. The high migration response results in small impacts on local
wages but big impacts on rental prices. The average size of the impact in the sample
is equal to a reduction in the ratio of military personnel to the total local population
by one percentage point. This impact reduces local wages by 0.47 percent, or 141
dollars annually, and barely affects the civilian employment to population ratio. In
contrast, local rental prices drop by 1.3 percent.
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To understand the reduced-form results and calculate welfare impacts on the
stakeholders of the local economy, I incorporate a two-sector model in a simple spa-
tial equilibrium framework with workers, landowners, firms, and their interactions.
In the model, each location is a small open economy, and capital and labor mo-
bility are costless. Workers have heterogeneous preferences over locations so that
some do not move when real wages decline in the local economies where they reside.
There are two sectors in the local economy, producing tradable and non-tradable
goods, respectively, and workers are interchangeable between the two sectors. The
housing market is competitive. The model endogenously determines the local econ-
omy’s population, employment, wages, housing rental prices, and prices of local
non-tradable goods. Military personnel contractions reduce demand for local non-
tradable goods and housing. Intuitively, businesses and workers in the non-tradable
sectors are directly affected. Displaced workers can work in the tradable sector with
lower wages, or migrate out of the local economy for a more competitive wage. For
a particular shock, the welfare of workers depends on the flexibility of their location
choices and the technology used in the housing, tradable and non-tradable sectors.
The welfare of the landowners, on the other hand, depends on changes in rental
prices and local population.
To calculate welfare impacts, I first derive expressions for changes in welfare
for workers, landowners, and profits for firms as functions of military personnel
contractions. I then relate these expressions to the reduced-form estimates. The
welfare loss for workers is negligible: as a result of reducing the military personnel
to population ratio by one percentage point, workers’ utility drops by a mere 0.02
percent. In fact, the utility of the tradable firms increases by 0.3 percent thanks to
declining local wages. Landowners bear most of the welfare loss, as rental revenue
drops by 3.6%. This result is not surprising since the large migration response
suggests that the local labor supply is elastic, but it has different policy implications
than more conventional approach to assess welfare which only measures the local
economic impact via the change in the number of jobs.
Finally, I investigate how quickly local economies adjust to shocks. Using
a year-by-year panel estimation, I find that local economies respond to military
personnel contractions quickly. The accumulated effects on employment, earnings,
and businesses in the first two years after a particular military cut are close to the
magnitude of the accumulated effects over the 12-year period.
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This chapter has relevant policy implications. The DoD is the largest em-
ployer among all federal agencies. After a decade of expansions since 9/11, the US
military is again making substantial budget cuts. In general, the non-welfare part of
federal government spending is projected to decline (Congressional Budget Office,
2014). Many local communities that rely heavily on federal spending are concerned
that their local economies may be deeply affected. The findings in this chapter sug-
gest that workers and local economies exhibited substantial resilience during similar
shocks in the 1990s. The size of local economic activity might be smaller as demand
shrinks, but a smaller economy does not necessarily mean a worse one. On the other
hand, landowners are likely to be most negatively affected, as land cannot move and
housing stocks are slow to adjust.4
This chapter contributes to the literature on local economic dynamics due to
exogenous local shocks. Most existing studies estimate a “local job multiplier” based
on a partial equilibrium framework. Black et al. (2005) find that losing one job in
the coal mining industry causes the loss of 0.35 jobs in the service sector in the
same county. Moretti (2010b) finds that an additional job in the tradable sector
creates 1.6 jobs in the non-tradable sector in the same metropolitan area. Other
papers look at local employment impacts from other sources, such as Chodorow-
Reich et al. (2012); Wilson (2012); Serrato and Wingender (2014); Shoag (2012)
on the effects of government expenditure, and Autor et al. (2013) on the effects
of competition from China. The post-Reagan military personnel contractions were
among the largest declines in employment in a single industry in the US history
and arguably the largest cuts of government employment. The magnitude of the
employment impact found in this chapter falls within the range of existing studies.
A partial equilibrium framework may lead to incomplete understanding of
local economic impacts. To obtain a fuller picture, one needs to model all the
relevant local economic agents and their interactions (Bartik, 1991; Gottlieb and
Glaeser, 2008). New developments in spatial equilibrium models extend the Rosen-
Roback framework (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982,9) and allow for welfare analysis
on different agents (Moretti, 2010a; Kline and Moretti, 2014b). Using this type of
models, recent papers show that the welfare implications differ from those based on
partial equilibrium frameworks. Taking into consideration house price differences
4There is a recent strand of thought that recommends that depressed local economies “shrink
to greatness.” For example, one recipe for Detroit is for the city to restore functionality an area
suitable for the volume of its current economic activity (Glaeser, 2010).
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across metroplitan areas, Moretti (2013) shows that the real wage difference between
skilled and unskilled workers is smaller than would be indicated by using nominal
wages. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) argue that the durability of housing during
local economic downturns provides a natural safety net for residents who choose to
stay. Notowidigdo (2013) points out that government benefit programs that kick
in during times of local economic distress have a similar role. Diamond (2013), on
the other hand, argues that endogenous amenities lead to welfare impacts larger
than what nominal wages imply. This chapter adopts a similar framework to study
the case of military personnel contractions, where reductions in military presence
directly hit the non-tradable sector and the housing sector, and the effects spill ovev
to other sectors via the shared local labor market and people’s migration decisions.
Variation in military spending has been used in the macroeconomics literature
for estimating the fiscal multiplier at the national or subnational level (e.g., Naka-
mura and Steinsson, 2014; Barro and Redlick, 2011; Ramey and Shapiro, 1998).
Surprisingly, there are few studies on the impacts of military spending on local
economies. Guthrie (1995); Hooker and Knetter (2007); Hultquist and Petras (2012);
aus dem Moore and Spitz-Oener (2012) are among the few that study local impacts
of military personnel contractions. These papers focus on local labor market out-
comes and, in general, do not address potential endogeneity concerns.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the setting
and historical background. Section 2.3 presents the model. Section 2.4 describes
the empirical approach. Section 2.5 describes the data and the sample. Section
2.6 presents the empirical results, relates the model and the empirical results, and
calculates welfare impacts. Section 2.7 investigates how fast local economies adjust
to new equilibria. Section 2.8 summarizes the findings.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Military Personnel and Local Economies
The vast majority of military personnel live in or around military bases. In 1987, 353
major military bases in the US were located in 381 counties. The personnel located in
these counties accounted for over 90 percent of total US military personnel. These
counties are spread across the United States, from large coastal metropolises to
sparsely populated deserts. This geographic dispersion is partly due to national
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defense considerations: the military should be somewhat evenly distributed across
the territory such that it can quickly react to threats to national security. Economic
and other practical considerations also affect location choices for military bases.
For example, Naval bases must be close to large bodies of water, while testing and
training areas, due to their demand for large pieces of land, are often located in
places with low population density and low land values.
On average, counties with military bases (henceforth called “base counties”)
are larger and more densely populated than counties without military bases (“non-
base counties”). In 1980, base counties accounted for about 12 percent of the total
county-level jurisdictions in the United States, but contained about 50 percent of
the country’s population. Their economic performance was also better: private
sector employment in base counties grew by 22 percent between 1980 and 1987,
almost twice as much as it did in non-base counties. However, the differences in
averages mask important heterogeneity within each group. As the military bases
are located across the country, the local economies where they are located have
many different types of geographic and economic characteristics. It is therefore a
potential econometric concern that cuts in military personnel may be correlated
with the underlying characteristics of the local economy.
The presence of military bases generates three types of direct impact on the
local economy. First, local military bases employ civilian workers, many of whom
work on the bases. In 1990, the DoD employed almost one million civilian work-
ers, making it the largest employer of civilian workers among federal government
agencies.5 Second, the military bases create demand for goods and services from
local contractors. Third, military personnel create demand for housing and local
non-tradable goods. Military contractions directly reduce the demand for local la-
bor, non-tradable goods, and housing, which in turn affects other parts of the local
economy.6
2.2.2 Post-Reagan Military Contractions
The size of the military as measured by the number of men and women in uniform
in the United States has been declining since the end of WWII. This trend paused in
5The 2012 Statistical Abstract. Table 499. url: http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0499.pdf.
Last accessed in Oct, 2014.
6I ignore the effects on local labor supply of new veterans. I find that military personnel
contractions in the sample period do not increase the number of veterans in the county.
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the 1980s when the Reagan Administration significantly expanded military spending
while the number of military personnel stayed stable.7 Political gridlock in deciding
which military bases to cut contributed to the pause, as members of Congress and
local politicians viewed letting military bases be slashed in their jurisdictions under
their watch as political suicide.
By the end of the Reagan Administration, it became clear that military con-
tractions were necessary. The international geopolitical situation changed dramati-
cally in the late 1980s as the winding down of the Cold War prompted a reduction
in military capacity in the United States. Domestically, the federal fiscal situation
after large tax cuts and spending hikes throughout the Reagan Administration also
made military cuts necessary. To circumvent political gridlock, in 1988, the Base
Re-Alignment and Closure (BRAC) Act was passed. An independent commission
with members jointly nominated by the president and Congress became responsible
for selecting military installations to be re-aligned or permanently closed, based on
a list of the DoD’s recommendations. The BRAC insulated individual members of
Congress from the political penalties of potential shutdowns of military bases in
their jurisdictions. Military values and cost-saving were the main criteria for choos-
ing military bases to be re-aligned or closed, although potential economic impacts
were also an explicit consideration.8
The top graph in figure 2.1 shows the trajectory of the number of active
duty military personnel between 1975 and 2010. Over two-thirds of the 535 major
military bases were affected by the four rounds of BRAC in 1988, 1991, 1993, and
1995. Many bases that were not chosen for closure by the BRAC also experienced
substantial declines in personnel as parts of their operations were cut or moved. The
declining trend did not stop until the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.9 Between 1988
and 2000, the number of military personnel dropped by over 30 percent, discharging
about half a million military personnel. It was one of the largest negative shocks
generated by a single industry in the past 50 years of US history.10 I refer to this
7The expansion was mainly concentrated in military procurement for developing new weapons,
but the number of military personnel also stopped declining during this period.
8The military value under consideration includes the current and future mission capabilities,
operational readiness; the availabiity and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace; the
ability to accommodate contigency, mobilization, surge, etc.
9Although there was another round of BRAC in 2005, the size of active duty military personnel
has been fairly stable at around one million since 2000.
10A comparable figure is that between 1977 and 1987, the United States shed about 500,000 jobs
in the auto industry and 350,000 jobs in the steel industry (Feyrer et al., 2007).
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episode of military personnel contractions as “post-Reagan military contractions”.
The post-Reagan military contractions affected counties with military bases
since most military personnel were stationed in these counties. As the bottom graph
of figure 2.1 shows, between 1990 and 2000, the number of military personnel in base
counties dropped from 1.47 million to 1.05 million, a 28.5 percent decline. In these
counties, the military personnel to population ratio dropped from 2.61 percent in
1988 to 1.68 percent in 2000. In contrast, the non-base counties saw negligible
military personnel contractions, as military personnel dropped slightly from 0.11
percent of the population in 1988 to 0.08 percent of the population in 2000. To
estimate the effects of military personnel contractions on local economies, I focus
on base counties. The non-base counties, with negligible military presence, serve as
potential comparisons.
Although not a priority, the potential impact on local economies was an ex-
plicit consideration for the DoD and the BRAC Commission in deciding where to cut
military personnel and by how much. During the process of deciding which bases
would be closed or realigned, objections from local communities citing economic
concerns were numerous, and there were indeed cases in which the BRAC Commis-
sion rejected large cuts proposed by the DoD due to local economic concerns.11 In
addition, considerations not directly related to local labor market conditions, such
as cost-saving considerations and military values, can be confounded with economic
outcomes. For example, since good labor market conditions drive up local prices, if
other factors remain constant, shrinking the military presence in these areas would
lead to sizable savings for the DoD. These explicit and implicit considerations for
local economic conditions raise concerns about the endogeneity of military personnel
contractions.
2.3 A Spatial Equilibrium Model
2.3.1 Overview
In order to describe the effects of military personnel contractions on local economies,
this section presents a spatial equilibrium model of local economies. The model
11For example, the proposed closure of the submarine base in New London, CT, was rejected by
the 2005 BRAC Commission partly because “[...] the Commission found the argument of overall
economic impact compelling”. (2005 BRAC Commission Report to the President)
14
serves three purposes. First, it describes the mechanisms through which military
personnel contractions affect various stakeholders in the local economy. Second, its
equilibrium conditions suggest a vector of outcomes of interest, which I will estimate
empirically in sections 2.4 through 2.6. Third, it allows me to derive expressions for
welfare changes of the stakeholders in the local economy, which I bring to the data
in section 2.6.4.
This model adapts from the framework for local labor market equilibrium in
Kline and Moretti (2014b). The model features many locations. Each location is
a small open economy in which households, landowners, and firms interact with
each other.12 Capital is elastically supplied nationwide. The key feature of this
framework is that the households, besides deriving utility from consumption, have
heterogeneous preferences over locations. Shocks to the local economy will be in-
framarginal for some households with strong preferences for the locality in making
migration decisions. These households will therefore bear the full welfare conse-
quences of changes in local wage, price, and rent. This feature distinguishes this
kind of model from the standard Rosen-Roback framework (Rosen, 1979; Roback,
1982,9) where workers are perfectly mobile, and migration fully arbitrages differ-
ences in local real wages across locations.
Military personnel contractions directly reduce the demand for locally-traded
goods, but nationally-traded goods are not directly affected. In order to model
this, I extend this framework by introducing a simple two-sector model. Firms in
the non-tradable sector, facing a competitive market, produce goods and services
that are traded within the local economy. The equilibrium of non-tradable goods is
obtained within the local economy with the local price endogeneously determined.
Each firm in the tradable sector produces a differentiated good that is sold in the
national market. Firms in the tradable sector are indirectly affected by the military
personnel contractions through changes in the conditions of the local labor market
they share with firms in the non-tradable sector. Introducing a two-sector model in
the spatial equilibrium framework thus adds an inter-sectoral wedge in local labor
supply besides the wedge generated by migration.13
12Landowners are assumed to be absent. Throughout the chapter, the term “household” is
interchangeable with the term “worker”.
13Kovak (2013) includes a local non-tradable sector in the analysis of trade shocks on local
economies. But his model does not allow heterogeneity in preference for locations. Yoon (2014)
builds a two-sector model with idiosyncratic individual preference over locations in a dynamic
model of location choices. Unlike the model introduced in this chapter, the changes in sectoral
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2.3.2 Household Problem
Each household i chooses where to live and how much to consume. Households
consume tradable and non-tradable goods and housing. Households all have the
same productivity and each provides one unit of labor inelastically.14 For a household





uic = lnAc + αlnhic + βlnXNic + (1− α− β)lnXTic + eic,
s.t., rchic + pcXNic + pTX
T
i = wc
where Ac is the dollar value of amenities in location c, which are freely available
to all its residents. hic, XNic , and XTic are, respectively, the amount of housing, the
amount of non-tradable goods, and the amount of the tradable goods consumed by









where j ∈ J is one variety of the partially substitutable tradable goods, and σT > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.15 pT is the price of the
composite tradable good, which is standardized to 1. Both rental price, rc, and non-
tradable goods price, pc, are determined by local housing and non-tradable goods
markets equilibria and differ across locations. The utility is in the Cobb-Douglas
form. α, β, and 1 − α − β represent the shares of income spent on housing, non-
composition are driven by nationwide factor-biased technological change in the two sectors.
14Appendix B.1 provides a simple extension of the household problem that allows for unemploy-
ment. In that extension, each household independently draws an idiosyncratic utility from leisure
(or distaste for work). The labor force participation decision is binary and is made by comparing
utility from working and that from not working. The local unemployment rate is thus determined
by the marginal worker who is indifferent between working and not. Given the same distribution
of idiosyncratic preference for leisure, the local unemployment rate is in turn determined by the
local real wage level. Local unemployment rates differ only because local real wage rates differ. In
the empirical section, I find that there is no effect on local unemployment rates, which suggests
that inelastic supply of labor is not a restrictive assumption here.
15This constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand function is widely used in the labor and
trade literature. σT > 1 indicates that xj and xj′ are substitutes. See Suarez-Serrato and Zidar
(2014) for a recent application in the spatial general equlibrium framework.
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tradable goods, and tradable goods, respectively.
eic is the idiosyncratic utility household i derives from living in location c. eic
is assumed to be i.i.d and follows a type I extreme value distribution with dispersion
σW .16 Solving the household’s problem, household i’s indirect utility from living in
location c is
vic = uc + eic (2.1)
uc, which is equal to a0 + lnwc − αlnrc − βlnpc + lnAc is the deterministic term
common to each household that lives in location c, where a0 is a constant. uc can
be also thought of as a measure of real wages adjusted for local living expenses and
amenities.
Each household chooses a location to live in such that vic is maximized. The








Denote c′ as a location other than location c. aC = ln
∑
c′ exp(uc′/σ
W ), which is
a constant. Local population is determined by the local real wage and the distri-
bution of preference across locations. The inverse of the dispersion of idiosyncratic
preference across locations, 1/σW , is the elasticity of local labor supply with respect
to local real wages uc. Intuitively, if σW is large, households have strong preferences
over different locations, and local labor supply is inelastic. After a negative shock,
as many households do not migrate out of the local economy, real wages drop and
the remianing households bear a large share of the welfare loss. In equilibrium, lo-
cal real wages can vary substantially across locations. Alternatively, if σW is small,
households do not have strong preferences across locations, and local labor supply
is elastic. After a negative shock, local real wages do not change by much in the
new equilibrium and neither does the welfare of the remaining households.
2.3.3 Housing Market
The Cobb-Douglas utility function predicts that each household spends a constant
share α of its income on housing; local residents’ total spending on housing is Ncαwc.
16The CDF is F (eic) = exp(−exp(−(eic)/σW ))
17See Appendix B.2 for derivation.
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Denote mHc > 1 as the demand shift due to the military presence.18 The aggregate




The housing sector in location c has productivity κc. Housing supply in lo-
cation c responds positively to local rental price but is restricted by geographic





The local housing market equilibrium is obtained by combining equation 2.3
and equation 2.4 and can be expressed in log forms
(1 + ηc)lnrc = lnNc + lnwc + lnmHc + aH , (2.5)
where aH = lnα − lnκc. Equation 2.5 is intuitive: the local rental price is higher
when the local population (Nc) is larger, local wage (wc) is higher, households spend
a larger share of income on housing (α), and when housing is hard to produce either
because of natural or policy restrictions (low ηc) or low productivity (low κc).
2.3.4 Local Businesses
2.3.4.1 Firms in the Tradable Sector
Each firm in the tradable sector produces one variety of good j ∈ J . Since all
j’s are symmetric, without loss of generality, I assume that there is only one firm
producing durable goods in location c and it produces one particular variety j. The
production function is in the Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns to scale and
labor’s share equal to hT . It is written as
18mHc is modeled as multiplicative to the demand generated by local residents for tractability of
the model. To be consistent with the model, in the empirical part, military presence is specified







where BTc is the total factor productivity.
In a world of differentiated goods, each firm is a monopolistic competitor in
the national market. It faces a downward sloping demand curve and earns a positive







where Ij is the nation’s total spending on xj, which is a constant; σT > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, and pj is the national price for
j. Since j is only one of many varieties in the tradable goods market, changes in
the production of xj do not affect the price of the composite tradable good, which






πj = pjxj − wcNTc − ρKTc . (2.8)
Solving this problem, labor demand in the tradable sector is19
lnNTc = [(1− hT )(σT − 1)− σT ]lnwc + aTL. (2.9)
As a standard result of the CES production function, the log profit can be expressed
as
lnπj = lnϕj + (σT − 1)[lnBTc − hT lnwc − (1− hT )lnρ], (2.10)
where ϕj is a constant.
19aTL is a constant. Appendix B.3 provides detailed derivations for the problem of the firms in
the tradable sector.
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2.3.4.2 Firms in the Non-tradable Sector
Firms producing non-tradable goods face a competitive market.20 Each firm’s






where BNc is the total factor productivity of the local non-tradable sector. The firm
is a price-taker, while the output price is determined by the equilibrium of local









1−hN − wcNNc − ρKNc . (2.12)




c + (1− hN)lnwc − (1− hN)lnρ+ aNX . (2.13)







20The assumption that the firms producing tradable goods are monopolistic competitors while
the firms producing non-tradable goods are perfectly competitive rests on both economic and
technical explanations. Economically, the differentiable goods in the tradable sector are a result
of the consumer’s “love for variety.” On the other hand, firms in the non-tradable sector are often
small-scale service establishments that provide homogeneous services and fit the environment of
perfect competition. Technically, in order to close the model, I need to specify these market
structures for both sectors. If the firm in the tradable sector earns zero profit, its labor demand
is flexibly adjusted such that the total local labor supply will not change after the shock. This
is because local labor is supplied relatively more inelastically than capital. A firm in a perfectly
competitive market facing exogenously given prices accommodates changes in labor supply by
freely adjusting its capital input. In order to generate labor mobility across regions, I need to
introduce a wedge such that the firm in the tradable sector faces other restrictions in adjusting its
production.
21Detailed steps for the solution of this problem, as well as other conditions for the non-tradable
sector listed below, are included in Appendix B.4.
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where β is the share of income spent on non-tradable goods. βwc/pc is the amount
of non-tradable goods demanded by each civilian household. mHc > 1 is the demand
shifter for the non-tradable goods, generated by the military presence in the local
economy.
The market for the non-tradable goods is cleared within the local economy
lnNNc − lnNc = hN lnwc + lnmHc − lnpc + aNL. (2.15)
Finally, the zero profit condition in the non-tradable sector yields
hN lnwc = lnpc + bN . (2.16)
2.3.5 Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium of the local economy can be described in 5 equations: (1) local
labor supply in equation 2.2, (2) local housing market equilibrium in equation 2.5,
(3) labor demand in the tradable sector in equation 2.9, (4) labor demand in the
non-tradable sector in equation 2.15, (5) zero profit condition for firms in the non-
tradable sector in equation 2.16. We are interested in the effects of changes in
military presence, ∆mHc , ∆mNc , on other outcome variables, differentiating these
equlibrium conditions yields
σW∆lnNc = ∆lnwc − α∆lnrc − β∆lnpc (2.17)
(1 + ηc)∆lnrc = ∆lnNc + ∆lnwc + ∆lnmHc (2.18)
∆lnNTc = [(1− hT )(σT − 1)− σT ]∆lnwc (2.19)
∆lnNNc −∆lnNc = hN∆lnwc + ∆lnmNc −∆lnpc (2.20)
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hN∆lnwc = ∆lnpc. (2.21)
2.3.6 Welfare Impacts
In this subsection I derive expressions for the impacts of military personnel contrac-
tions on the welfare of workers, landowners, and firms in the tradable sector.22
2.3.6.1 Workers/Households
Figure 2.2 illustrates the impacts on workers as the local real wage (uc) drops.
The horizontal axis represents the whole population of the nation, aligned by in-
creasing eic, household i’s preference for location c, from left to right. The vertical
axis shows the utility of household i living in location c or somewhere else c′.
The solid upward sloping line shows that the utility of living in location c
increases with eic. The downward sloping line in dash-dots shows that the utility
of living somewhere else drops as eic increases. The intersection of the two lines
determines the marginal household, with eic = e∗ic, which is indifferent between
either location. Every household that has eic > e∗ic chooses to live in location c.
Location c has a population equal to 1− F (e∗ic) = Nc, where F (·) is the cumulative
distribution function for eic.
Now consider a decline in uc to u′c due to military personnel contractions. The
new utility of living in c as a function of eic moves down to the dashed line. Some
households originally living in location c that have eic just above e∗ic will migrate
out. The new marginal household, with the idiosyncratic preference for location e∗∗ic ,
will be determined by the intersection of the dash-dotted line and the dashed line.
Population in location c drops to 1− F (e∗∗ic ) = N ′c.
Households that migrate and those that stay bear different welfare incidences.
Households that choose to migrate out of location c have idiosyncratic preferences
such that eic ∈ (e∗ic, e∗∗ic ). These households suffer from a loss in utility, as they have
to move to a less desirable location. For the household with eic = e∗ic, welfare loss
is zero; for the household with eic = e∗∗ic , the loss is equal to ∆uc = uc − u′c; for
households with e∗ic < eic < e∗∗ic , the welfare loss is somewhere in between. ∆lnNc
22Firms in the non-tradable earn zero profit, so they do not bear welfare incidence.
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share of location c’s original residents choose to leave. The total loss for movers is
illustrated in the graph as area B, which can be approximated by ∆lnNc · ∆uc/2.
Households that have idiosyncratic preferences for location c such that eic > e∗∗ic
choose to stay. Each of these households bears a drop in utility that is equal to
∆uc. (1 − ∆lnNc) share of residents choose to stay. The total welfare loss for
remaining households is illustrated in the graph as area A and can be expressed as
(1−∆lnNc) ·∆uc. The total welfare change for households can be approximated as




Recall that ∆uc = ∆lnwc − α∆lnrc − β∆lnpc, and plug in equation 2.21 for ∆lnpc.
We have the welfare change for workers
∆V W = (1− 1
2
∆lnNc) · [(1− βhN)∆lnwc − α∆lnrc] (2.22)
2.3.6.2 Landowners
The welfare change for landowners is equal to the change in aggregate rents
∆V H = ∆ln(rcHc)=∆lnrc + ∆lnHc, (2.23)
where Hc is the number of equilibrium housing units.
2.3.6.3 Firms in the Tradable Sector
The welfare change for the firm in the tradable sector is the change of its profit
(equation 2.10)
∆V T = ∆lnπj = −(σT − 1)hT∆lnwc. (2.24)
Notice that −(σT − 1)hT < 0, the firm in the tradable sector gains from a negative
demand shock to the non-tradable sector, since local labor becomes cheaper.
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2.3.7 Implication for Empirical Study
The model provides guidance for empirical studies. The equilibrium conditions
and welfare implications suggest a vector of outcomes of interest {∆lnpc, ∆lnwc,
∆lnrc, ∆lnHc, ∆lnNc, ∆lnNNc , ∆lnNTc ,∆Hc}.23 We investigate all these out-
comes in the empirical section. The model also involves a vector of parameters
{α, β, hT , hN , σT , σW , ηc}. I borrow from the macro-level data and existing studies
to determine the values of these parameters whenever they are used.
2.4 Econometric Approach
2.4.1 Estimation Model
The impacts of the post-Reagan military personnel contractions on local economic
outcomes over the period of 1988 and 2000 can be modelled empirically as
∆ykc = βk∆milc + ∆ξkc. (2.25)
∆milc = milc,2000 −milc,1988 is the change in military presence in county c, where
milc,t = Milct/Popc,1980 is the number of military personnel in county c in year t
scaled by its population in 1980, such that the impact is always proportional to the
size of the local economy. Since population is also an outcome variable of interest,
I use population data from 8 years prior to the cuts to avoid possible endogene-
ity. 1980 is also a census year, so the population count is more accurate and the
division error is reduced. ∆ykc = ykc,2000 − ykc,1988 is the change in outcome k of
county c.24 yk may represent each of the following: (1) civilian employment di-
vided by 1980 population, empc = Empc/Popc,1980; (2) earnings divided by 1980
population, incc = Incc/Popc,1980; (3) civilian population divided by 1980 popula-
tion, popc = CivPopc/Popc,1980; (4) log median rental price, lnrc; (5) private sector
business establishments divided by 1980 population, estc = Estc/Popc,1980; (6) log
average county wage, lnwc; (7) occupied housing units divided by 1980 population,
hc = Hc/Popc,1980; (8) civilian employment by sector s divided by 1980 population,
empsc = Empsc/Popc,1980. These are the outcomes of interest as suggested by the
23We do not observe price for local non-tradable good pc, but it can be handily expressed by a
function using equation 2.21.
24Some outcomes are measured between 1990 and 2000.
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model in section 2.3.
∆ξkc is the composite error term that includes everything other than military
personnel contractions that affects the dependent variable. I separate it into two
components,
∆ξkc = ∆γkλc + ∆εkc.
The first term captures the secular trend of outcome k determined by time-invariant
county characteristics λc. The term ∆γkλc exists in this long-differenced specifica-
tion when there are location-specific trends in the outcome variables. For example,
a county with a seaport is likely to be on a different labor market trajectory from
a county in the desert. ∆εkc captures other unobservable contemporaneous shocks
pertinent to the outcome. An example for ∆εkc is a weather shock in the period
when the long difference is taken. I assume that ∆γkλc and ∆εkc are orthogonal to
each other.
Both λc and ∆εkc are potentially unobservable. The OLS estimation of equa-
tion 2.25 can be biased since both ∆γkλc and ∆εkc can be endogenous, though for
different reasons. The first is a omitted variable problem. Location choices for mili-
tary bases are not random; particular locational characteristics both attract military
bases and affect trends in economic performance. Larger cuts in military person-
nel are also concentrated in places with large military bases, so if these places are
growing at a different rate, ∆γkλc and ∆milc can be correlated. The second is a
simultaneity problem. The DoD may avoid large cuts in places experiencing unfa-
vorable idiosyncratic shocks in order to minimize the economic and political cost of
military contractions, so ∆εkc and ∆milc can be correlated.
When locational characteristics have no effect on the outcome variable or the
effects are time-invariant such that long-differencing cancels out the effects, ∆γkλc =
0. In this case, we can use a simple instrument to address the simultaneity problem.
The instrumental variable I propose is the shift-share predictor widely used in the
literature.25 Specifically, I instrument the actual cut in military personnel in each
location with the product of its pre-determined military presence and the size of the
25Also known as the Bartik instrument due to Bartik 1991.
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nation-wide cut. That is




where milc,1987 = Milc,1987/Popc,1980 is the military personnel to population ra-
tio in county c the year before the post-Reagan military contractions. NtlMilt
is the total number of military personnel nationwide in year t. (NtlMil2000 −
NtlMil1988)/NtlMil1988 is the percent change in nationwide military personnel be-
tween 1988 and 2000. Therefore, the instrumental variable is the predicted size of
military personnel contractions in county c had the DoD adopted a simple rule of
cutting military personnel everywhere by the same proportion. The instrument is
valid as long as neither the pre-determined military presence nor the national trend
is correlated with the idiosyncratic shock ∆εkc. The nationwide military cuts were
unlikely to be driven by local economic shocks in some particular locations. The
post-Reagan military contractions were motivated by national political and fiscal
situations, and each location is small compared with the whole nation.26
The instrument is invalid when ∆γkλc 6= 0 because ∆milIVc can be correlated
with ∆γkλc. To see this more clearly, notice that since the second term of ∆milIVi
is the same for all observations in the long-difference equation, the variation in the
instrument only comes frommilc,1987 (denote as ∆milIV
′
c ), which might be correlated
with λc. For example, the fact that Washington, DC is the capital city (λc), leads
to both large presence of military personnel (milc,1987) and the fact that it attracts
private sector economic activities seeking political connection, and thus the city has
promising trends in economic performance (∆γkλc). Therefore, the instrument is
only valid conditional on the county-specific secular trend ∆γkλc.27
I use two approaches to partial out the county-specific secular trends. First,
in a standard approach, I include observable pre-determined county characteristics
in equation 2.25 in place of ∆γkλc. That is, I estimate the following equation by
26I test for this possibility in the Appendix by excluding local economies that were most likely
to have influenced national policy. The results are robust.
27In general, the Bartik instrument based on pre-determined sectoral composition can be corre-
lated with time-invariant local fundamentals. As long as the effects of the fundamentals are not
constant, differencing or controlling for location dummies cannot get rid of their effects, making
the Bartik instrument invalid and the two-stage least squares estimate inconsistent. This point is
worth stressing since many papers that use the Bartik instrument do not make this assumption
explicit.
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the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator using ∆milIV ′c as the instrument for ∆milc
∆ykc = βk∆milc + Xkc · γk + εkc. (2.27)
Each observation in the regression is a county with military bases in 1987. Xkc is
a vector of pre-determined county characteristics.28 The identifying assumption is
that the choice of the pre-determined characteristics correctly specifies the secular
trends. This approach has a few limitations. First, it imposes parametric assump-
tions: it assumes that secular trends in all counties can be described by the same
data-generating process. Since military bases are spread across the United States
in all kinds of economic and geographic situations, a single data-generating process
may fail to work for every county. More importantly, the paucity of information on
county characteristics which I collect from population censuses and County Busi-
ness Patterns may fail to correctly specify the secular trends, which may lead to
inconsistent estimates.
2.4.2 A Generalized Synthetic Control Approach
In this subsection, I propose an alternative approach in order to partial out secular
trends. This non-parametric approach eliminates ∆γkλc by constructing a counter-
factual based on a large number of counties that did not have military bases in 1987.
The idea is simple: since there was little change in the size of the military presence
between 1980 and 1987 (see figure 2.1), the changes in outcome variables were on
average driven by the secular trends. If I can find for each base county a comparison
county with the same trajectories of the outcome variables in the period prior to the
treatment, I can use the comparison county’s outcomes in the period of treatment
28These variables are constructed from various data sources including population censuses, Re-
gional Economic Accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, County Business Patterns, and
County Data Books. X includes state dummies and metropolitan status; civilian employment,
earnings level (scaled by 1980 population) and growth from 1980 to 1987; log median housing price
in 1980, 1990, and their difference; number of private business establishments (scaled by 1980
population) and growth from 1980 and 1987; demographic (racial, educational, age) and industrial
(2-digit sectors) composition in the latest available year; and other social and economic indicators
such as crime rate, number of physicians per 10,000 people, population density, road density, area,
and terrain. When appropriate, X also includes the quadratic forms of all aforementioned vari-
ables. I alternatively use a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach to select the most relevant
covariates (Hoeting et al., 1999). The results from using X and those from the BMA are very
similar.
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to represent the secular trends of the county with military bases.
The comparison is constructed as the weighted average of non-base counties.
Formally, denote c ∈ I as a base county, and j ∈ J as a non-base county. For each





Note that there is no k subscript for the weights as the same set of weights should
match the secular trend of any outcome variable k. This means that the constructed
comparison county is the same in the pre-treatment period in all dimensions of
interest. The weights are well behaved in the sense that they are bounded between
0 and 1 (wcj ∈ [0, 1], ∀c, j) and sum up to 1 (
∑
j wcj =1).
Equation 2.28 is the identification assumption, as we do not observe λc. In








Z is a vector of variables for which the distance is minimized. Z includes the pre-
treatment trajectories of the local economic conditions.29
The underlying identification assumption is that by matching on the pre-
treatment trajectories of the outcome variables, we are capturing the underlying
mechanisms of the secular trends. This approach makes no assumption about the
underlying determinants of the secular trends, and it allows for arbitrary functional
forms of secular trends for each base county.
This approach is similar in spirit to the synthetic control method (?). In the
standard synthetic control approach, a counterfactual, called the synthetic control,
is constructed based on the past trajectory of the outcome variable up to the period
of treatment. The treatment effect is obtained by subtracting the outcome of the
29I pick the important outcome variables as predicted by the model. Specifically, these vari-
ables are (Empc,1984 − Empc,1980)/Popc,1980, (Empc,1987 − Empc,1980)/Popc,1980, (Incc,1984 −
Incc,1980)/Popc,1980, (Incc,1987 − Incc,1980)/Popc,1980, rc,1990 − rc,1980, phc,1990 − phc,1980. In fact,
the results are robust to alternative set of predictors. All the predictors are given the same weight
in the loss function. The results are quantitatively similar when the inverse of standard deviation
is used as weights. As in all matching-based methods, there is a tradeoff between the number of
variables to be matched on and the average matching quality for each variable.
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synthetic control from the real outcome. I extend this approach in three important
dimensions. First, instead of focusing on one outcome variable, I match on a vector
of outcome variables. Second, the synthetic control assumes that the treatment is
binary and exogenous, while in this case the treatment is continuous and endoge-
nous. Third, the standard synthetic control model has only one or a small number
of treated units; here I have hundreds, so I pool pairs of base counties and their
synthetic controls and estimate using weighted 2SLS. Despite the differences, with
some abuse of the terminology, I call this way of constructing comparing groups a
“synthetic control approach”.
This approach has a few advantages over the first approach, which simply
includes pre-determined covariates. First, this non-parametric approach allows for
a county-specific secular trend for each treated unit, which is more flexible than
parametric specifications. Since military bases are located in virtually all types of
counties, the individual matching approach is arguably more precise than pooled
regressions. Second, by constructing a counterfactual based on the trajectories of
outcome variables in the pre-treatment period, the chance of mis-specification is
lower. In this case, mis-specifying the covariates not only reduces the precision
of the estimation, but also invalidates the instrument and results in inconsistent
estimates. In Appendix C, I show using a simulation exercise that mis-specifying
the secular trend in a parametric way leads to large biases, while non-parametric
matching based on pre-treatment trajectories of outcome variables leads to reduced
bias in a finite sample. Finally, this approach finds a synthetic county that is similar
in many important dimensions of interest, which is conceptually consistent with a
“counterfactual” county.
I denote a county group g as the collection of the base county and the counties
making up its synthetic control, and estimate the following equation using Weighted
Two-Stage Least Squares estimator
∆ykhg = βk∆milhg + θg + εkhg, (2.30)





where county h ∈ I ∪ J is either a base county or a non-base county and θg is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if county h belongs to county group g. I use
weights from the synthetic control and assign counties with military bases weights
equal to 1. Each county group thus has a total weight equal to 2. ∆milIV ′h = milh,1987
is used as the instrumental variable for ∆milIVhg .
The standard errors of estimating equation 2.30 should be adjusted for mul-
tiple reasons. First, a non-base county can be used multiple times as parts of the
synthetic control for different base counties. Second, the fact that a base county
and its synthetic control had similar secular trends suggests that they are likely to
be affected by similar shocks. Finally, estimation of equation 2.30 involves using
weights in the synthetic control that are constructed from a previous step. Stan-
dard errors should be adjusted to reflect the uncertainty in the the way the weights
are constructed. I report two sets of standard errors. First, I cluster the standard
errors by county (h) and county group (g), using the multi-way clustering technique
proposed by Cameron et al. (2011). The two-way clustered standard errors uti-
lize the prior knowledge about the error structure, but do not take into account of
the uncertainty of the synthetic control approach in the first step. Alternatively, I
bootstrap the whole procedure to conduct statistical inferences.30 The bootstrapped
standard errors incorporate variability from the construction of the weights, but can
be less efficient since it does not fully incorporate prior knowledge about the error
structure. Nevertheless, both methods give very similar statistical inference.
To illustrate this novel identification strategy that combines synthetic control
and weighted 2SLS, figure 2.3 shows the case of San Diego County, which has the
largest number of military personnel in the United States. The four panels in figure
30One complete procedure includes (1) re-sampling with replacement separately for the sample
of base counties and the sample of non-base counties, (2) constructing synthetic controls for each
base county from the pseudo-sample of the non-base counties, and (3) estimating equation 2.30 and
clustering the standard error by county group and county. The standard error from the bootstrap-
se procedure is the standard deviation of the estimated coefficients from bootstrapped pseudo-
samples. Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrapping fails for simple nearest neighbor
matching. The intuition is that, by restricting the closest comparison units to a fixed small
number, bootstrapping fails to generate meaningfully different pseudo-samples. They conjecture
that bootstrapping works for kernel density matching since it allows somewhat different comparison
units to enter the sample, though the convergence rate is slower. My approach is similar in spirit to
kernel density matching in the sense that more similar comparison units are given higher weights
and less similar comparison units are given smaller weights. In Appendix D, I show Monte Carlo
simulation evidence that bootstrapping leads to a rejection rate that is close to the true rate. In
Appendix D, I also compare statistical inferences based on the bootstrap-se procedure and that
based on the bootstrap-t procedure.
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2.3 show changes in military presence and changes in civilian employment, total
civilian earnings, civilian population, and private business establishments for both
San Diego and “synthetic San Diego”, with the levels in 1980 standardized to 1.
Between 1980 and 1987, the ratio of military personnel to 1980 population in San
Diego stayed at around 0.08. This number gradually dropped to below 0.06 in 2000.
Synthetic San Diego, on the other hand, had military presence close to zero through-
out the period. San Diego and its synthetic control exhibit similar trajectories in
all four sequences before 1988. After 1988, San Diego experienced slower growth in
employment, earnings, population, and the number of business establishments than
its synthetic control. The difference between the changes in outcome variables in
San Diego and in its synthetic control is attributed to the net changes of military
presence in San Diego. Any possible correlation between the size of military cut and
idiosyncratic shocks is addressed by using the Bartik instrument.31
Figure 2.3 shows that the synthetic control for San Diego closely resembles San
Diego in pretreatment trends. In table 2.1, I report the overall quality of synthetic
controls for all base-counties. Each row shows the changes in the outcomes of interest
prior to the military cuts. Column 1 reports the changes for base counties, and
column 2 reports the changes for non-base counties. On average, base counties were
on a better growth path than non-base counties, prior to the cuts. For example,
between 1980 and 1987, civilian employment grew by 19 percent in base counties,
and only 11 percent in non-base counties. Column 4 reports the p−value for the
differences between column 1 and column 2, which shows that the differences are
always statistically significant at the 1% level. Column 3 shows that the weighted
averages of the synthetic counties are very similar to those of the base counties
(column 1); the differences are statistically insignificant at any conventional levels,
regardless of whether the comparison is made on average (column 5) or within each
county pair (column 6).
31Mathematically, the weighted 2SLS estimation of equation 2.30 is equivalent to estimating the
following equation (∆ykc −
∑
j wcj∆ykj) = βk(∆milc −
∑







j ) as the instrument. Each observation is a county with military
bases. Estimating this equation gives results very similar to those from equation 2.30.
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2.5 Data and Sample
This chapter uses multiple sources of publicly available data. This section briefly
introduces data sources and the construction of the main sample. Appendix A has
a more detailed description of how the key variables are constructed.
2.5.1 Data
The Department of Defense (DoD) publishes the distribution of military bases in its
annual Base Structural Report (BSR). The BSR from 1989 reports a snapshot of 535
major military bases with at least 250 personnel as of February 1988, eight months
before the enactment of the Base Re-alignment and Closure Act. The geographic
boundaries for most of these military bases are obtained from a digitalized map
called “Military Installations, Ranges, and Training Areas Boundaries”, prepared by
the DoD and published as part of the National Transit Database in 2011. For the
remaining bases, I searched for historical maps as well as web resources including
Google Maps and Wikipedia to determine their location and boundaries. I then
overlaid the GIS map with the 1989 military bases onto a GIS map of US counties
from 1990 Census. I consider a base county to be any county in which at least parts
of its territory intersect with a military base.
The number of military personnel by county in each year comes from the
Regional Economic Accounts (REA) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
a panel dataset at the county level with annual local economic characteristics. The
REA collects data from another DoD annual publication called the Distribution of
Personnel, which gives detailed information on DoD employees on military bases and
in major cities and converts this into the number of military personnel by county.32
The outcomes of interest in this chapter capture aspects of the size of the
population, and changes in the strengths of the local labor market, local housing
market, and local businesses. County population counts are county-level tabulations
of decennial censuses, with the number in non-census years interpolated. The REA
also reports employment and earnings by 2-digit sectors, from which I calculate total
civilian sector employment and earnings. County median rental prices and units of
32The Distribution of Personnel reports both military personnel and civilian employees who
work on bases. Unfortunately, the REA only separately reports the number of military personnel.
Civilian employees of the DoD are grouped into a broader category called federal civilian workers.
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occupied housing also come from county-level tabulations of decennial population
censuses. These variables are based on self-reported values of individual households
responding to the census. The annual number of private business establishments by
2-digit sectors comes from County Business Patterns.
2.5.2 Sample
This chapter treats counties as local economies since they are the level of aggregation
for most of the key variables used in this chapter.33 Due to concerns that military
personnel contractions can spillover across county borders, in one of the robustness
checks I use commuting zones as the alternative definition of local economies.
The REA groups some neighboring small counties into new county-level units.
Throughout the chapter I use the REA definition of counties and convert county-
level variables from other sources accordingly. To avoid cases in which the military
is the only economic activity, I drop counties that had fewer than 5,000 civilians in
1980. I further drop about 10 percent of base counties that actually experienced
increases in military presence between 1988 and 2000. Since the effects can be
asymmetric for expansions,34 dropping a small number of counties that experienced
expansions helps with the interpretation of the estimation results. The final sample
has 335 base counties. There are also 2,429 non-base counties prior to matching.
2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 Comparing Specifications
I estimate various specifications of the baseline model in equation 2.25 and equation
2.30, with and without using the Bartik instrument. Table 2.2 reports these esti-
mates using changes in civilian employment between 1988 and 2000 as the outcome
variable. Since both the outcome variable and the key explanatory variable ∆milc,
the 1988-2000 change in military personnel, are scaled by the 1980 population, the
coefficient associated with ∆milc can be conveniently interpreted as the number of
33Existing studies have used various definitions of local economies, including counties (e.g., Black
et al., 2005), commuting zones (e.g., Autor et al., 2013), metropolitan areas (e.g., Moretti, 2010b),
and states (e.g., Blanchard and Katz, 1992).
34For example, Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Notowidigdo (2013) explain why positive shocks
and negative shocks have asymmetric effects.
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civilian jobs lost that is associated with cutting one military person.
I first estimate equation 2.27 using OLS on a sample of only base counties.
I control for a vector of pre-determined county-level economic and demographic
characteristics. The results are reported in column 1 of table 2.2, which shows that
cutting one military worker is associated with losing 0.8 jobs in the civilian sector.
The estimate is statistically significant at 1% level. The OLS estimate may be
inconsistent due to simultaneity bias and omitted variable bias. If the DoD avoided
large cuts in counties with negative idiosyncratic shocks, or counties experiencing
large cuts had otherwise faster economic growth, the OLS estimate is likely to be
biased downwards. Column 2 estimates the same equation as in column 1 but uses
the initial military presence (∆milIV ′c ) as the instrument for the change in number of
military personnel. The estimated coefficient is 1.2, and it is statistically significant
at the 1% level. The first stage is strong with F statistics of about 60. Consistent
with the hypothesized source of endogeneity, the 2SLS estimate is larger than the
OLS estimate, although a simple Hausman test shows that the difference is not
statistically significant.35
If the covariates included in the regression in column 1 and column 2 mis-
specify the secular trend, the estimates could still suffer from omitted variable bias
and the instrumental variable would be invalid. Column 3 in table 2.2 uses the gen-
eralized synthetic control method introduced earlier to purge out the secular trends
and estimate equation 2.30 by weighted 2SLS. The weights constructed from the
synthetic control approach are used in the regression. The number of observations
increases to 19,787 just because each component of the synthetic control is included
as an observation, no matter how small a weight it bears in the regression. The
weights in each county group sum to 2. The estimated coefficient is about 1.3, sim-
ilar to that in column 2. I report two sets of standard errors. Standard errors in
parentheses are two-way clustered at the county level and the county-group level.
Standard errors in curly brackets are the standard deviation of 100 bootstrapped es-
timates. The two-way clustered standard errors are very similar to those in column
2. Both two-way clustered standard errors and the bootstrapped standard errors
give the same statistical inference and are significant at the 1% level.
Column 4 re-estimates equation 2.30 using weighted 2SLS while controlling
for the same set of covariates as in column 2. If the specifications in column 2 and
35When conducting the Hausman test, I use conventional standard errors.
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column 3 are both valid, including valid controls will not change the point estimate
but only improve the precision of the model. I find an estimated coefficient of around
1.3, and the clustered standard error is slightly smaller than that in column 3. The
result in column 4 lends more confidence to the findings in column 2 and column
3. Equation 2.27 and equation 2.30 rely on different identification assumptions and
use different sources of variation, so the fact that both yield very close results is
reassuring. For the remainder of the chapter I use the specification in column 3
as the baseline for its flexibility in assumptions and good quality in matching, as
argued and demonstrated in subsection 2.4.2.
The number of additional jobs created or destroyed in the local economy as a
result of adding or losing one job is called the local job multiplier. Table 2.2 column 3
shows that the local multiplier is about 1.3. This number falls within a wide range of
estimates from previous studies. Using coal price fluctuations as exogenous shocks,
Black et al. (2005) estimate that one coal-mining worker brings an additional 0.35
workers to the local labor market within a four-year period. One possible reason for
the small effect might be that fluctuations in coal price was perceived as temporary
shocks, so local businesses do not adjust on the extensive margin. Moretti (2010b)
finds that one additional job in the manufacturing sector creates another 1.6 jobs
in the service industry at the MSA level over a decade, a number much closer to
mine. This number rises to 2.5 additional jobs, if the manufacturing job is filled by
a skilled worker.
2.6.2 Local Labor and Housing Markets
Using the same specification as in column 3 of table 2.2, table 2.3 reports the esti-
mates on a vector of outcomes regarding local labor and housing markets. Columns
1 through 5 report the effects of military personnel contractions on the levels of local
economic activity. Column 1 repeats the estimate on changes in civilian employ-
ment. Columns 2 through 5 report the estimates on civilian earnings (in thousands
of 2000 dollars), civilian population, the number of private business establishments,
and the number of occupied housing units. All these outcome variables are divided
by the county population in 1980. Therefore, the coefficients can be interpreted as
the changes in levels of each outcome due to cutting one military worker.
The military personnel contractions have sizable effects on levels of civilian
employment, earnings, population, and business establishments. Specifically, cut-
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ting one military worker causes a reduction of 1.3 civilian jobs (column 1) and 31,000
dollars in earnings (column 2) of civilian workers. It also causes a drop of 3.1 civil-
ians in the local population (column 3). This is a large migration response relative
to the impacts on the local labor markets. The result suggests that essentially ev-
ery individual who lost a job left the local economy with his or her family.36 The
number of local business establishments also declines with local employment. For
every 10 military jobs cut, a local business is also lost.37 All of these estimates are
statistically significant.
The military to population ratio in counties with military bases dropped by
about one percentage point, on average, during the sample period. At the bottom
of each column, I convert the effects to percent changes. Reducing the military
to population ratio by one percentage point reduces civilian employment by 2.3
percent, total civilian earnings by 1.8 percent, and the civilian population by 2.9
percent. The fact that the percent decline in employment is greater than the percent
decline in total earnings suggests that the jobs lost were relatively low-paying.
Column 6 reports the effect on changes in the ratio of civilian employment to
civilian population. Given the large migration response to job losses, it is not sur-
prising that employment to population ratios are not seriously affected. In fact, the
estimate is small, statistically insignificant, and has the wrong sign: reducing mili-
tary to population ratio by one percentage point increases the civilian employment
to population ratio by 0.3 percentage points.38
36According to the 1990 census, each military person has on average 0.7 dependents living in
the same household. About 60 percent of the civilian population works in the civilian sector. So a
loss 1.2 civilian jobs is associated with 2 civilians. Therefore, cutting one military worker directly
affects about 2.7 civilians. A reduction of 3.1 civilians is larger than that back-of-the-envelope
calculation.
37The effects are concentrated in small firms with fewer than 25 employees.
38A natural alternative measurement is unemployment rate. The county-level unemployment
rates are from the Local Area Unemployment Series (LAUS) published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). Using the unemployment rate has three disadvantages. First, county-level unem-
ployment rates are only available from 1990. Second, county-level unemployment rates are model
based, and the model has changed since 2000. Third, since unemployment rates are based on
state unemployment insurance claims, it is possible that displaced workers who have migrated are
still counted as unemployed in their original counties. Using county unemployment rates as the
outcome variable, I find that reducing the military to population ratio by one percentage point
increases the unemployment rate between 1990 and 2000 by 0.14 percentage points. The estimate
is statistically significant at the 5% level but is very small in magnitude. The average unemploy-
ment rate was around 5.4 during the period. About 60% of the population is in the workforce,
so an increase in the unemployment rate of 0.14 percentage points roughly corresponds to 0.08
unemployed workers per 100 people. As the same cut reduces the civilian population by 1.3 per
100 people, this suggests that the vast majority of the displaced workers are not unemployed by
36
The next two columns report the effects on log local prices. Therefore, the
coefficients can be conveniently interpreted as semi-elasticities. Column 7 reports
the effects on local average wages. Due to data limitations, I calculate local av-
erage wages based on county-level variables adjusted by demographic characteris-
tics. First, I calcuate annual raw average wages by dividing total county wages
and salary earnings with total county wages and salary employment, both from the
REA. I then regress log raw county average wages on a vector of county demographic
characteristics. These characteristics include racial compositions (white, black, and
other), percent of adults with college degrees, and the quadratic terms of these
variables. County demographic characteristics are drawn from decennial censuses.
Demographic characteristics in non-census years are interpolated.
Column 7 shows that cutting the military to population ratio by one percentage
point reduces the log wage by 0.47 percent. The effect is not statistically significant
and is quite small in magnitude: for an average job paying 30,000 dollars a year, a
0.47 percent decline is a loss of 141 dollars per year. Although average wages are
potentially measured with a lot of error, the estimated effect is consistent with the
estimated effects on other results. First, effects on civilian employment and civilian
earnings suggest that the effects on raw average wages are small.39 Second, the large
migration response suggests that workers are rather mobile; large changes in wages
will be arbitraged out by large out-migration. Column 8 reports the effects on the
median rental price. Cutting the military to population ratio by one percentage
point reduces log median rent by 1.3 percent. The decline in rental prices is a result
of both lower wages and smaller population. Since wages do not drop by much while
many people leave the local economy, it is not surprising that the effect on rental
prices is larger than that on wages.40
the end of the sample period.
39Note that if workers are homogeneous, changes in log wages can be expressed in terms
of log changes in total civilian employment and log changes in total civilian earnings, that is
∆lnWage = ∆lnEarning −∆lnEmployment. From column 1 and column 2 in table 2.3, we have
the ∆lnWage due to a one percentage point decline in the military to population ratio equal to
(-1.796-(-2.345))=0.549. That is, the wage would increase by 0.5 percent. Comparing this result
with that in column 5 also suggests that military personnel contractions affect low-skilled workers
more severely.
40An alternative measure of local housing market conditions is the median housing price. Since
conceptually the housing price is just the present discounted value of future rental prices, the
percent change in rental prices and housing prices due to the same shock should be the same.
Using the same specification, I estimate an effect that cutting the military to population ratio by
one percentage point reduces local housing prices by 0.9 percent. Smaller responses in housing
prices than in rental prices are often found in the literature, especially when housing prices are
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Throughout table 2.3, I report two sets of standard errors: the two-way clus-
tered standard errors are in parentheses, and the bootstrapped ones are in curly
brackets. Both sets of standard errors are very similar and give the same statistical
inference, but the bootstrapped standard errors are always slightly smaller. Un-
less otherwise specified, for the rest of the chapter I report only two-way clustered
standard errors so as to be conservative about statistical inference.
2.6.3 Sectoral Composition
The model in section 2.3 incorporates the tradable and non-tradable sectors and
gives different predictions for them under military personnel contractions. Accord-
ing to equation 2.20, labor demand in the non-tradable sector declines since local
wages (wc), local population (Nc), and the demand shifter for local non-tradable
goods (mNc ) all decline. In contrast, according to equation 2.19, employment in the
tradable sector may in fact increase as the firm hires more workers when local labor
costs become lower. I therefore investigate separately the impact of military person-
nel cuts on different sectors. Moreover, I also investigate the effects on the number
of federal civilian workers since those eployed by the DoD are directly affected by
the downsizing of military operations.
Table 2.4 reports the results of re-estimating equation 2.30 using changes in
civilian employment in each 2-digit sector as the outcome variables. Column 1 shows
that for cutting every four military jobs cut, one federal civilian job is also lost. In the
sample base counties in 1988, federal civilian workers account for 2.5% of the total
population. Therefore, a one percentage point drop in the military to population
ratio reduces the average level of federal civilian employment by about 10%, which
is shown in the last row of column 1. Column 2 reports the effect on employment
in the manufacturing sector, a typical tradable sector, where the military personnel
contractions have a small and negative effect and the estimate is not statistically
significant. So there is no evidence that local firms in the tradable sector expand
their employment. Columns 3 through 5 show the employment responses in non-
tradable sectors. I find large and statistically significant effects in the construction
and the retail sectors, and a sizable effect on the service sector, although it is not
self-reported. Because houses are only infrequently transacted, self-reported housing prices may
not reflect current housing market conditions (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008; Busso et al., 2013).
Therefore, I use rental prices instead of housing prices.
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statistically significant. These findings are in agreement with previous studies that
have also found that the impacts are concentrated in the local non-tradable sectors
and that the tradable sector is not affected (e.g., Black et al, 2005).
2.6.4 Welfare Impacts
I can calculate the magnitude of the welfare changes for workers, landowners, and
firms by plugging the empirical results found in the previous section into the ex-
pressions for welfare analysis in section 2.3.6, i.e., equations 2.22, 2.23, and 2.24. In
order to calculate the welfare impacts, I first need to calibrate the model parameters
involved in these expressions. I choose the values of the relevant parameters from
national accounts as well as other studies. The share of expenditure on housing,
α, and the share of income spent on non-tradable goods, β, come from the BEA
National Income and Product Accounts Tables, α = 0.18, β = 0.46.41 The share of
labor in the non-tradable sector production, hN , and the share of labor in the trad-
able sector, hT , both take the value of 0.7.42 The constant elasticity of substitution
among differential goods is taken from the trade literature: σT = 2.2.43 With a one
percentage point drop in the military to population ratio, the changes in welfare for
each agent are
∆V W = −0.02% (0.72%)
∆V H = −3.6% (0.39%)
∆V T = 0.3% (0.22%).
That is, the welfare of workers drops by 0.02 percent and the welfare of landowners
drops by 3.6 percent, while the welfare of firms in the tradable sector increases
41Source: Section 2: Personal Income and Outlays. Table 2.3.5: Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product for 2012 full year. Expendi-
ture on housing includes “Housing and utilities” (line 15). Expenditure on non-
tradable goods includes all service items except for housing (lines 15-21). URL:
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=9&step=1&acrdn=2#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&903=65.
Last accessed on Aug 24, 2014.
42This value is the commonly used labor’s share of national income, e.g., (e.g., Krueger, 1999).
43Source: Broda and Weinstein (2006). The median value of 3-digit SITC code for tradable
goods. URL: http://www.columbia.edu/~dew35/TradeElasticities/ElasticitiesBrodaWeinstein90-
01_SITCRev3_3-digit.xls. Last accessed Aug 24, 2014.
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by 0.3 percent. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses for each welfare
calculation.44 Only the welfare impact on landowners is statistically significant.
The average decline in the military to population ratio was about one percent-
age point for counties in the sample over the 1988 to 2000 period. The aggregate
welfare impact is small for workers and firms in the tradable sector but substantial
for landowners.45
2.7 Adjustment of Local Economies
2.7.1 Estimating Dynamic Effects
The results thus far show the long-run effects of military contractions.46 It is also
interesting to investigate how quickly local economies adjust to the shocks and
achieve new equilibria. For example, although there is little welfare loss for workers
in the new equilibrium, if it takes a long time for the local economy to arrive at the
new equilibrium, the welfare cost in the transition might still be large.
The existing literature has not reached a consensus on how long it takes for new
equilibria to be achieved. Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Feyrer et al. (2007) find
that employment levels and unemployment rates in US states, MSAs, and counties
recover from negative shocks within a decade. Bartik (1991) finds a somewhat longer
period of recovery. Still other studies (e.g., Yoon, 2014) find that negative shocks
can have lasting impacts on local economies.
Ideally, we would have panel data and a one-time shock so that we could
capture the dynamic effects of the shock using the impacts of the shock on outcome
variable changes over many periods both before and after the shock. In the setting
of this study, however, the shocks continued for over a decade and were followed
44The variance-covariance matrix for the empirical results is obtained by bootstrapping. Denote
bk = {β̂1k, .., β̂Bk } as the vector of estimated coefficients for outcome k from bootstrap. The boot-
strapped standard error for the original estimate β̂k is the standard deviation of bk, σbk . Denote
bl as the vector of estimated coefficients for another outcome l, the bootstrapped correlation coef-
ficient between outcome k and outcome l is cov(bk, bl)/σbk · σbl . Table 2.9 shows the bootstrapped
standard errors for the full vector of outcome variables and their correlation coefficients. The
standard errors for welfare calculations are then obtained using the Delta Method.
45Appendix E provides a host of robustness checks and estimates heterogeneous effects.
46To be precise, the effects shown here are the changes in county outcomes over a 12-year period
as a result of military contractions that took place anytime in between. I loosely call these estimates
long-run effects. Most of the cuts in military personnel took place between 1988 and 1995, and
as I will show in this subsection, the full effects of a particular cut was usually realized within 3
years.
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by a different treatment period resulting from the anti-terrorism wars prompted by
9/11. Therefore, including many periods of leads and lags is not feasible. Instead
of depicting the full trajectory of dynamic effects, this subsection will address the
less demanding question of how many years it takes for a shock’s effects to become
negligible.
I propose two alternative approaches. First, I estimate a panel model with a
few leads and lags. I intend to identify the limits of leads and lags that have any
effect on the outcome in the current period. Second, I run long-differenced equations
with varying numbers of years in between. As we increase the length of the time
period for which the difference is taken, the estimate will eventually converge as the
the local economy achieves the new equilibrium, since the inclusion of more years
does not make a difference.




βks∆milhgs + θgt + ∆εkhgt, (2.31)
where, as earlier, a county h is either a base county or a non-base county. g refers
to the county group constructed from the synthetic control approach, and t indexes
year. ∆ykhgt = ykhgt − ykhgt−1 is the first-differenced outcome k in county h. The
outcomes include civilian employment, earnings, and private businesses. Dynamics
of rental price, population, and units of occupied housing are not included since
they are only available decennially. ∆milhgs = (Milhgs − Milhgs−1)/Poph,1980 is
the first differenced number of military personnel in the county, scaled by its 1980
population. I include past and future cuts up to two years (T = 2) in order to
capture the dynamic effects.47 ∆εkhgt is the error term.
∆milhgs is instrumented using the Bartik instrument as discussed earlier




milh,1987 = Milh,1987/Poph,1980 is the initial military presence. (NtlMils−NtlMils−1)/NtlMils−1
47Ideally, I would like to include many leading and lagging terms in order to capture the full
dynamic effects. However, including more terms creates two problems. First, the number of
observations will be smaller for years between 1988 and 2000. Second, including more leads and
lags increases the likelihood of incurring multi-colinearity problems.
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is the annual percent change in nationwide military personnel. In a dynamic panel
setting, the variation of the instrument comes from both cross-county and within-
county. Finally, the standard errors are two-way clustered at the county group-year
level and at the county level.
Column 1 in table 2.5 shows the dynamic effects on employment. Changes in
employment are mainly effected by changes in military personnel contractions that
takes place in the current year (t) and those took place in the year before (t − 1).
Both estimates are sizable and statistically significant. The sum of the effects in
these two years (1.35) is close to the overall effect found in the long-differenced
specification (1.26). Although the sample does not allow for the inclusion of more
lags, a comparison of the dynamic results here with those from the long-differenced
specification suggests that a military personnel cut has a permanent effect on the
level of employment: the effect takes place within a couple of years after the cut,
and there is no evidence of recovery.
Since most of the cuts were planned and anticipated, future cuts could have
effects on current employment as people respond to future cuts by chaning current
behavior. Contrary to that prediction, I find that military cuts in the next year the
the year after (s = t + 1 and s = t + 2) have small and statistically insignificant
effects. The dynamic effects on civilian sector earnings (column 2) and business
establishments (column 3) exhibit similar patterns, although the estimates of the
effects on earnings are not statistically significant. I report the Angrist-Pischke
partial F statistics to assess the power of instruments for each endogenous variable.
The first stages are strong.
The dynamic panel models with leads and lags potentially suffer from colinear-
ity, the many IV problem, and loss of observations with the inclusion of more leading
and lagging terms. In the second approach, I estimate a series of long-differenced
equations with increasing year gaps and see how long it takes the estimates to
converge. Suppose the treatment takes place in year 0; this approach builds the
intuition that if the local economy has achieved a new long-run equilibrium, say in
year n, we would find the same result by comparing the local economy in year 0
with that in year n, or with any year after n. The smallest year gap for which we
observe the long-run effect is likely to be the amount of time it takes the local econ-
omy to achieve the new equilibrium. Formally, I estimate variations of the following
equation
42
∆ykcl = βkl∆milcl + θgl + ∆εkcl, (2.33)
where ∆ykcl = ykc,1988+l − ykc,1988 and ∆milcl = milc,1988+l − milc,1988, and θgl are
dummies for county-group-year-group dummies. The Bartik instrument, ∆milIVcl is
constructed in the same manner. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the
county-group-year-group level and the county level. Recall that the cuts in military
personnel during the sample period were continuous, which means that cuts in two
different periods, ∆milcl and ∆milcl′ , are likely to be positively correlated. For the
same reason, ∆milIVcl is also correlated with ∆milcl′ . ∆milcl′ will be the omitted
variables in equation 2.33, and the 2SLS estimate of equation 2.33 will be upward
biased. The correlation will be smaller when the two periods are further away or
when l is larger. Therefore, when β̂kl and β̂kl′ (l′ > l) are similar, it is evidence that
when we look at a long enough period of time, the omitted variable bias is not too
much of a concern.
Figure 2.4 shows the effects with l ranging from 1 to 12. For all three outcome
variables, the effects achieve a plateau in about 3 years. This result is consistent
with those in table 2.5 and shows that local economies are relatively quick to adjust
to shocks.
2.7.2 Mobility
The quick adjustment of local economies and the large effects on population after
negative shocks are consistent with the high mobility of the US population. During
the 1990s, about 3% of the population moved across state borders and about 5% of
the population moved across county borders every year (Molloy et al., 2011). Low
skilled workers, however, are less mobile and more likely to be affected by local
shocks. As a result, the negative demand shocks tend to have longer effects on local
economies (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Notowidigdo, 2013; Yoon, 2014).
One explanation for the high mobility found in this chapter is that people dis-
placed due to military personnel contractions are more mobile than typical displaced
workers. Military workers have little connections to the localities where they serve.
Once discharged, they are likely to leave with their dependents, some of whom work
in the local economy. Veterans, who tend to cluster near military bases in order
to benefit from amenities such as commissaries and post exchanges, also tend to
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leave as these amenities pull out along with the declining military presence.48 Some
civilian workers employed by the DoD have special skills and need to migrate to find
good fits. All of these factors may contribute to the large migration response after
military personnel contractions.
I test whether there is something special about military contractions in terms of
the resulting migration response by estimating the effects of a different type of shock
that is arguably more similar to conventional demand shocks. The post-Reagan
military contractions involved not only cuts in military personnel contractions, but
also cuts in military procurement contracts awarded to local companies. Unlike
military personnel contractions, people affected by military procurement reductions
are not directly associated with military operations. If indeed military personnel
contractions generate particularly high migration responses, we would expect the
migration response for each job loss due to military procurement contractions to be
lower.
The inclusion of cuts in military procurement contracts to local contractors
also serves as a test to check whether military procurement contractions are cor-
related with personnel contractions. If that is the case, the impacts of personnel
contractions found in previous sections are overestimated, and including procure-
ment contractions will significantly reduce the estimates. That said, it is unlikely
to be the case, since the spatial distribution of changes in military personnel and
those in procurement are not correlated.49
I use contract-level data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS)
and identify military procurements by restricting procurements to those ordered by
the Department of Defense. Since 1969, every contract worth more than 25,000
dollars was recorded. Crucially, the files show the amount of each contract and
the county address of the primary contract awardee. I aggregate the amount of
procurement to the county-year level. Changes in procurement contractions dur-
ing the post-Reagan military contractions are measured as ∆procc = (Procc,98−00−
Procc,86−88)/Popc,1980, where Procc,86−88 is the average value of procurement awarded
48I find that reducing one military worker increased about 0.2 new veterans in the county who
served in the 1990s. Since cutting one military worker on net creates about 4 new veterans, the
probability of new veterans staying in the county where they served is as low as 5% (0.2/4). I find
that the number of older veterans decrease as the military pulls out. On net, I find that the total
number of veterans do not increase: the estimate is small and statistically insignificant.
49The correlation coefficient is around 0.2. The bulk of the military contracts are for weaponry
and equipment. The awardees of these contracts are usually large manufacturing companies located
in industrial clusters.
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to companies located in county c between 1986 and 1988.50 Popc,1980 is the county





× Proc98−00 − Proc86−88
Proc86−88
,
where Proc86−88 and Proc98−00 are the total amounts of procurement awarded at
the beginning and the end of the period, each of which is averaged across threee
consecutive years.
Table 2.6 reports the results. First note that including procurement contrac-
tions does not change the estimates on personnel contractions. The two components
of post-Reagan military cuts, though connected at the national level, have separate
effects on local economies. Angrist-Pischke partial F-statistics are reported for each
endogenous variable, and the instruments are strong throughout. Procurement con-
tractions have expected effects, although the coefficients are not always precisely
estimated. Most importantly, the migration response is similar for both personnel
contractions and procurement contractions. For the former, for each job loss in the
civilian sector there are 2.4 civilians leaving the county (3.2/1.3); for the latter, this
ratio is about 2.1. This is evidence that the large response in out-migration is not
due to the special characteristics of military personnel contractions.
2.8 Conclusions
This chapter studies the local economic impacts of military personnel contractions
in the United States between 1988 and 2000. The contractions had sizable effects on
the levels of economic activities in counties with historical military presence. Cutting
each military worker resulted in the loss of an additional 1.3 civilian jobs and 0.1
private business establishments, most of which were in the non-tradable sectors and
from small businesses. However, local economies adjusted quickly. By year 2000,
2.4 civilian residents had left the county for each civilian job loss. As a result,
declines in local wages were small relative to those in rental prices. Quantifying
50The reason for using a 3-year average is that procurement is a flow variable and is bumpy
from year to year. In contrast, the number of military personnel is a stock variable. Changes in
military procurement from 1986-1988 compared to 1998-2000 capture the gradual contraction in
procurement in the 1990s.
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the welfare impacts based on a simple spatial equilibrium framework, I show that
negative welfare shocks to workers due to lower local labor demand were largely
compensated by substantive declines in local cost of living, while landowners suffer
from a large decline in total rents.
Many local economies rely heavily on military spending. There are increasing
concerns in these communities in a period of substantial cuts in military spending:
the budget sequestration of 2013 planned for a 42 billion dollar cut in military
expenditure. In a more recent military budget plan, the former Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel proposed to cut the Army to pre-WWII levels.51 This chapter, by
exploiting a similar policy in the past, finds that these cuts have distributional
effects. On the one hand, the labor market quickly adjusts via labor migration, and
the welfare of workers is not affected very much. On the other hand, landowners
suffer a large decline in rental revenues as local demand for housing drops and
housing stocks are slow to adjust. I also find no effects on government revenue or
expenditure, or on Congress incumbents’ probability of being re-elected.52
Policies targeting particular places in order to promote local economies are
popular across the world. State and local governments in the United States spend
billions of dollars every year trying to attract new businesses or retain existing ones
through various incentives (Story, 2012; Story et al., 2012). At the national level,
these policies are only justifiable by agglomeration effects in production or frictions
in labor mobility, such that the gains from locating in a larger local economy is
greater than the gains if the business is located somewhere else. This chapter does
not explicitly test the effects of the military operations on the productivity of nearby
firms, but it finds small frictions in migration across local economies. The effects
of these policies are likely to be consolidated in local land prices instead of being
reaped by workers.
This chapter makes a few simplifying assumptions. In reality, some households
contain both workers and landowners. It would be interesting to see the heteroge-
neous effects on renters and homeowners. Renters have fewer constraints to move,
but they also incure a smaller welfare shock if they choose to stay. Another as-
sumption I made is that workers are interchangeable across sectors. The wealth
effects due to changes in housing values and the tradeoff between space mismatch
51TheWashington Post, Feb 24, 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/24/chuck-
hagel-shrink-army-pre-wwii-levels-report/
52Results available upon request.
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and sector mismatch may both affect households’ migration decisions, which in turn
have implications for impacts on wages and welfare. The simple model introduced
in this chapter can be extended to relax these assumptions. Finding invidiual data
on home ownership, industry, and migration, and empirically testing the predictions
of the enriched model would be interesting future work.
Empirically, I demonstrate that the validity of the widely used shift-share
instruments hinges on the assumption that past levels of the treatment variable are
not correlated with unobservable secular trends in the outcome variable. Because the
location choices of many economic activities are endogenous and can be correlated
with expected economic trajectories, this assumption can be violated. To solve this
problem, I develop a novel two-step identification strategy combining the synthetic
control and the two-stage least square methods. Using information from a pre-
treatment period, the synthetic control approach constructs a counterfactual and
purges out the unobservable secular trends, conditional on which the shift-share
instrument is valid. This approach has general applications in cases where parallel
trends are not guaranteed and the instrument is only conditionally valid.
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2.9 Appendices
2.9.1 Appendix A: Sources and Construction of Variables
Key explanatory variable
milct = Milct/Popc1980 is the military personnel in county c in year t as a
ratio to the county’s population in 1980. NtlMilt is the total number of military
personnel in the United States (not including those on overseas military bases) in
year t. ∆milc = milc,2000 −milc,1988 is the long difference between 1988 and 2000.
∆milct = milct −milct−1 is one-year difference.
Outcome variables
CivEmpct/Popc1980 is the civilian sector employment in county c in year t
divided by the county’s population in 1980.
CivIncct/Popc1980 is the civilian sector earnings (in thousand dollars, 2000
constant dollar) in county c in year t divided the county’s population in 1980.
Wagect is the demographic-adjusted average civilian sector wage in county c
in year t. It is calculated as follows. First, average wage per job is calculated as
CivIncct/CivEmpct. It is then regressed on a vector of county-level demographic
characteristics. The demographic-adjusted average wage is the residual from the
regression.
CivPopct/Popc1980 is the civilian population in county c in year t as a ratio
of the county’s population in 1980. Civilian population is total population minus
military workers.
Estabct/Popc1980 is the number of private business establishments in county c
in year t divided by the county’s population in 1980. Private business establishments
are from County Business Patterns.
uratect, the unemployment rate in county c in year t, is from Local Area
Unemployment Statistics reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. County un-
employment rates are model-based and are only available since 1990.
CivEmpct/CivPopct is the civilian employment to civilian population ratio in
county c in year t.
MedRentct is the median rental price in county c in year t, and is from county-
level tabulations in decennial censuses in 1980, 1990, and 2000.
Other variables
Other county characteristics are from various issues of County Data Books
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as well as population censuses. These variables include share of white, share of
black, share of women, share of population aged between 25-64, share of college
graduates, share of high school graduates, share of high school dropouts, share of
urban population, county geographic and climatic characteristics, such as population
density, average temperature in January, average annual precipitation and snowfall,
census regions, etc.
In order to describe the demographic characteristics of the military person-
nel, including educational attainment, marital status, residence status (live on or
off base), characteristics of military spouses (living arrangement, working status,
etc), and number of dependents, I use publicly available 5% individual level data
of decennial censuses in 1980, 1990, and 2000 from IPUMS. IPUMS data report
MSA and state but do not have county identifier. I impute county-level military
demographic characteristics by MSA, or by state when the county is not part of any
MSA.
Military procurement is from Department of Defense Form DD350, available
from 1966 to 2006. DD350 includes all DoD procurement contracts more than
25,000 dollars awarded to the primary contractor. I aggregate the procurement at
the county-year level.
2.9.2 Appendix B: Details of the Model
B.1: Household Problem with Unemployment
In this appendix I extend the household problem in section 2.3.2 to allow for
(voluntary) unemployment.53 Each household now makes a discrete choice of labor
market participation. dic is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the household
chooses to work, 0 otherwise. Workers have the same productivity if they choose
to work. If household i chooses to work, it earns a local wage w̃c but derives
no utility from leisure; if it chooses not to work, it receives a pecuniary benefit
which is standardized to 0, but enjoys a utility from leisure, denoted as li.54 Equally
productive workers facing the same labor market conditions have different job market
participation decisions due to idiosyncratic preference for leisure. Household i’s
problem becomes:
53See also Busso et al. (2013) for a similar treatment of unemployment. Kline and Moretti (2013)
introduces involuntary unemployment in the model with matching frictions.






uic = lnAc + αlnhic + βlnXNic + (1− α− β)lnXTic + li · (1− dic) + eic,
s.t., rchic + pcXNic + pTX
T
i = dicw̃c
I assume the distribution of li to be independently distributed across locations
and is uncorrelated with locational characteristics. I assume that the cumulative
density function (c.d.f.) is L(.). The problem for a non-working household and
for a working household can be solved in the same way as the problem in section
2.3.2. Denote (hwic, XNwic , XTwic ) as the optimal consumption bundle for a working
household and (hnic, XNnic , XTnic ) as the optimal consumption bundle for a non-working
household. All these choices are functions of a vector of local prices and model
parameters. ulc = lnAc +αlnhlic +βlnXNlic + (1−α−β)lnXT lic , l ∈ {w, n} is thus the
real wage a household gets if it chooses to work, or not. The decision for whether
to work is:
dic =
0, if uwc < unc + li1, if uwc ≥ unc + li.
Denote the marginal household with idiosyncratic locational preference for leisure





i . Therefore, households with li < l∗i choose to work, while households
with li > l∗i choose not to work. The unemployment rate in location c is
uratec = 1− L−1(l∗i ).
Since l∗i is a function of local prices {w̃c, rc, pc}, which are jointly determined by the
local economic equilibrium, the unemployment rates are different across locations.
However, the unemployment rate is determined by other local economic conditions.
Having unemployment in the model in this way does not alter the intuition or
mechanism of the local economic equilibrium model introduced in in section 2.3.
B.2: Local Labor Supply
50
The population size in location c is captured by the preference of the marginal
household, e∗ic, in the distribution of eic. Assume the total population nationwide is
1. Following the standard result of a type-I extreme value distribution, population





Take log on both sides, we have equation 2.2.
B.3: The Tradable Sector





πj = pjxj − wcNTc − ρKTc ,
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Stacking equation 2.34 and equation 2.35, we have the marginal rate of sub-









Plug equation 2.36 back into equation 2.34, we derive the expression describing


















Take logs on both sides yields equation 2.9
lnNTc = [(1− hT )(σT − 1)− σT ]lnwc + aTL,
where
aTL = σ
T lnhT + ln(Ij) + σT ln(
σT − 1
σT
) + (σT − 1)lnBTc
+(σT − 1)(1− hT )[ln(1− hT )− ln(hT )]− (1− hT )(σT − 1)lnρ
Notice that [(1−hT )(σT −1)−σT ] < 0. The demand for labor in the tradable
sector decreases with local wage.
Similarly, plug equation 2.36 back into equation 2.35, we derive the expression
for demand for capital in the tradable sector as a function of factor prices and model
parameters:
















Take logs on both sides
lnKTc = −(σT − 1)hT lnwc + aTK , (2.37)
where
aTK = [(σ











B.4: The Non-Tradable Sector
In order to derive the labor demand function for the non-tradable sector, we









1−hN − wcNNc − ρKNc















)−hN = ρ (2.39)
Stacking equation 2.38 and equation 2.39, we have the marginal rate of sub-










Plug the MRS condition back into the production function of local non-
tradable goods, we have the supply of local non-tradable goods as a function of















Take logs on both sides and we get equation 2.13, where aNX = lnBNc + (1 −
hN)[ln(1− hN)− ln(hN)].
Taking logs on both sides of equation 2.14 and combining it with equation 2.13
yields equation 2.15:
lnNNc − lnNc = hN lnwc + lnmHc − lnpc + aNL,
where aNL = lnβ − lnBNc − (1− hN)[ln(1− hN)− lnρ− lnhN .
The implications for the zero-profit condition for firms in the non-tradable
sector can be derived as follows. Plugging equation 2.40 into equation 2.12 and










⇒ hN lnwc = lnpc + bN ,
where bN = lnBNc + (1− hN)ln(1− hN) + hN lnhN − (1− hN)lnρ.
2.9.3 Appendix C: Two-Step Estimation of Panel Model with Endogenous Treat-
ment
C1. Data Generating Process
Consider the following data-generating process
yit = β0 + β1Xit + f(λi, t) + εit, (2.41)
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where i is the index for units and t is the index for time periods, t ∈ [1, T ]. Xit is
the treatment of interest. f(.) is an unknown function of fixed effect λi and t. λi is
unknown to the econometrician.
There is an observable predetermined status Di = {0, 1} which is a function
of λi and vi, Di = g(λi, vi). vi is iid and uncorrelated with εit, E[vi, εit] = 0.
Xit depends on Di and is correlated with unobserved determinants of the
outcome, and is potentially measured with error:
Xit =
0 , if Di = 0 or t < tsρ1X̃it−1 + eit + h(λi, εit, t) + εit , if Di = 1 and t ≥ ts
The specification of Xit requires some clarification. First, ρ1 > 0 means that Xit ex-
hibits positive serial correlation. eit is classical measurement error with iid distribu-
tion and mean zero. X̃it is the deterministic part of Xit, E(X̃it, εit) = 0. h(λi, εit, t)
specifies the endogeneity structure of Xit. εit is an iid error term, E[εit, εit] = 0,
E[εit, λi] = 0, E[εit, X̃it] = 0. Endogeneity of the treatment, Xit, comes from three
sources. First, it conditions on Di, which is determined by λi. Second, it is cor-
related with the unobserved fixed effects λi. Third, it is also correlated with the
contemporaneous error term εit.
XIVit is a candidate instrumental variable for Xit.
XIVit =
0 , if Di = 0 or t < tsρ2X̃it−1 + ẽit + ε̃it , if Di = 1 and t ≥ ts
ẽit is also classic measurement error. XIVit is uncorrelated with εit, E(XIVit , εit) = 0.
But it is conditional on Di, in other words, E(XIVit , λi) 6= 0. Thus the validity of
XIVit as an IV hinges on whether f(λi, t) can be purged out from equation 2.41.
Consistency of the conventional panel model hinges on the correctly specifying
f(.). Consider the simplest case where f(λi, t) = λi, the data generating process
reduces to:
yit = β0 + β1Xit + λi + εit.
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In a panel fixed effect model, the equation is first demeaned:
(yit − ȳi) = β1(Xit − X̄i) + εit,
where the condition ε̄i = 0 is used. (XIVit − X̄IVi ) is thus a valid IV for (Xit − X̄i)
in the demeaned equation, as E[(XIVit − X̄IVi ), εit]. But in general, if f(.) is not a
constant, demeaning does not cancel out λi and XIVit is invalid.
We construct a synthetic control for each unit i with Di = 1 from a the “donor
pool” of units with Di = 0 such that the distance between the trajectory of yit in








where αj ∈ [0, 1] if Dj = 0, and
∑
j αij = 1. αi = 1 if Di = 1. Zit = {yiτ , τ ∈ [1, s)}
is a set of past realizations of the outcome variable before the treatment takes
place in period s. According to the data generating process as specified in equation
2.41, under the optimal weights αij , the distance ||f(λi, t)−
∑
j αijf(λj, t)|| is also
minimized.
If the matching is perfect, f(λi, t)−
∑
j αijf(λj, t) = 0. Counties in the same
synthetic control group (Di = 1 and Dj = 0) with appropriate weights can be
written as
yit = β0 + β1Xit + f(λi, t) + εit
αijyjt = αij [β0 + β1Xjt + f(λj, t) + εjt]
We can purge the secular trend by taking difference between the treated unit
and its synthetic control.
yit −
∑
αijyjt = β1(Xit −
∑
j




We can estimate the following transformation of equation 2.41:
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yhgt = β0 + β1Xhgt + ωhgt + εhgt, (2.42)
where county h can be a treated unit i or an untreated unit j, group g includes a unit
i with Di = 1 and units j with Dj = 0. ωigt is a dummy variable indicating a group-
time period. Each equation is weighted by αh. Demeaning within the group-time


































To sum up, we have a case here where the instrument is only conditionally
valid. If the unobserved heterogeneity affects the outcome in the sample period, our
instrument is only valid when conditional on the potentially time-varying effects
of the unobserved heterogeneity. When the functional form of the time-varying
heterogeneous effect is unknown, the synthetic control approach provides a non-
parametric way to partial out the effects of the heterogeneous effect.
C2. Analogue
I have a sample of counties (i and j) between 1980 and 2000 (t). Military
cuts (Xit) started in 1988 (ts). Only counties with military bases (Di) are affected.
Military bases have been in a county since many periods earlier. Whether hav-
ing military bases (Di) and economic outcome (yit) are both determined by some
unobservable characteristics of the county (λi). The effect of λi on the outcome
variable can also vary with time in an unknown functional form (f(λi, t)). The size
of the military cut in a particular year is correlated with the time-invariant county
characteristics and potentially time-varying idiosyncratic shock (h(λi, εit, t)), and is
measured with error (eit).
C3. Simulation
I simulate the data and demonstrate that the two-step procedure proposed
above reduces estimation bias without knowing the functional form of f(λi, t), while
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the bias of the standard panel data approach replies on correctly specifying f(λi, t).
I assume that the unobservable time-invariant county characteristics λi is
drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean 5 in a sample of N = 200. De-
fine D∗ = λi + vi, where vi ∼ N(0, 5). I then sort D∗ from the largest to the
smallest and assign Di = 1 for the 50 units with the largest D∗. vi is drawn from
a distribution with relatively large standard error such that the group with Di = 1
and the group with Di = 0 have enough overlapping in λi. As in a conventional
matching approach, overlapping is crucial for the validity of the estimator.
I draw T = 30 periods. The treatment period starts since ts = 11. Equation
2.41 is parameterized as follows: εit ∼
i.i.d
N(0, 2), β0 = 3, β1 = 1. f(λi, t) = γ1λi +
γ2λi · t. The endogenous variable, Xit, is parameterized as follows:
Xit =
0 , if Di = 0 or t < tsρ1X̃it−1 + de · eit + h(λi, εit, t) + εit , if Di = 1 and t ≥ ts
eit
i.i.d.∼ N(0, 5), εit is from an extreme value distribution. Xi1 = 0. ρ1 = 0.95. There-
fore, the shock is most likely to be centered around zero, but there are chances when
a large shock takes place, it tends to persist. The high serial correlation captures
the fact that annual cuts during the Post-Reagan military personnel contractions
were rather smooth. The endogeneity structure of the treatment is specified as
h(λi, εit, t) = dλ · ρλ · t + dε · εit. dλ, dε, de are dummy variables that turn on and
off endogeneity due to, respectively, unobservable local characteristics, unobservable
contemporaneous shocks, and measurement error.
C4. Simulation Results
Results using different estimating approaches when dλ, dε, de take different
values are reported in table 2.7. Columns in panel A are estimated using Two-Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) estimator in a conventional panel model with unit dummies
(hereafter called panel FE model). Columns in panel B are estimated using a two-
step approach which involves generating groups and sample weights using the syn-
thetic control approach in the first step and estimate using weighted 2SLS in the
second step. Column 1 shows the case with no endogeneity, in which case both
panel FE and the synthetic matching methods give consistent results, and the esti-
mated coefficients are close to the true value. When there is secular trend based on
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unobservable characteristics, panel FE estimate is biased due to mis-specification
(panel A, column 2), and estimating the model using 2SLS with the instrument
does not make the estimation correct (panel A, column 3). In contrast, the two-step
approach, no matter whether the model is estimated using weighted least squares or
weighted 2SLS, gives estimates close to the true value (panel B, column 2 and col-
umn 3). Column 4 and column 5 estimate a model with both unobservable secular
trend and endogenous contemporaneous shocks. Panel FE models, either estimated
using OLS or 2SLS, are biased. For the synthetic control approach, the weighted
least square estimate is also biased (panel B, column 4), but the two-step weighted
2SLS estimate is close to the true parameter (panel B, column 5). Column 6 and
column 7 report results when the endogeneity comes from the unobservable county
characteristics, column 8 and column 9 report results when the endogeneity comes
from both sources, panel FE models all have results far off from the true value, while
the two-step weighted 2SLS estimator obtains results that are similar to the true
value.
2.9.4 Appendix D: Statistical Inferences for the Two-Step Estimation
The two-step estimation involves the weights and group dummies constructed from
the first step to be used in the second step estimation. The standard errors for the
second step estimation do not take into account of the uncertainty in matching in
the first step. I use bootstrap to conduct statistical inference. In each bootstrap,
a pseudo sample is drawn and the two-step procedure, including constructing the
synthetic groups with weights and the subsequent estimation, is carried out. Abadie
and Imbens (2006) and Abadie and Imbens (2008) note that bootstrap does not
work in simple nearest neighbor matching with fixed number of matches since the
bootstrapped samples do not achieve the asymptotic distribution of the population.
They postulate that the bootstrapping in matching estimates that allows a smoother
reweighing function, which include the two-step approach introduced here, are likely
to remain valid.
I simulate the data using parameters specified table 2.7, column 2, specifically,




0 , if Dh = 0 or t < ts
0.95 ·Xht−1 + εit , if Dh = 1 and t ≥ ts
0 , if t = 0
,
D = 1{D∗ = λh + vh ≥ d̄},
where εht ∼
i.i.d
N(0, 2), vh ∼ N(0, 5), εht is from an extreme value distribution.
The sample size is N = 200. d̄ is a fixed value such that there are 50 units with
Dh = 1. β1 = 0. In each simulation, εht and vh are simulated and other variables
are generated according to the data generating process.
Since Xht is not correlated with εht, I estimate the model using weighted
least squares as in table 2.7, panel B, column 2. In each bootstrap, I redraw with
replacement units with Dh = 0 and Dh = 1 separately such that the pseudo samples
have the same number of units as in the original samples. Then I conduct synthetic
control and construct the groups (whg) and weights (αhg). Finally, I estimate the
following regression using weighted least squares:
yhgt = β0 + β1Xhgt + ωgt + εhgt .
I conduct three sets of statistical inference based on pairwise bootstrapping. The
first is the conventional t−statistics with standard errors clustered at the group and
unit level. The second approach involves using the standard deviation of the boot-
strapped β̂1 as the bootstrapped standard error, then calculating the Wald statistic
and conduct statistical inference. The third approach involves bootstrapping the
Wald statistic, a pivotal statistic, so that the bootstrapping procedure also provides
asymptotic refinement. Specifically, denote the Wald statistics from the original
sample for the null hypothesis H0 : β1 = 0 as w0 = β̂1/se(β̂1). Then for each boot-
strap, calculate the Wald Statistics wb = (β̂b1 − β̂1)/seb(β̂1). I rank wb’s from the
smallest to the largest. Denote the 2nd percentile as wbp2 and the 98th percentile as
wbp98. If wb ∈ [wbp2, wbp98] then we cannot reject H0. If wb /∈ [wbp2, wbp98] then we reject
H0.55
55The reason for using the 96th confidence interval instead of the conventional 95th is because I
only conduct 100 bootstraps.
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I use three different estimation models. The first model uses the correctly
specified model - in this case panel OLS with county fixed effect and county-specific
time trend. The second model uses a mis-specified model, in this case panel OLS
with unit fixed effects. The third estimation uses the proposed two-step approach.
For each estimation model, I calculate the average bias of the estimation, and the
rejection rate at 4% level based on (1) the cluster-robust standard errors from OLS,
(2) Wald statistics using β̂01/sd(β̂b1), where sd(β̂b1) is the standard deviation of esti-
mates from bootstrapped sample, and (3) whether the wb /∈ [wbp2, wbp98]. Table 2.8
reports the results.
Findings based on table 2.8 are as follows. First, OLS with the incorrect
specification is clearly biased and inconsistent. The two-step identification strategy
gives estimates that are close to the real vlue. The degree of bias depends on the
effects of the unobserved heterogeneity can be purged, which in turn relies on the
match quality. The quality of match relies on the overlapping of the distribution
of λh from the group of units with Dh = 1 and the group of units with Dh = 0.
As in the simulation exercise, Dh = g(λh, vh). vh is iid and uncorrelated with εht,
E[vh, εht] = 0. Matching quality will be better if the standard deviation of vh is large
comparing with the standard deviation of λh, which generates sufficient overlap of
λh among the treated units and the untreated units. Second, the correctly specified
OLS estimate is less biased than the two-step approach based on the synthetic
control, but not by much. The standard errors are larger in the synthetic control
approach than that in OLS due to many more control variables. Thus the statistical
inference based on the Wald statistic from cluster-robust standard errors in the OLS
is under-rejected.
2.9.5 Appendix E: Robustness and Heterogeneous Effects
E1. Robustness Checks
Panel model with county dummies
A conventional approach to deal with unit-specific time trend in a differenced
equation is to include set of unit dummies. Notice that it is impossible to include
county dummies in the baseline model in equation 2.25, as each county has only one
observation. However, we can include the pre-treatment period, and estimate the
following equation:
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∆ycp = β∆milcp + λc + τp + ∆εcp, (2.43)
where each c is a base county. p indicates one of the two periods, the pre-treatment
period between 1980 and 1987, and the post-treatment period between 1988 and
2000. λc is a set of county dummies and τp is a dummy indicating the post-treatment
period. The instrument for ∆milcp is
∆milIVcp = (Milc,1980/Popc,1980) · (NtlMilp̄ −NtlMilp)/NtlMilp,
p and p̄ indicates the first year and the last year in the period, respectively.
Equation 2.43 allows the secular trends to be county-specific, but assumes
that the trends to be linear throughout both periods. The model is identified by the
deviation in the changes and the predicted changes in military personnel (IV). Notice
that the first component, the pre-existing military presence, is time-invariant, the
model is identified by the variation in the second component, the changes in national
total military personnel. If the variation of the instrumental variable mainly comes
from the differences in pre-existing military presence, the first stage is likely to be
weaker in estimating equation 2.43. Table 2.10 shows that it is indeed the case.
The first stage F statistics is only about 3. Although the estimated coefficients stay
largely the same as in table 2.25, the standard errors are much larger and many of
the coefficients are not statistically significant.
Parallel to equation 2.31, I estimate a first-differenced panel model with leads
and lags in military cuts in order to study the dynamic effects:
∆yct = β∆milct + λc + τt + ∆εct, (2.44)
where ∆ indicates first differences. Similarly, the instrumental variable for ∆milct
is
∆milIVct = (Milc,1980/Popc,1980) · (NtlMilt −NtlMilt−1)/NtlMilt−1.
The results are reported in table 2.11 exhibit the same patterns: the estimates are
smaller and somewhat less precisely estimated as those in table 2.5.
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Influential counties
One assumption needed for the validity of the instrumental variable is that the
national military contractions were not driven by the unobservable economic shocks
in some particular local economies. A hypothetical, though unlikely, example of
this case is that some local interest groups regard the existence of military bases as
detrimental to their local economies, and they lobby for national military cuts. To
rule out this possibility, I identify three sets of counties that are most likely to have
the incentive and capability to have influenced the national policies: base counties
in the Washington, DC area, counties with the largest military bases, and counties
that are from districts that were formerly represented by key decision makers in
the BRAC commission.56 The sample in panel A of table 2.12 excludes the 27 base
counties in the DC area. The sample in panel B excludes the top 5 percent counties
with the largest military bases. The sample in panel C excludes 25 counties that
potentially have political influences. Overall the results are remarkably similar to
the baseline results in table 2.3.
Geographic aggregation
People may work, live, and consume in different counties, the boundaries of
local labor markets can be larger than counties. The impacts of military personnel
contractions in a larger geographic area can be either larger or smaller than those
using counties as local economies. The reason is both economic and statistical. In
terms of economics, the impacts are likely to be larger in a larger geographic ag-
gregation if there are spillover effects across county borders. On the other hand, a
larger geographic aggregation may internalize local economic impacts, which leads
to smaller estimates. For example, in the extreme case, if we define the entire
United States as a local labor market, there will be little migration response to
demand shocks. Statistically, using larger geographic aggregation may either alle-
viate or exacerbate the measurement error problem. Aggregation cancels out mea-
surement error, while converting some county-level outcomes into larger geographic
aggregations incur additional measurement error. Military contractions at a larger
geographic level are also more likely to be endogenous, as a large local economy
can influence national policies. Finally, larger aggregations result in a smaller donor
pool, the matching bias from the synthetic matching approach is likely to be larger
and the two-step identification strategy more likely to lead to inconsistent estimates.
56These people include Speaker of the House, House Minority Leader, members of the BRAC
commission.
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I use 1990 commuting zones as an alternative definition of local economies. The
commuting zones are developed by the Department of Agriculture according to com-
muting patterns. The 741 commuting zones in 1990 cover the entire United States.
On average a commuting zone is about four times as large as a county. I call a “base
commuting zone” if the commuting zone intersected with at least one military base
in 1987, and the remaining commuting zones form the donor pool. Commuting zone
level outcomes are either aggregated from county level variables (for employment,
income, population, housing units, etc) or are averages using county population as
weights (for median rental price, etc). I identify 208 commuting zones with military
bases and saw military presence decline during the 1988-2000 period. I then con-
struct a synthetic control for each base commuting zone from the donor pool. The
instrument for military contractions in each commuting zone is the a Bartik instru-
ment constructed in the same way as in equation 2.26. Finally I estimate equation
2.30 using the commuting zone sample.
Table 2.13 shows the results using the same specification and outcome variables
as in table 2.3. The estimated impacts of military personnel contractions are in many
cases much larger than those at the county level. For example, cutting one military
worker causes the commuting zone to lose about 2.9 civilian jobs, more than twice
the estimate at the county level. The migration response is smaller due to larger
geographic area: for each civilian job loss, 1.3 civilians leave the commuting zone.
For one percentage point decrease in the military to population ratio, the average
wage drops by 0.95 percent, but this is not statistically significant. The rental price
drops by 3.7 percent, also much larger than the effect found using the sample of
counties.
E2. Heterogeneous Effects
By the size of the cut
So far the results show that although military personnel contractions have
sizable effects on the levels of local employment and population, the welfare impacts
are small, and local economies adjust quickly. This finding may mask the non-linear
effects of negative shocks. In particular, a local economy may be resilient to small
shocks, but large shocks can kick off chain effects causing the local economy to end
up on a downward spiral.
In this subsection I investigate non-linearity in the treatment effects by divid-
ing the sample by the size of the cut. Panels A through C in table 2.14 reports the
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results of replicating table 2.3 using base counties (and their synthetic controls) that
experience military personnel contractions above the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile
of the distribution. For base counties that are above the 25th percentile, the average
size of military personnel contractions accrue to 1 percent of its 1980 population.
For base counties that are above the 75th percentile, that it is 3 percent, or close to 6
percent of its 1980 workforce. It is a substantial shock by any standard. Somewhat
surprisingly, all three panels give very similar results, which are also close to those
in table 2.3. It seems that the effects of military contractions are close to linear.
By population density
Local economies differ in various dimensions, such that a same degree of mili-
tary cuts may have different effects across local economies. I investigate the hetero-
geneous effects by population density of the local economy. I use population density
to proxy for the richness of local labor markets in terms of alternative job oppor-
tunities. Studies have found that urban local labor markets are more resilient to
shocks, we would expect that local labor market outcomes would be less negatively
affected in counties with high urban rate.
I divide base counties into two groups, one with the 1987 population density
above median and the other below. I repeat the estimates in table 2.3 separately for
the two samples. Table 2.15 shows the results. The first stage is equally strong in
both sub-samples, so the models are well identified. The impacts on employment and
population in more densely populated counties are slightly smaller than that in less
densely populated counties (column 1 and column 3), and the impacts on civilian
earnings, wage and local businesses are larger in less densely populated counties
(column 2, column 4, and column 7). Thus it seems that local labor markets in
more densely populated areas weather shocks better. Rental price also drops less in
more densely populated counties.
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Figure 2.1: Military Personnel Contractions between 1988 and 2000
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Note: Data for figure A are from the annual report of the Distribution of Personnel from
the Department of Defense. Active-duty military that deployed in the 50 states and the
District of Columbia are included. Figure B shows the change in military to population
ratio by whether the county had a major military base in 1987.
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private business establishment
Note: This figure shows an example of San Diego County, California and its synthetic
control. The first graph shows the trajectory of civilian sector employment. The second
figure shows the trajectory of civilian sector earnings. The third figure shows the
trajectory of civilian population. The fourth figure shows the trajectory of private sector
establishment. All trajectories are standardized at 1 in 1980. In each panel the gray line
shows the trajectory of the military personnel to population ratio.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
No bases p− value
Bases No bases synth (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% change in civilian employment, 1980-1987 .192 .109 .191 0 .909 .671
(.186) (.196) (.204)
% change in civilian payroll, 1980-1987 .228 .093 .226 0 .946 .792
(.234) (.25) (.265)
% change in civilian population, 1980-1987 .078 .019 .075 0 .827 .391
(.098) (.099) (.109)
% change in private establishment, 1980-1987 .340 .211 .341 0 .795 .69
(.186) (.099) (.191)
log change in median housing price, 1980-1990 .508 .368 .505 0 .916 .775
(.262) (.213) (.309)
log change in median rental price, 1980-1990 .618 .552 .62 0 .902 .763
(.157) (.172) (.202)
County-group dummies N Y
Number of counties 335 2764 1737 2764 1691 1691
Total weights 335 2764 335 2764 670 670
Note: There are, in total, 2764 counties in the sample that had a civilian population of at least 5000 in 1980. In the first 3 columns, I
tabulate average county characteristics for counties with military bases (column 1), counties with no military bases (column 2), and
reweighted counties with no military bases on synthetic approach (column 3). Standard deviations are in parentheses in the first 3
columns. Column 4 reports the p−value of the mean difference between columns and column 2. Column 5 reports the p−value of the
mean difference between columns 1 and 3. Column 6 reports the p−value of the difference between counties with military bases and
those without while restricting the comparison to be within each treated county and its synthetic cohorts. Predicted changes in county
characteristics between 1988 (1990 for housing market outcomes) and 2000 are obtained by running a set of pooled seemingly unrelated
regressions using counties without military bases.
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Table 2.2: Military Personnel Contractions and Civilian Employment, 1988-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆milc 0.793*** 1.188*** 1.259*** 1.266***
(0.225) (0.343) (0.405) (0.343)
{0.338} {0.283}
Covariates X X X
N 335 335 19,787 19,787
Total weights 335 335 670 670
Model equation no. (2.27) (2.27) (2.30) (2.30)
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Weights X X
First stage F-statistics 58.634 70.688 68.908
Note: The dependent variable is the change in civilian sector employment between 1988
and 2000, scaled by 1980 population. For weighted regressions, weights constructed from
the synthetic control, wcj , are used. For 2SLS estimations, first stage F-statistics are
reported. In columns 1 and 2, robust standard errors reported in the parentheses are
robust to heteroskedasticity. In columns 3 and 4, standard errors in parentheses are first
clustered at the county group level, then clustered at the county level. Significance levels
are marked according to the standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , ***
p < 0.01 . For columns 3 and 4, bootstrapped standard errors are reported in curly
brackets.
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Table 2.3: Military Contractions and County Outcomes, 1988-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
civ emp civ earning civ pop
private busi
estab
∆milc 1.259*** 32.245* 3.095*** 0.097***
(0.405) (17.815) (0.810) (0.032)
{0.338} {15.243} {0.691} {0.025}
percent change with ∆milc = −0.01 -2.345 -1.796 -2.903 -3.78




housing units median rent
∆milc 0.902*** -0.263 0.468 1.336***
(0.183) (0.227) (0.296) (0.192)
{0.162} {0.222} {0.259} {0.179}
percent change with ∆milc = −0.01 -2.227 0.438 -0.468 -1.336
Note: Each column uses the outcome variable as indicated in the column headline. In
columns 1 through 6 and column 8, the outcome variable is long-differenced between
1988 and 2000. In columns 1 through 4, outcome variables are scaled by 1980 population.
Percent changes are reported for columns 1 through 4. Percentages are calculated based
on the estimated coefficients and 1988 average levels among base counties. Rental and
housing prices use contemporaneous prices. Earnings are in thousands of dollars and are
denominated in 2000 dollars. See text for details about the additional covariates. All
columns are estimated using the weighted 2SLS estimator using the predicted military
personnel contractions as the instrumental variable, and weights, wcj , are constructed
from the synthetic control, as in Column 3 of Table 2.2. The first-stage F statistic is
70.688. There are 19,787 observations in the sample and 335 county groups. Standard
errors are first clustered at the county-group level, then clustered at the county level.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . Bootstrapped standard errors
are in curly brackets.
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Table 2.4: Changes in Civilian Employment between 1988 and 2000 by Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Emp to 1980 pop by sector federal civilian manu construct retail service
∆milc 0.251*** 0.044 0.204*** 0.246*** 0.158
(0.057) (0.085) (0.055) (0.087) (0.164)
N 19787 19173 18656 19723 19223
First-stage F statistics 70.688 70.282 62.222 70.623 70.051
Mean dependent variable 0.025 0.075 0.031 0.097 0.143
percent change with ∆milc = −0.01 10.4 0.57 6.58 2.54 1.10
Note: All columns are estimated using the weighted 2SLS estimator using the predicted military personnel contractions as the
instrumental variable. The number of observations varies across columns because I drop counties that have a left-censored number of
employees in each sector. Standard errors in parentheses are first clustered at the county level, then at the county-group level.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .73




s = t− 2 -0.038 9.591 0.041**
(0.244) (14.323) (0.019)
[23.749] [23.749] [23.749]
s = t− 1 0.644** -0.062 0.036**
(0.277) (9.339) (0.017)
[28.407] [28.407] [28.407]
s = t 0.714** 15.957 0.022
(0.281) (11.159) (0.018)
[15.009] [15.009] [15.009]
s = t+ 1 0.017 -2.427 -0.005
(0.310) (9.929) (0.017)
[12.253] [12.253] [12.253]
s = t+ 2 -0.175 10.185 -0.010
(0.302) (10.347) (0.014)
[16.411] [16.411] [16.411]
obs 257231 257231 257231
Note: Years in the sample are from 1988 to 2000. I use weighted 2SLS estimates in all
specifications, as well as weights from the synthetic controls. I include changes in
military personnel up to two years before and after the year in question. Outcome
variables are the one-year change of the county attributes as indicated by the shorthand
on top of each column. Specifically, the outcome variable is annual change in civilian
sector employment per 1980 population in column 1; annual change in civilian sector
labor income per 1980 population in column 2; annual change in private business
establishments per 1980 population in column 3. Standard errors are first clustered at
the county-group by year level, then clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *
p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . The Angrist-Pischke first-stage partial F-statistic
for each endogenous variable is reported in brackets.
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Table 2.6: Military Personnel Contractions and Procurement Contractions




busi log occ log emp
earning estab rent houses wage pop
∆milc 1.317*** 29.650 3.217*** 0.101*** 1.374*** 0.937*** 0.465 -0.240
(0.405) (18.818) (0.804) (0.032) (0.189) (0.185) (0.304) (0.236)
[72.380] [72.380] [72.380] [72.380] [72.380] [72.380] [72.380] [72.380]
∆procc 0.075 -3.295 0.156** 0.005** 0.048 0.042* -0.004 0.030
(0.049) (3.445) (0.070) (0.002) (0.046) (0.023) (0.046) (0.023)
[15.557] [15.557] [15.557] [15.557] [15.557] [15.557] [15.557] [15.557]
Note: ∆Procc is the change in levels of military procurement between 1986-1988 and
1998-2000 in county i, scaled by 1980 population. Each column uses the outcome variable
as indicated in the column headline. There are 19,787 observations in the regression. All
columns are estimated using the weighted 2SLS estimator using the predicted military
personnel contractions as the instrumental variable. The Angrist-Pischke partial
F-statistic is reported in brackets. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, first
clustered at the county level, then clustered at county-group-year level. Significance
levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 2.7: Simulation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Model OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A: Panel FE
Xit 1.012 1.869 1.943 0.106 1.961 -0.380 2.725 -0.228 2.705
(0.027) (0.071) (0.100) (0.021) (0.253) (0.110) (0.314) (0.065) (0.333)
N 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000
β1 = 1 (p−value) 0.647 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Synth reweighing
Xit 0.984 1.034 1.086 0.539 1.141 0.375 1.090 0.352 1.089
(0.010) (0.202) (0.160) (0.092) (0.146) (0.241) (0.171) (0.220) (0.171)
N 137900 137900 137900 137900 137900 137900 137900 137900 137900
Total weight 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
β1 = 1 (p−value) 0.112 0.868 0.589 0.000 0.334 0.010 0.600 0.004 0.601
γ1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
γ2 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
de 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
dλ 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
dε 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at unit-group and unit levels in Panel B.
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Table 2.8: Bias and Rejection Rate by Estimation Model
emp earning pop estab occupied emp/pop ln(wage) ln(rent)houses
emp 1
earning .821 1
pop .698 .476 1
estab .798 .682 .786 1
occupied housing .663 .516 .696 .635 1
emp/pop .164 .043 -.412 -.223 -.128 1
ln(wage) .129 .218 .013 .103 .112 0.068 1
ln(rent) .323 .189 .399 .285 .109 -.198 .05 1
bootstrap s.e. .338 15.243 0.691 0.025 0.163 0.222 0.259 0.179
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Table 2.9: Variance and Correlation Matrix from Bootstrapping
emp earning pop estab occupied emp/pop ln(wage) ln(rent)houses
emp 1
earning .821 1
pop .698 .476 1
estab .798 .682 .786 1
occupied housing .663 .516 .696 .635 1
emp/pop .164 .043 -.412 -.223 -.128 1
ln(wage) .129 .218 .013 .103 .112 0.068 1
ln(rent) .323 .189 .399 .285 .109 -.198 .05 1
bootstrap s.e. .338 15.243 0.691 0.025 0.163 0.222 0.259 0.179
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Table 2.10: Panel Regressions with County Fixed Effects, 1980-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
emp inc pop house price estab occ house
∆milct 1.394 84.085 3.162** 1.900 0.014 1.159**
(0.861) (49.968) (1.573) (2.395) (0.022) (0.573)
County FE X X X X X X
Period FE X X X X X X
N 762 762 762 762 762 762
First Stage F 3.007 3.007 3.007 3.007 3.007 3.007
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county level. * p < 0.05 , ** p < 0.01 , ***
p < 0.001 .
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Table 2.11: Dynamic Effect of Military Personnel Contractions- Dynamic panel




s = t− 2 -0.059 21.532 0.004
(0.146) (14.461) (0.012)
[23.036] [23.036] [23.036]
s = t− 1 0.161 10.667 0.003
(0.174) (9.616) (0.009)
[36.739] [36.739] [36.739]
s = t 0.422** 9.978 0.014
(0.207) (14.159) (0.011)
[17.667] [17.667] [17.667]
s = t+ 1 -0.137 -17.431 -0.009
(0.241) (10.812) (0.009)
[10.241] [10.241] [10.241]
s = t+ 2 -0.052 -9.572 0.001
(0.188) (13.837) (0.009)
[21.165] [21.165] [21.165]
County FE X X X
obs 4355 4355 4355
Note: Years in the sample are from 1988 to 2000. All columns control for county dummy
variables and are estimated using the 2SLS estimator. I include changes in military
personnel up to two years before and after the current year. Outcome variables are the
one year change of the county attributes as indicated by the short-hand on top of each
column. Specifically, the outcome variable is annual change of civilian sector employment
per 1980 population in Column 1; annual change of civilian sector labor income per 1980
population in Column 2; annual change in private business establishments per 1980
population in Column 3. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance
levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . Angrist-Pischke first stage partial
F-statistics for each endogenous variable is reported in brackets.
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Table 2.12: Influential Counties




busi log occ log emp
earning estab rent houses wage pop
Panel A: exl. DC area
∆milc 1.191*** 33.092* 3.346*** 0.106*** 1.366*** 0.921*** 0.491 -0.492**
(0.436) (19.084) (0.882) (0.036) (0.186) (0.189) (0.319) (0.213)
N 18579 18579 18579 18579 18579 18579 18579 18579
# of base counties 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 308
first stage F 49.8 49.800 49.8 49.8 49.8 49.8 49.8 49.8
Panel B: exl. largest bases
∆milc 1.076*** 29.663 2.662*** 0.082*** 1.485*** 0.913*** 0.632* -0.282
(0.373) (18.457) (0.671) (0.026) (0.206) (0.204) (0.371) (0.224)
N 18885 18885 18885 18885 18885 18885 18885 18885
# of base counties 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319
first stage F 76.973 76.973 76.973 76.973 76.973 76.973 76.973 76.973
Panel C: exl. politically connected
∆milc 1.279*** 32.286* 3.112*** 0.098*** 1.323*** 0.901*** 0.469 -0.261
(0.411) (17.634) (0.820) (0.033) (0.193) (0.185) (0.295) (0.230)
N 17912 17912 17912 17912 17912 17912 17912 17912
# of base counties 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
first stage F 69.272 69.272 69.272 69.272 69.272 69.272 69.272 69.272
Note: Each panel includes a sample as indicated. Each column uses the outcome variable as indicated in the panel headline. All
columns are estimated using the weighted 2SLS estimator using the predicted military personnel contractions as the instrumental
variable. Number of observations, number of county groups, first stage F- statistics are reported. Standard errors in parentheses are first
clustered at the county level, and then clustered at the county group level. Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 2.13: Commuting Zones
(1) (2) (3) (4)
civ emp civ earning civ pop
private busi
per capita
∆milz 2.885*** 50.942 3.886** 0.235***
(0.999) (44.762) (1.510) (0.070)




housing units pop rent
∆milz 1.525*** 0.104 0.949 3.660***
(0.529) (0.329) (0.777) (0.983)
Note: Each column uses the outcome variable as indicated in the column headline. There
are 16,721 observations and 208 commuting zones (indexed by z) with military bases. All
columns are estimated using the weighted 2SLS estimator using the predicted military
personnel contractions as the instrumental variable and weights constructed from the
synthetic matching. First stage F statistics is 72.877. Standard errors in parentheses are
first clustered at the commuting zone level, then clustered at the commuting zone group
level. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 2.14: Heterogeneous Effects by the Size of the Cut
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
civ civ
civ pop
busi log occ log emp
emp earning estab rent houses wage pop
Panel A: cuts ≥25th percentile
∆milc 1.326*** 36.319** 3.025*** 0.100*** 1.342*** 0.922*** 0.457 -0.240
(0.403) (17.483) (0.803) (0.032) (0.192) (0.182) (0.296) (0.226)
N 16848 16848 16848 16848 16848 16848 16848 16848
# of base counties 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 270
first stage F 72.394 72.394 72.394 72.394 72.394 72.394 72.394 72.394
Panel B: cuts ≥50th percentile
∆milc 1.340*** 38.090** 3.002*** 0.100*** 1.344*** 0.926*** 0.459 -0.254
(0.405) (17.726) (0.802) (0.032) (0.192) (0.182) (0.295) (0.226)
N 11695 11695 11695 11695 11695 11695 11695 11695
# of base counties 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
first stage F 72.044 72.044 72.044 72.044 72.044 72.044 72.044 72.044
Panel C: cuts ≥75th percentile
∆milc 1.300*** 38.455** 2.959*** 0.094*** 1.275*** 0.850*** 0.352 -0.276
(0.390) (16.872) (0.770) (0.031) (0.184) (0.162) (0.282) (0.221)
N 5996 5996 5996 5996 5996 5996 5996 5996
# of base counties 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
first stage F 72.858 72.858 72.858 72.858 72.858 72.858 72.858 72.858
Note: Each panel includes a sample as indicated. Each column uses the outcome variable as indicated in the panel headline. All
columns are estimated using the weighted 2SLS estimator using the predicted military personnel contractions as the instrumental
variable. Number of observations, number of county groups, first stage F- statistics are reported. Standard errors in parentheses are first
clustered at the county level, and then clustered at the county group level. Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 2.15: Heterogeneous Effects by Population Density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
civ civ civ busi log occ log emp
emp earning pop estab rent houses wage pop
Panel A: high population density
∆milc 1.103* 2.570 2.793*** 0.063* 0.917*** 1.147*** 0.370 0.009
(0.598) (27.972) (1.032) (0.036) (0.293) (0.380) (0.424) (0.471)
N 11031 11031 11031 11031 11031 11031 11031 11031
First Stage F 42.647 42.647 42.647 42.647 42.647 42.647 42.647 42.647
Panel B: low population density
∆milc 1.338*** 47.402** 3.249*** 0.114*** 1.550*** 1.168*** 0.518 -0.403*
(0.498) (21.479) (1.065) (0.040) (0.213) (0.317) (0.376) (0.237)
N 8756 8756 8756 8756 8756 11031 11031 11031
First Stage F 38.415 38.415 38.415 38.415 38.415 42.647 42.647 42.647
Note: Each column uses the outcome variable as indicated in the column headline. Panel
A includes base counties that have 1986 population density above the median, panel B
includes those with 1986 population density below the median. All columns are
estimated using the weighted 2SLS estimator using the predicted military personnel
contractions as the instrumental variable. First stage F statistics are reported. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses, first clustered at the county level, then clustered at
county-group-year level. Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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3 CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECT OF AID ON GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM A
QUASI-EXPERIMENT
3.1 Introduction
Whether foreign aid causes economic growth in recipient countries is a highly de-
bated research question. Following the influential studies by Boone (1996) and
Burnside and Dollar (2000), many others have emerged, but a basic consensus is
still absent. William Easterly and Roodman (2004) show that the key finding of
Burnside and Dollar (2000) – namely that aid contributes to growth but only where
economic policies are favorable – is not robust to the use of an updated and enlarged
dataset. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and Channing Arndt and Tarp (2010) are
only two of many recent papers that review the bulk of the existing literature yet
arrive at differing conclusions. Identification of the causal effect of aid on growth
has been elusive so far due to foreign aid being endogenous in growth models. An
instrumental variable is needed to address these problems. However, as Clemens
et al. (2012) conclude in their recent assessment: “the aid-growth literature does
not currently possess a strong and patently valid instrumental variable with which
to reliably test the hypothesis that aid strictly causes growth.
In this paper we contribute to this literature by instrumenting, in an eco-
nomic growth equation, the endogenous foreign aid variable exploiting a plausible
quasi-experiment created by the income threshold set by IDA (International Devel-
opment Association), the World Bank’s program of grants and concessionary loans
to low-income countries. Exploiting this new instrument, we are able to plausibly
investigate the causal effect of aid and growth.
This income threshold has been used as a key criterion in allocating scarce
IDA resources since 1987, and is adjusted annually only to take into account infla-
tion. Other major donors also appear to use the IDA threshold as an informative
signal, and we show that total aid declines significantly once a recipient country
crosses the IDA income threshold from below. The IDA threshold is nevertheless an
arbitrary income level which does not necessarily represent any structural change in
economic growth. Threshold crossing is thus a plausibly valid instrumental variable
for variations in aid over years for a recipient country in a panel data model that
controls for initial income levels and also includes country and period effects (we
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group years into 8 three-year periods).
The main concern with the identification strategy exploited in this study is
that some countries might cross the threshold by having a series of large positive
shocks that are eventually reversed, making the exclusion restriction invalid.57 This
should not necessarily be the case since our estimated empirical growth model can
account for the differential timing at which countries cross IDA threshold. In our
analysis we exploit only the data for the countries that cross the threshold from
below during the period studied while our growth model allows countries to grow at
different rates over time (by allowing for country-specific effects on growth and by
allowing conditional convergence). Additionally, countries start at the beginning of
the sample period from different levels below the threshold. Hence, the differential
timing at which countries cross the IDA threshold from below exploited for identifi-
cation in our study does not have to be driven by unobservable shocks.58 It could be
accounted for by our empirical growth model. Nevertheless, we extensively investi-
gate this threat to our identification strategy by implementing a battery of tests and
robustness checks. Importantly, we use an alternative instrumental variable based
on a smoothed income trajectory which is plausibly uncorrelated with the country
specific idiosyncratic shocks and obtain similar results. All of the evidence gathered
does not point toward rejecting our identification strategy.
Using a sample of 35 countries that crossed the IDA threshold from below
between 1987 and 2010, we find that a one percent increase in the aid to GNI ratio
raises the annual real per capita short term GDP growth rate by 0.0312 percentage
points. The mean aid to GNI ratio at the crossing is 0.09, so a one percentage
point increase in the aid to GNI ratio raises annual real per capita GDP growth by
approximately 0.35 percentage points. Our effects are about 1.75 times as large as
those reported by Clemens et al. (2012). Using OLS, they find that a one percentage
point increase in aid/GDP (at aid levels similar to our sample mean) is followed by
57On average, however, our sample of countries grew faster after crossing the IDA threshold than
before, consistent with the fact that developing countries in general exhibited better performance
in the latter part of our 1987-2010 sample period.
58Although this is true for crossing from below, it is unlikely to be true for the smaller set of
countries crossing from above the threshold; at least those countries were displaying systematic
negative growth rates such that the country fixed effects in the growth model were negative.
Moreover, IDA policies are premised on the expectation of growth and eventual graduation, and
there is no corresponding set of formal policies for “de-graduation”: instances of crossing the
threshold from above are dealt with in a more ad hoc fashion. Crossing from above and from
below may therefore have highly asymmetric effects on aid, and in turn on subsequent growth.
Thus, our study focuses only on the countries that cross the IDA threshold from below.
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at most a 0.2 percentage-point increase in growth of real GDP per capita. We find
similar effects of aid on growth to the ones reported by Clemens et al. (2012) without
instrumenting foreign aid. We also present evidence consistent with the fact that
OLS estimates suffer from attenuation bias due to measurement error in aid, which
is exacerbated when the variability in the aid to GNI ratios is exploited to identify
the effect of foreign aid on economic growth in a fixed effect or first-differenced
growth equation commonly used in the literature. Thus, one should expect that
2SLS using a valid instrument produces larger estimates than OLS. This could also
be the case if economic growth affects aid levels.
The sizable effect of foreign aid on economic growth we find may also be
attributable in part to the fact that our sample consists of a group of similar low-
income countries that are financially constrained, where aid could have the largest
impact. Prior to crossing the IDA threshold, the countries we study tend to have
relatively large amounts of aid and low capital levels. Aid is likely to be relatively
effective in this context. Although we focus on a small group of countries, our results
have strong policy relevance since the sample is composed of low-income countries.
We also show suggestive evidence that our results might have meaningful external
validity to the remaining poor countries as they grow closer to the IDA threshold.
Investment appears to be the channel through which aid affects growth. We
show the investment rate drops following the reduction in aid. Increasing the aid
to GNI ratio by one percentage point increases the investment to GDP ratio by
0.54 percentage points. The magnitude of the effects on growth and investment is
consistent with the average capital stock to GDP ratio for the sample countries,
which we estimate to be approximately 2.
As in most of the literature relying on panel data, we estimate the short-run
effect of aid on economic growth, an effect that mainly operates through physical
investment. In the long run, aid could affect growth through several other channels,
but its identification requires exogenous changes in aid over a very long period of
time. Our instrument does not provide such exogenous variability to estimate that
parameter.59
59Regressing the average growth rate over a long period of time onto the average aid on that
period does not identify the long-term effect of aid on economic growth, even if aid were exogenous
in that equation.
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3.2 Previous Aid-Growth Studies
Identifying the causal effect of foreign aid on economic growth is fraught with diffi-
culties. First, aid relative to GNI is likely measured with error.60 The problem of
measurement error is exacerbated as the estimated model is often demeaned or first
differenced in order to eliminate the country fixed effects (Griliches and Hausman,
1986). Second, identification might be confounded by unobserved factors that de-
termine both economic growth and aid. Third, growth itself could also affect aid.
In response to these potential problems, previous studies have introduced different
instrumental variables to identify the causal effect of aid on growth, in some cases
using cross-sectional data and in others panel data. In this section we briefly review
the two major identification strategies previously exploited in the literature.
Studies that use cross-sectional data often rely on population size, economic
policies and donor-recipient political connections as instruments for aid (e.g., Boone,
1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). These cross-
country instruments are likely to violate the exclusion restriction since they are
correlated with observable and plausibly also unobserved country-level character-
istics that also contribute to economic growth. For example, population size can
affect economic growth through channels other than aid Bazzi and Clemens (2013).
Donor-recipient ties (e.g. colonization, trade or migration) that are correlated with
aid flows can also affect growth indirectly through the institutional environment
Daron Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) or other channels.
Other studies relying on panel data rule out the impact of time-invariant deter-
minants of economic growth by either first differencing the data or by conditioning
on country fixed effects. These studies tend to focus more on the short term effect of
aid on growth. Many studies in this category adopt a dynamic panel model and em-
ploy difference GMM or system GMM estimators. They instrument for current aid
with lagged values of income and aid, as well as with other standard cross-country
regressors Hansen and Tarp (e.g., 2001); Rajan and Subramanian (e.g., 2008).
However, recent studies show that GMM estimators of dynamic panel models using
all mechanical instruments are unstable and potentially biased in finite samples,
due to the problem of many and weak instruments Roodman (2007,0,0); Bazzi and
Clemens (2013); Bun and Windmeijer (2010). System GMM estimators, in addition,
60Even if aid/GNI did not display measurement error, GNI itself could not be strictly exogenous
in a growth equation.
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might also suffer from the lack of valid exclusion restrictions.61
We contribute to the literature by proposing a plausibly valid instrument for
foreign aid. The IDA income threshold is exogenously determined and applicable to
all recipient countries, and hence uncorrelated with their current characteristics and
historical backgrounds. Controlling for a continuous measure of per capita income,
crossing the IDA threshold from below is found to significantly reduce aid levels.
3.3 Data and Sample
The data used in this study are primarily from two sources. Income, investment, eco-
nomic growth, and other country characteristics are from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI).62 Aid data are obtained from the Development Co-
operation Directorate (DAC) of the OECD.63 Following much of the previous litera-
ture, aid is measured by total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) disburse-
ments as a share of GNI, in current US dollars.
We identify 35 countries that crossed the IDA income threshold from below
between 1987 and 2010.64 Table 3.1 shows the names and years of crossing for
these countries. For countries that crossed the threshold more than once, in our
baseline specification we consider only the first crossing in defining the instrumental
variable. We then show, however, that our results are robust to changes in this
criterion. Following the convention of the literature, we smooth out fluctuations in
the annual data by using period averages. Due to the length of our panel dataset,
and (more importantly) because IDA has a three-year replenishment cycle, we group
years into 8 three-year periods that roughly coincide with the IDA replenishment
61A few other recent studies exploit donor-recipient connections interacted with over-time vari-
ations in total donor contributions. For example, Eric Werker and Cohen (2009) use the political
connections between OPEC countries and other Islamic countries and changes in oil prices to iden-
tify how aid money is spent. They find a small and marginally significant effect of aid on growth.
Nunn and Qian (2014) find that humanitarian aid extends civil war by using variation over time
in crop harvests to instrument for the amount of humanitarian aid that a country receives.
62http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2, accessed and ex-
tracted in August, 2012. The WDI dataset is usually updated 4 times a year. It not only adds the
most up-to-date data, but also revises historical data, some of them from many years back. Most
of the revisions are minor.
63Data are from DAC Table 2a, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A#,
accessed in August, 2012.
64Sao Tome and Principe crossed the threshold in 2009. It has only 2 periods of data in the
sample and is thus automatically dropped from the analysis and hence also from the sample.
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periods.65 The first period, with data from calendar years 1987-1989, corresponds
roughly to IDA8, covering fiscal years 1988-1990 (July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1990).
The final period, with data from 2008-2010, roughly corresponds to IDA15 (July 1,
2008 to June 30, 2011). Donors pledge contributions for each replenishment period,
rather than annually. Moreover, policies for allocating IDA funds (e.g. the relative
weights assigned to poverty, quality of economic policies, and quality of governance)
among eligible recipients are often modified between IDA periods but never within
an IDA period. For this reason country allocations should be more correlated from
one year to the next within an IDA period than across two replenishment periods.
The 3-year IDA periods are therefore a natural way of grouping the data. The timing
of actual graduations from IDA also tends to coincide with the end of replenishment
periods. The baseline sample contains 247 country-period observations.66
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for the baseline sample. Real per capita
GDP of the sample countries grew at an average annual rate of 2.9%. Investment
on average accounted for 25% of GDP. ODA equaled about 8% of GNI for a typical
country in a typical year in the sample. Of total ODA, about 9% is from IDA, 67%
is from DAC countries, 2% is from non-DAC countries, and 23% is from multilateral
agencies other than IDA.
3.4 The IDA Threshold and Foreign Aid
Beginning in 1987, a major criterion for IDA eligibility has been whether or not a
country is below a certain threshold of per capita income, measured in current US
dollars. This “operational threshold” was established for the purpose of rationing
scarce IDA funds. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the IDA threshold converted
in current US dollars between 1987 and 2010. It was originally set at $580, and has
been adjusted annually only for inflation. By 2010, the threshold had increased to
$1175.
Once a country has exceeded the IDA income threshold and is judged to be
65Recent studies that use panel data often group years in 4- or 5-year periods. As Temple
(1999, 132) observes, “The question of when to test for growth impacts plagues the entire growth
literature, not just aid-growth research. Empirical research on the determinants of growth cannot
escape the selection of a fixed observation period, but “selecting the time intervals over which to
study growth ... is a question that remains largely unsettled.” (excerted from Clemens et al.,
2012). We nevertheless follow the convention of the literature by using non-overlapping periods.
66Appendix Table 3.16 lists the definitions and sources of data for variables used in this paper.
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creditworthy, it is considered on track for “graduation” from IDA. Allowance is
made for the possibility of income fluctuations, so lending volumes typically are
reduced (and repayments accelerated) only after a country has remained over the
threshold for three consecutive years. Thus, in most cases threshold crossing will
result in reductions of IDA flows beginning in the next replenishment period, not
in the current one World Bank (2010,0). The decline in aid from IDA is amplified
by similar behavior from other donors. Some agencies such as African Development
Bank (AfDB) and Asian Development Bank (AsDB) explicitly use the IDA income
threshold in their own aid eligibility criteria. Other donors often view crossing the
IDA income threshold as a signal that countries are in less need of aid and cut their
own aid, reinforcing the decline in aid from IDA Moss and Majerowicz (2012). As a
result, although IDA usually contributes less than 10% of the total aid to a typical
recipient, crossing the IDA threshold may have a sizable effect on total aid.
The relevance of IDA threshold crossing as an instrument for aid can be tested
by looking at its effects on total aid and aid from different donors. We distinguish
among four groups of donors: IDA, DAC (OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee) bilateral donors, non-DAC bilateral donors, and other multilateral donors.
Lagged aid is the main explanatory variable in our growth regressions, so our in-
strumental variable is a dummy indicating whether the country has crossed the IDA
threshold at least two periods earlier. Throughout the paper we use t to represent
a specific year and s to represent a specific period. We define Crossingi,s−2 equal to
1 if a country’s first threshold crossing during the sample period took place at least
two periods before period s, where s includes years t − 2, t − 1, and t. Otherwise,
Crossingi,s−2 equals 0. We estimate the following equation:
Aidjis−1 = β1yis−1 + β2Crossingis−2 + β3Popis−1 + λi + τs + vjis (3.1)
The dependent variable Aidjis−1 is the log of average ratio of aid from donor type j to
GNI or the log ratio of average total aid (i.e., the sum of aid from all donor sources) to




y denotes log real per capita GDP measured in constant 2000 US dollars. yis−1 is
measured as log real per capita GDP in the second year of the last period s − 1
67We follow the convention of the majority of the literature and measure both GNI and ODA
in current US dollars. A minority of studies, such as Boone (1996), use GNI in purchasing power
parity terms, however.
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and hence it is equal to yit−4. Popis−1 is the log average population of period s− 1.
Crossingis−2 is defined as earlier. This second lag is introduced because the IDA
graduation process – including cuts in new lending and acceleration of repayments
– typically begins only three years after a country crosses the threshold, i.e. in the
next replenishment period. The crossing status lagged one period relative to aid
also allows time for other donors to respond to threshold crossings.
Table 3.3 reports the results of estimating Equation 3.1. For Column 1 to Col-
umn 5, respectively, the dependent variables are the one-period lag of the logarithm
of aid share of GNI from (1) IDA, (2) DAC countries, (3) non-DAC countries, (4)
multilateral agencies except for IDA, and (5) all donors.
To be conservative, we use two alternative methods to conduct statistical in-
ference throughout the paper. We first report robust standard errors clustered at
the country level, which allow for arbitrary within-country correlation. There are
35 countries in our sample. Standard asymptotic tests might over-reject the null
hypothesis under the presence of few clusters Bertrand et al. (2004). Although
35 clusters is not a small number, for robustness we also report the p-value from
the wild bootstrap-t procedure following Cameron et al. (2008).68 Either approach
yields very similar statistical inferences.
We find that following IDA threshold-crossing, the IDA to GNI ratio dropped,
on average, by about 92 percent (i.e., 1 − e−2.5). Other donors also cut their aid
substantially. Estimates of the coefficients associated with threshold crossing are
negative and substantial in magnitude. Except for aid from non-DAC donors, the
estimated coefficients are also statistically significant at conventional levels. The
total aid to GNI ratio dropped, on average, by 59 percent (i.e., 1− e−0.88). Higher
income levels are also a strong predictor of aid: a one percent increase in real per
capita GDP is associated with reductions in aid of about 8.6 percent from IDA, 1.4
percent from DAC countries, 4.7 percent from non-DAC countries, 2.5 percent from
other multilateral agencies, and 1.5 percent for the overall ODA to GNI ratio.
We test whether our results are robust to controlling for a quadratic relation-
ship between aid and log initial income level, with results shown in Table 3.11. The
68To calculate the wild bootstrap p-value, we first calculate the Wald statistic w0 associated
with the estimate β̂0 using the original sample. We then estimate β̂b and its standard error ˆse(β)
for each wild bootstrap sample b out of B (= 1000) bootstrapped samples: wb = (β̂b − β̂0)/ ˆse(β).
The p-value is computed as follows: first we locate in the distribution of the wb the percentile of
w0, α. Then, if α ≤ 0.5, the p-value is equal to 2α while if α > 0.5, then the p−value is equal to
2(1− α).
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estimated coefficients on the IDA threshold crossing dummy all increase slightly (in
absolute value), and the quadratic specification does not improve the fit between aid
and income. Most notably, the coefficients for log initial income level and its square
are not statistically significant for total aid/GNI (see Column 5, Table 3.11).
We conduct a placebo test to further ensure that these effects are not a sta-
tistical artifact. Specifically, we replace the true IDA threshold value with a fake
threshold equal to 50% of the true value, and re-estimate equation 3.1 using a
threshold-crossing dummy variable based on this false threshold.69 Table 3.4 reports
the results of this falsification test. In the analysis we retain only country-period
observations prior to the period in which countries cross the actual threshold, so the
regression sample is unaffected by the effect of actually crossing the true threshold.70
Crossing the false threshold has no significant effect on aid, and its coefficient has
an opposite sign of the coefficient associated with the true threshold value.
Another concern is that IDA threshold crossing may not be a good instru-
ment to identify the direct or structural effect of aid on economic growth because
country leaders may endogenously alter policies to take advantage of potential com-
plementarity (or substitutability) between aid money and policies.71 Ex ante it is
unclear whether and how aid might affect the quality of policymaking—one can
conceive easily aid improves policymaking or instead make policymaking worse by
stimulating rent seeking (e.g., Rodrik, 1996)—and whether country leaders can en-
gineer quick policy changes to have an immediate effect on growth along desired
directions.72 We investigate this potential threat to our identification strategy by
estimating equation 3.1 after replacing aid as the dependent variable by a set of
variables measuring policymaking and institutional quality. These variables include
measures of civil liberty and political rights from Freedom House, the World Bank
CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment), broad money (M2) as a per-
centage of GDP, inflation measured by the GDP deflator, and dummy variables
6950% of the true value is an appropriate level for the placebo test. Few countries have income
levels below alternative fake thresholds that are much smaller than 50%. Fake thresholds that
are much closer to the true level predict the actual crossings too well, defeating the purpose of a
placebo test.
70For sample countries with per capita GNI always above the fake threshold, the crossing dummy
is replaced with 0.
71This threat applies also to papers that take aid as exogenous.
72As Rodrik (1996) notes, “. . . external resources reduce the costs both of reform and of doing
nothing—that is, avoiding reform.” Thus, ultimately, it is an empirical question whether aid or,
more generally, conditions attached to loans affect policymaking and/or policies, which might have
a different answer in different samples.
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indicating respectively bank, currency and debt crisis (See Table 3.16 for the defi-
nition of these variables).73 Results reported in Table 3.12 show that crossing the
threshold has no statistically significant effect on any of the variables considered.
Thus, we document that crossing the IDA income threshold mainly affects the level
of aid and not quality of policymaking and policies adopted in the countries in our
sample. We also show below that our main results are robust to including these
variables as economic controls.
3.5 Foreign Aid and Economic Growth
3.5.1 Econometric Models
We postulate the following model in order to test the null hypothesis that foreign
aid does not affect economic growth:
gis = β1yis−1 + β2Aidis−1 +Xis · β3 + λi + τs + εis, (3.2)
where, as before, s denotes non-overlapping 3-year periods. Period s includes years
t, t− 1, t− 2. y denotes log real per capita GDP. gis, constructed as (yit− yit−3)/3,
is the arithmetic average real GDP per capita growth rate of country i in period s.
yis−1 is measured as the log real per capita GDP in the second year of the previous
period (i.e., yit−4).74 We expect β1 to be negative. The initial income level captures
conditional convergence – as a country gets richer, it grows more slowly, ceteris
paribus. Aidis−1 is the log of average aid received by country i as a share of GNI in
the previous period.75 We use the one-period lag of aid instead of contemporaneous
73We do not include trade as a percentage of GDP in the analysis in this section, because our
interpretation of the effect of aid in our sample is that it operates directly by allowing financially
constrained recipient countries to increase investment, which likely affects imports, and hence total
trade as a percentage of GDP.
74Notice that, by construction, yis−1 is not mechanically correlated with the dependent variable.
Some studies in the literature use per capita real GDP in purchasing power parity terms to measure
income level and to calculate growth (e.g., Boone, 1996). Real per capita GDP based on current
exchange rates (in constant dollar terms, and using the Atlas method) and real per capita GDP
in PPP terms are highly correlated: in our sample, the correlation is over 0.95. Growth rates
constructed from the two versions are essentially the same. We use per capita GDP based on
current exchange rates (in constant dollars) because there are fewer missing observations in the
WDI database than for the PPP measure. Using instead the PPP measure we obtain almost
identical results for our basic specifications in Table 3.5.
75The measure of aid is slightly different from most of the literature which often use the aid
to GDP or GNI ratio as the main explanatory variable. We take the log of aid since previous
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aid in order to allow time for aid to take effect, following Clemens et al. (2012). Xis
is a vector of time-varying variables, which in our baseline specification includes the
logarithm of population and it is assumed to be strictly exogenous (though we do
not use its lagged values as instruments in any specification). We check below the
robustness of our key results to controlling for other potential growth determinants.
λi is the country i fixed effect. τs is the period s fixed effect.
The standard way to estimate equation 3.2 is to eliminate the unobservable
country-specific effects, λi, by including a set of country dummy variables in the
model, which is equivalent to demeaned equation 3.2 and estimate the transformed
equation by OLS. This estimator, however, is likely to be inconsistent due to aid
being also affected by economic growth, measurement error, and (perhaps also)
time-varying unobservable variables. We therefore instrument aid in period s − 1
(i.e., Aidis−1) with a dummy variable indicating whether the country has crossed the
IDA threshold by the end of period s−2, that is, Crossingis−2, as defined in Section
3.4. To address the endogeneity of the initial income level yis−1, we instrument the
initial income level with further lags of the income level.
Our instrumental variable is based on per capita (nominal) GNI crossing the
IDA threshold two periods earlier. Per capita (nominal) GNI level in period s − 2
is correlated with the idiosyncratic shock to (real) economic growth of that period,
εis−2.76 Thus, estimating equation 3.2 by means of the fixed effects estimator, which
first de-means the equation, mechanically introduces a correlation between the in-
strumental variable and the demeaned error term, ε̈is = (εis − ε̄i). However, if εis
is not serially correlated, the correlation between ε̈is and ε̈is−2 will be small if the
evidence suggests that the marginal effect of aid on growth is decreasing. The logarithmic form
is a parsimonious way to introduce concavity while preserving our ability to identify aid’s causal
impact with only one exogenous binary instrumental variable. However, note that instrumented
aid still takes on a large number of values on its domain, since each country’s aid is shifted by the
instrument starting from different values (over time). The logarithmic specification is admittedly
less flexible than a quadratic specification; in particular, it does not allow the marginal effect of aid
to change its sign. Clemens et al. (2012), however, find that the effect of aid on growth does not
turn negative until aid exceeds roughly 15% of GDP. In our sample, over 90% of the observations
are below 11% of GDP. Thus a logarithmic specification provides a good approximation over the
range of observed values on aid. Additionally, we report as a robustness test in Table 3.14 results
from using Aid∗is−1 = (
∑5
k=3(ODAit−k/GNIit−k))/3 (i.e. not logged) as the measure for aid.
Aid∗is−1 has a positive, quantitatively large, and marginally significant coefficient, despite a lower
first stage F statistic. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the aid to GNI ratio raises
annual per capita GDP growth by 0.57 percentage point at the sample mean of the aid to GNI
ratio. This estimate is even larger than our baseline result, reported later.
76This correlation could be weak, however, since our instrumental variable is a dichotomous
variable and the error term only affects the latent process behind the binary variable.
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time dimension of the panel is large. Our sample has 8 periods, which is not con-
sidered short in the literature. We will also show below that we do not reject the
null hypothesis of no serially correlation of the error terms in equation 3.2. Note,
nevertheless, that since εis−2 is negatively correlated with ε̈is, Crossingis−2 is also
probably correlated with the demeaned error term and, hence, the 2SLS estimator
of the demeaned equation will likely under-estimate, ceteris paribus, the true effect
of aid on economic growth.
We propose two approaches to circumvent this potential statistical problem.
The first approach relies on a smoothing method of the latent process that deter-
mines our instrumental variable. Specifically, we do the following. We take a panel
of 130 developing countries that appear in the official DAC aid recipient country
list at any time between 1987 and 2010, other than the 35 countries in our original
sample.77 We demean all the series in our extended panel (165 countries in total)
by projecting the annual log of nominal per capita GNI onto a set of country fixed
effects, denoted ŷi. We then take the residuals, êit. For each of the 35 countries
in our working sample, we construct a set of weights wj ∈ {wi, w2, ..., wJ} bounded
between 0 and 1 for the 130 donor countries added to the dataset such that the
following distance function is minimized:
Di = ||ei −
∑
j
wj · ej||, (3.3)
where || · || is the Euclidian distance operator. The vector e includes the residuals
êht. For each country i, we use all the years in our sample because that minimizes
the influence of a given observation around the period of crossing the IDA threshold.





êjt, and construct the predicted log per capita nominal GNI as ŷit = ŷi + êit.78 By
the nature of construction, ŷit is plausibly uncorrelated with the error in equations
3.2.79 Thus the predicted crossing of the IDA threshold based on exp(ŷit) is also
77Since the both our sample and the extended dataset are unbalanced panels, for each of the 35
countries in our sample we only use a panel of balanced available donors.
78This algorithm is in the spirit of the synthetic control approach discussed in Alberto Abadie
and Hainmueller (2009), but its sole purpose here is to provide a set of weights to smooth income
trajectories from country specific idiosyncratic shocks.
79Exploiting the conditional expectation function of per capita GNI based on the cross country’s
own data to construct an alternative instrumental variable for aid would not work here because the
factors of production, like capital, for example, could be subject to the similar country idiosyncratic
shocks that we want to eliminate from the series of output in this robustness check.
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likely to be uncorrelated with the error term, satisfying the exclusion restriction
needed for identification. Accordingly, we also exploit in our analysis the predicted
crossing two periods earlier, Crossingpredis , as the instrumental variable for Aidis−1.
There are 10 countries out of 35 for which we predict a different period of crossing
than their respective actual period of crossing.80
The second approach we adopt to circumvent the threat to our identification
strategy is to first-difference equation 3.2 and estimating the following equation:
∆gis = β1∆yis−1 + β2∆Aidis−1 + ∆Xis · β3 + τs + ∆εis (3.4)
In using ∆Crossingis−2 to instrument ∆Aidis−1, our identification strategy exploits
only the sharp variability in aid at the period after crossing the IDA threshold.
Under treatment heterogeneity, both in terms of the effect of threshold-crossing on
aid and of the latter on economic growth, this strategy will identify a particular
local average causal effect. Instead, we can also use just Crossingis−2 to instrument
for ∆Aidis−1. Note that ∆εis = εis − εis−1.
Thus, the validity of the exclusion restriction in this case basically requires that
the error terms εis are serially uncorrelated. Therefore, the instrumental variable
will be invalid if the unobservable idiosyncratic error term in the growth equation
is serially correlated up to two periods. Below we investigate in depth the validity
of this assumption. Finally, as another robustness check, we also use Crossingpredis−2
as the instrument for aid.
In the first differenced model, even if the error terms in equation 3.2 were
i.i.d., the transformed error terms will not be, and will exhibit first-order serial
correlation. Standard GMM inference when using optimal weights takes into account
this feature while 2SLS does not. Thus, through the rest of the paper (with the
exception of models estimated by GMM), as in the previous section, we rely on two
alternative methods to conduct statistical inference. We first report robust standard
errors clustered at the country level, which allow for within-country correlation. For
robustness, we also report the p-values from the wild bootstrap-t procedure. Both
methods imply similar statistical conclusions for the main parameters of the growth
equation.
80These 10 countries are: Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana, In-
donesia, Kiribati, Peru, Samoa, and Ukraine. Countries for which the predicted and actual periods




Column 1 of Table 3.5 reports the estimate of equation 3.2 without instrumenting aid
while column 2 reports the estimate of equation 3.4 also without instrumenting aid.
Columns 3 through 7 are all estimated by the 2SLS estimator where we instrument
only for aid. Column 3 estimates equation 3.2 using Crossingis−2 as the instrument
for Aidis−1. Column 4 uses the crossings based on predicted per capita GNI from the
smoothing exercise, Crossingpredis−2, as the instrumental variable. Finally, columns 5
to 7 report estimates of equation 3.4 using respectively ∆Crossingis−2, Crossingis−2
and Crossingpredis−2 as instrumental variables.
The fixed effect model in Column 1 and first difference estimate in Column
2 show that aid is positively correlated with real economic growth. The estimated
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level but is small in magnitude. A
one percent increase in the aid to GNI ratio increases annual real per capita GDP
growth by 0.0105 and 0.013 percentage points.
Studies on aid and growth typically calculate the increases in annual real per
capita GDP growth rate in percentage points implied by a one percentage point
increase in ODA’s share of GNI. Because we take logs of ODA/GNI, the implied
effect of a percentage point increase in ODA/GNI depends on its level. We use the
average aid to GNI ratio at the period of crossing (i.e., 0.09) because this is the
most relevant value given our identification strategy. The OLS estimate in Column
1 suggests that a one percentage point increase in the aid to GNI ratio from the
average level at the period of crossing is associated with a 0.12 percentage point
increase in real per capita GDP growth. The result in Column 2 implies that a 1
percentage point increase in the aid to GNI ratio from the same level is associated
with a 0.14 percentage point increase in growth. These findings are similar to those
in Clemens et al. (2012). They address endogeneity of aid simply by lagging it one
period, and find that a one percentage point increase in aid/GDP from the sample
mean increases annual real per capita GDP growth by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points
in the next (4-year) period.
Columns 3 through 7 are estimated using the 2SLS method. The point es-
timates of the aid coefficient are more than twice as large as those estimated by
OLS. In column 3 we report the estimate of equation 3.2 using Crossingis−2 as the
instrument for Aidis−1. We find that a one percent increase in the aid to GNI ratio
raises growth by 0.028 percentage points. The coefficient is statistically significant
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at the 1% level according to cluster-robust standard errors or by the wild bootstrap
procedure. The first stage is strong, with an F−statistic of about 16. Initial income
is negatively correlated with growth, supporting the hypothesis of conditional con-
vergence. In column 4 we use the predicted crossings based on the smoothed per
capita GNI trajectory, Crossingpredis−2 as the instrument. The estimated coefficient
associated with Aidis−1 increases slightly, as expected, to 0.352 and is statistically
significant at the 5% level. The first stage is somewhat weaker, with an F−statistic
of 7.4. Interestingly enough, the point estimates of the effect of aid on economic
growth in columns 3 and 4 are not very different quantitatively and are not statis-
tically different.
Columns 5 through 7 estimate the first differenced model in equation 3.4. The
coefficients are all larger than those in Column 3 and Column 4. Column 5 uses
∆Crossingis−2 as the instrumental variable for ∆Aidis−1. In this specification, we
are estimating the coefficient of aid using only the variability from the one period
after crossing. The estimated coefficient associated with aid is 0.0475 and is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level, and just misses the 5% level according to the
wild bootstrap−t procedure. Higher initial income levels are associated with lower
growth, and the coefficient is larger than those in the previous columns. Column 6
uses Crossingis−2 as the instrumental variable for ∆Aidis−1. The first stage and the
estimated coefficients are essentially unchanged from those in column 5. Column 7
uses the predicted crossing, Crossingpredis−2, as the instrument. The first stage is very
strong, with an F−statistic of 24. The estimated coefficient associated with aid is
0.055 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. All in all, our instrumental
variable estimates are robust and consistently larger than the OLS estimates.81
As we discussed in the previous subsection, for the first differenced model,
our instrumental variable approach will be invalid if the unobservable idiosyncratic
error term in the growth equation (equation 3.2) is serially correlated. We formally
test for the presence of serial auto-correlation in the error terms in equation 3.2
following Arellano and Bond (1991). The Arrellano-Bond test for serial correlation
tests the nth order of serial correlation of the first differenced error to infer the
(n − 1)th order of serial correlation of the error terms in the original equation (see
also Roodman, 2009b). We report the p−values of the Arellano-Bond tests for
AR(2) after estimations in Columns 5, 6, and 7. None of the tests rejects the null
81Table 3.13 re-estimates the model in column 3 of Table 3.5 while including quadratic and cubic
terms of yis−1. The results remain similar.
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hypothesis of no serial correlation in the errors in equation 3.2.
So far we have treated Aidis−1 as the only endogenous variable. However,
the initial income level, yis−1, is also endogenous. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6
we re-estimate the models in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5, respectively, but also
instrumenting yis−1 (i.e., yit−4) with yit−5. In column 3 we re-estimate the model in
column 6 of Table 3.5 and uses yit−8 to instrument for ∆yis−1 (i.e., yit−4 − yit−7).
The aid coefficient remains similar. Columns 4 and 5 are estimated by means of the
difference GMM estimator, which is widely applied in this literature. In light of the
potential problems of many instruments, we use a parsimonious set of instruments
(Roodman, 2007,0,0; Bazzi and Clemens, 2013; Bun and Windmeijer, 2010). We use
yit−8, yit−9, yit−10 as instruments. We use Crossingis−2 as an instrument in Column
4 and Crossingpredis−2 in Column 5. With instruments outnumbering endogenous vari-
ables, we are able to test the validity of these over-identified restrictions, as a way
to test for model specification. Both the Sargan and Hansen tests do not reject the
null hypothesis of the validity of the over-identification restrictions in both columns.
Failing to reject the null hypothesis of the over-identification restriction, and
failing to detect an AR(1) structure in the error term in equation 3.2, both suggest
that the error terms in the growth equation (equation 3.2) are serially uncorrelated.
Here we provide a third piece of evidence. If the error terms were serially correlated,
including lagged values of the dependent variable will likely alter the estimates of
the aid coefficient. We re-estimate the model in Column 3 of Table 3.5 but include
the once-lagged value of the dependent variable as a control variable (Column 6 of
Table 3.6), or its twice-lagged value (Column 7 of Table 3.6), and then both the
once- and twice-lagged values (Column 8 of Table 3.6). Columns 9, 10, and 11 of
Table 3.6 repeat Columns 6, 7, and 8 but using Crossingpredis−2 to instrument aid. The
estimates of the effect of aid remain similar.82
We find a sizable effect of aid on economic growth. The estimated effects of
aid on economic growth on Columns 1 to 5 in Table 3.6 are all very similar. Taking
the point estimate in Column 2 we observe that a one percent increase in aid to
GNI ratio increases real per capita GDP growth by 0.0312 percentage points. A
one percentage point increase in the aid to GNI ratio from its average value at the
82For the model in column 3 of Table 3.5, we find that the clustered standard errors and the
robust standard errors are very similar (results not shown). The similarity between the two sets
of standard errors is consistent with the evidence of lack of serial correlation of the error term in
equation 3.2.
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period of crossing (0.09) thus raises the growth rate by 0.35 percentage points.
In the short run, the main possible channel through which aid could cause
growth is through fostering physical investment. Irrespective of the form aid takes,
it constitutes a flow of funds to recipient countries, which (if they are financially
and perhaps fiscally constrained) would release resources in the economy that could
be invested. Because the countries we study were all financially constrained by
definition, this is a relevant scenario. However, our results would not necessarily
extrapolate to countries that are more developed and have better access to credit
markets.
It is useful then to consider what would be the expected effect of an increase
of 1 percentage point in aid if it were fully invested in physical capital. Assuming a
linear technology at the aggregate level of the economy, the rate of economic growth
would increase in the inverse of the capital-output ratio.83 Using the standard
perpetual inventory method, we estimate this ratio to be approximately equal to
3.2 in our sample.84 Thus, one would expect that growth could increase by as much
as 0.5 percentage points if all of the aid were invested.
How much aid fosters physical investment is therefore an empirical question,
one we now investigate. In Table 3.15 we re-estimate the baseline specifications in
Table 5 but replacing economic growth with the period average investment to GDP
ratio as the dependent variable. The OLS estimates in Column 1 and Column 2 of
the effect of aid on investment are statistically insignificant and have the “wrong”
sign. Instrumenting investment in Columns 3 to 7, we find that the coefficient
associated with aid becomes positive and ranges between 0.5 and 0.8. In one case
it is significant at the 10% level but in general it is only marginally significant,
with p-values around 0.15. In column 4 we see that a one percent increase in aid
to GNI ratio increases the investment to GDP ratio by 0.049 percentage points.
Evaluated at the average level of aid to GNI ratio at the period of crossing, an
increase of 1 percentage point in the aid to GNI ratio increases the investment to
GDP ratio by 0.54 percentage points. Using the estimated capital-output ratio of 2,
83Note that even under a linear technology the effect of aid on economic growth could be strictly
concave since, for instance, the effect of aid on physical investment might be decreasing in aid.
Moreover, the aggregate technology could be non-linear.
84Note also that this figure is also consistent with standard growth accounting assumptions.
Assuming capital per capita depreciation rate of 10 percent per year, and an investment rate of
25 percent of GDP per year, a country with a capital-output ratio of 2 would grow, in per capita
terms, at 2.5 percent per year, which is consistent with the figures in our sample.
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a 0.54 percentage point increase in physical investment would raise economic growth
by 0.27 percentage points, which is not far away from our back-of-the-envelope
calculation of the effect of aid on growth.
3.5.3 Measurement Error in Aid
An issue that is overlooked in the aid-growth literature is that the amount of aid
that a country receives as a ratio of its GNI is likely to be measured with error.
Not all donors report their aid to the DAC in all years. For example, aid from the
former Soviet Union and from China in the Mao era to other communist countries
was not reported to the DAC. Aid from China and some other emerging donors has
increased in recent years and is also not included in the DAC data. Additionally,
but better understood, the denominator, GNI, is also measured with sizeable error
for many less developed countries (Jerven, 2013). With classic measurement error,
the OLS estimate of the effect of aid is biased towards zero. Demeaning or first
differencing the model would exacerbate the bias if aid levels are persistent over
time.
The natural experiment we exploit in this paper provides a unique opportu-
nity to test the hypothesis that measurement error in foreign aid biases the OLS
estimate towards zero. We have shown that the amount of aid a country receives
tends to decline substantially following its crossing of the IDA threshold from below.
Assuming that the measurement error is i.i.d., it would contribute much less to the
total variation in ∆Aidis in periods closer to threshold crossings. Thus the OLS
estimates of equation 3.4 using only periods in the neighborhood of the crossings
are likely to provide more accurate estimates of aid’s effect on growth than the one
exploiting all of the variability in aid from all periods. To test this, we re-estimate
equation 3.4 by OLS and 2SLS (using Crossingis−2 to instrument aid), successively
narrowing the window of periods used in the analysis around the crossing point of
each country.85 We expect the OLS estimate of the effect of aid on growth to increase
as we narrow the window of estimation. Naturally, given our identification strategy,
the 2SLS estimate of the same parameter should remain stable independent of the
window used for estimation. We find exactly that in Table 3.7, Panel B.
85We rely on first differenced models in this exercise because changing the number of periods
also affects the estimation of the country fixed effects, and we want to hold everything constant
except for the signal to noise ratio in aid.
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Panel A of Table 3.7 reports the OLS estimates. We start from the original
sample, which has a maximum of 7 periods before crossing the threshold and 7
periods after crossing the threshold. Columns 2 through 6 gradually narrow to
at most 2 periods before and 2 periods after the crossing point of each country.
As we narrow the window, the estimated coefficient associated with foreign aid
monotonously and gradually increases. The coefficient in Column 6 is 0.0201, more
than 50% larger than that in Column 1. A generalized Hausman test of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient associated with Aidis−1 is the same in Column 1 and
in Column 6 is rejected with a p-value of 0.07. These findings are consistent with
the existence of significant measurement error in aid, reinforcing the supposition
that the aid to GNI ratio is measured with substantial noise.
3.5.4 Bunching
Our identification strategy hinges on the large decline in the amount of aid received
following the crossing of an arbitrarily given and pre-determined threshold. If coun-
tries can manipulate their income data to remain below the IDA threshold, then
threshold crossing may not be a valid instrument for aid. Countries with lower ex-
pected growth and hence a greater “need” for aid would presumably be the most
likely to understate their incomes to remain IDA eligible.
Endogenous manipulation of the income level is not likely to be prevalent
for several reasons. First, the GNI estimates used by the World Bank are by no
means entirely within a government’s control. The national accounts data produced
by national statistical agencies are merely one of several inputs into the World
Bank’s income estimates Jerven (2013). Governments cannot perfectly predict (1)
the adjustments to those national accounts data often made by World Bank staff,
(2) the exchange rates used, or (3) the population estimates used in constructing
GNI per capita. Second, crossing also depends on the current IDA threshold, and
its annual adjustments for global inflation rates cannot be predicted perfectly either.
Finally, income level with respect to the threshold is not the only criterion for IDA
eligibility; e.g. countries that cross the threshold from below can remain eligible if
they are not judged to be creditworthy for IBRD or private lending.
Nevertheless, we tested for evidence of manipulation. A histogram on the left
side of Figure 3.2 shows the distance between a country’s current GNI per capita
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and the contemporaneous IDA threshold. All countries that were ever eligible for
IDA between 1987 and 2010 are included, and each GNI per capita value in each
country-year is treated as a separate observation. We group country-year obser-
vations in 100-dollar bins according to the distance between income level and the
contemporaneous IDA threshold. If many governments understate GNI to stay be-
low the IDA threshold, we should observe significant “bunching” of observations just
below the threshold, relative to the number of observations just above it. Specifi-
cally, we should observe the bin just to the left of the threshold to be abnormally
high relative to the neighboring bins. If there is no bunching, the numbers of ob-
servations in each bin should cross the threshold of zero smoothly. As shown in the
histogram on the left in Figure 3.2, there is no visual evidence that countries bunch
right below the IDA threshold. A formal test confirms this result. Using a density
test proposed by McCrary (2008), we find no significant evidence of bunching. The
graph on the right in Figure 3.2 shows the fitted kernel density functions at both
sides of the threshold. Contrary to the pattern expected of endogenous manipula-
tion, the density is actually lower to the left of the threshold. The estimated “jump”
in density from left to right is the opposite of what we would expect if bunching
exists (-0.000291, with standard error equal to 0.000818).
3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section we present various robustness tests. In all of these tests, we report
two sets of results. The first uses Crossingis−2 as the instrument for aid, and the
second uses Crossingis−2. All of the robustness checks are based on our preferred
specification in Column 3 of Table 3.5 (or Column 4 of Table 3.5 when Crossingpredis−2
is used as the instrument). Results are largely consistent in both sets of results.86
3.6.1 Omitted Variables
Throughout the study, we control for period fixed effects, log of initial income,
and log of population. Period fixed effects take account of secular trends that
affect all countries similarly. Initial income and population are among the key time-
86Results are also robust to (for example) the model column 6 of Table 3.5.
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varying factors that affect economic growth. We also control for country fixed effects
which account for any time-invariant cross-country variability in economic growth.
Other important determinants of growth such as the quality of economic policies
and institutions exhibit much more cross-country variation than variation over time
within a country, particularly over our relatively short 1987-2010 period. Their
impact will thus mostly be captured by the country fixed effects.
We nevertheless test whether other time-varying factors could be confounding
the effect of aid on economic growth, by adding to the baseline regression a host of
economic and political variables, including the primary school enrollment rate, the
Freedom House index of civil liberty and political rights, the World Bank’s Country
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings, total trade as a percentage of
GDP, broad money as a percentage of GDP, inflation as measured by the GDP
deflator, and dummies for whether the country is experiencing a banking crisis,
currency crisis, or debt crisis. Due to missing values, we add these variables in
separate groups to maintain a reasonable sample size for each regression. Table
3.8 shows the results of these exercises. Columns 1 through 5 use Crossingis−2
to instrument for aid while Columns 6 through 10 use Crossingpredis−2. In this small
and homogeneous sample that controls for country fixed effects, few of the additional
regressors have a statistically significant effect on growth in either set of estimations.
In Columns 1 through 5, the first stage remains relatively strong throughout, while
the estimated coefficients for aid remain robustly positive, large and significant.
In Columns 6 through 10, the first stages are somewhat weaker. However, the
aid coefficients remain statistically significant and similar in magnitude to their
counterparts in the baseline regressions.
3.6.2 Timing of Crossing
Recall that our instrument is a dummy variable that switches from 0 to 1 two
periods after the country crosses the income threshold from below. The countries in
our sample all crossed the threshold at some point between 1987 and 2010, but for
countries that crossed the threshold in the last and the next-to-the-last periods (i.e.
in periods 7 or 8) the instrumental dummy variable is always zero. We keep these
countries in the sample because they satisfy our simple rule for sample selection and
they provide relevant information for estimating the effects of the control variables.
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We now check whether our results still hold when we drop these countries.
In Column 1 of Panel A in Table 3.9, we drop the seven countries that crossed
the threshold in the final period of our sample (2008-2010). The point estimate
increases and remains statistically significant at conventional levels. In Column 2
we further drop the seven countries that crossed the threshold in the next-to-last
period (2005-2007). The coefficient is slightly larger than that in Column 2 and
remains statistically significant at the 5% level. The first stage remains strong in
each case. The first stage is weaker when we use Crossingpredis−2 as the instrument in
panel B, but the results are qualitatively similar.
As shown in Table 3.1, a few countries crossed the IDA threshold from below
more than once during the sample period. These countries must have crossed the
threshold from above after its first crossing from below, then crossed from below
again. These cases might be a threat to our identification strategy. If income drops
below the threshold again immediately after the first crossing for any reason other
than a decline in aid, the estimated effect of aid might be confounded. In Column
3 of Panel A of Table 3.9, we drop countries with multiple crossings. The estimated
effect of aid changes very little. In Column 4, we use the last threshold crossing
(from below) instead of the first one to construct the instrumental variable. The
estimated effect of aid on growth again changes very little, relative to the baseline
specification. It remains statistically significant in panel A, but in panel B the
standard errors increase and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect at
conventional levels.
3.6.3 Other Robustness Checks
There are two exceptional groups of countries in the sample. First, a few countries
were never classified as IDA eligible in the 1987-2010 period due to various reasons,
despite having income levels below the threshold for one or more years. We include
them in the sample because the IDA income threshold potentially serves as a useful
benchmark for donors other than IDA. Second, several countries in the sample ben-
efit from the “small island country exception,” which permits island nations with
populations below 1.5 million to remain IDA eligible even after surpassing the in-
come threshold. In Column 5 we drop the three small island countries of Table 3.9.
In Column 6, we drop the four countries that were never eligible for IDA throughout
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the sample period. The estimated effects of aid are robust to these sample changes.
3.7 External Validity
Our sample consists of a special group of aid-recipient countries that all successfully
crossed the IDA income threshold from below between 1987 and 2010. A natural
question is how our results would apply to other aid-recipient countries, particularly
those that are still below the IDA cutoff. On the one hand, if the sample countries
crossed the IDA threshold level because they have fundamentally different attributes,
the results of this paper may have little relevance for those remaining very poor.
On the other hand, if the difference between crossing and non-crossing countries
is mainly due to being in different development stages, and the two samples have
similar growth patterns conditional on the initial income, then it is conceivable that
our results may apply to these countries as well when their income level approaches
the IDA threshold.
In this section we investigate whether the crossing countries have systemat-
ically higher growth rates (conditional on the initial income level) than the non-
crossing countries using a simple regression. We include all country-year observa-
tions with per capita GNI level below the threshold, and linearly project the annual
real per capita GDP growth onto a dummy variable indicating whether the obser-
vation belongs to a country in the crossing sample, controlling for a one-year lag
of log per capita real GDP and its quadratic form, as well as for year dummies.
When their income levels were still below the IDA threshold, real per capita GDP
in countries that eventually crossed were growing on average 1.98% per year. During
the same period, real per capita GDP in countries that had not crossed the thresh-
old by 2010 were growing on average 1.11% per year. In Table 3.10 we show that,
after we control for the initial real GDP per capita level (Column 1) as well as its
quadratic form (Column 2, the difference in average annual GDP per capita growth
between the crossing countries and the non-crossing countries is approximately 0.7
percentage points and not statistically significant. In Column 3, we compare the
average annual GDP per capita growth of the two groups of countries within each
quartile of the distribution of the lagged income levels. When the income level is
in the lowest quartile, countries that eventually crossed the threshold were growing
at a much higher rate than those that have not crossed. In other higher quartiles
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of income level, the differences in annual growth rates between the two groups are
small in magnitude and not statistically significant. Thus, for most of the income
distribution below the IDA threshold, we do not find significant differences in pre-
crossing growth rates between the sample of countries studied in this paper and
those still below the IDA threshold.
3.8 Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the effect of foreign aid on the recipient coun-
try’s economic growth, exploiting the substantial drop in aid after a country crosses
an exogenous income threshold set by the World Bank for IDA eligibility. We use a
group of countries that have crossed the IDA threshold since 1987 and find that for-
eign aid has a sizable positive effect on economic growth. Increasing the aid to GNI
ratio by one percentage point from average aid to GNI ratio at the period of crossing
raises the real per capita GDP growth rate by approximately 0.35 percentage points.
We address various identification concerns, and our results remain robust
throughout. Despite focusing on a special group of countries, this group is particu-
larly interesting because it is composed of poor countries for which aid is particularly
important since they are financially constrained. Rendering further support to the
positive causal effect of aid, we provide evidence that aid also increases the invest-
ment rate significantly in our sample. Indeed, a back of the envelope calculation
suggests that the increase in physical investment is the main channel through which
aid operates in the short-run. Finally, we provide some evidence that suggests that
our results may generalize to countries that are still under the IDA threshold, as
they grow closer to the threshold.
We estimate a model similar to those in the recent aid-growth literature, and
address the identification challenge using a novel instrument for aid, derived from
a plausible exogenously-determined aid allocation policy. We also provide a new
way of constructing predicted income trajectory using a smoothing technique. Our
finding of a positive impact of aid on growth is consistent with several other recent
studies, most notably Clemens et al. (2012). Our estimated effect, however, is
somewhat larger than in most other studies.
Identification of causal effects is a daunting task (See Samuelson, 1948), espe-
cially at the macroeconomic level. All causal estimates of country level parameters
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should be taken cautiously. Needless to say, at the micro level, researchers still need
to evaluate on a case by case basis which aid projects work better, if at all. Our
evidence only shows that overall foreign aid increases economic growth among poor
countries where foreign aid is a large source of funding. Moreover, even at the macro
level aid may have heterogeneous effects depending on recipient characteristics, aid
modalities, and donor motives (Mekasha and Tarp, 2013).87 Our relatively small
and homogeneous sample is not ideal for testing heterogeneous effects of aid. More-
over, because we identify only the effect of aid on growth in the short term, our
evidence does not contradict any view of the effect aid has on long-term economic
development. Despite these caveats, we believe our evidence contributes to under-
stand the effect of aid on economic growth in the short-term for poor countries that
are financially constrained.
Our results also contribute to the empirical literature on donors’ aid alloca-
tion decisions across recipient countries (See Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Chong and
Gradstein, 2008). They support the conjecture by Moss and Majerowicz (2012) that
bilateral donors use IDA policies – and specifically its income eligibility threshold
– as an informative signal of recipient need. Patterns of donor “herding” measured
by Frot and Santiso (2011) may be partially due to donors’ common responses to
recipient countries’ crossing the IDA income threshold.
Our findings also have implications for IDA graduation policies. The threshold-
crossing sample likely consists of growing countries facing financial constraints, per-
haps explaining why aid has large positive effects in our study. If aid reductions are
followed by declines in growth for this set of countries, arguably the IDA graduation
process should be made lengthier. For example, declines in aid and changes in lend-
ing terms following threshold crossing could be made more gradual. Consideration
should also be given to increasing the income threshold in real terms. Those changes
could lead to a more effective use of IDA funds, compared to the alternative of con-
centrating more aid among the shrinking number of countries projected to remain
under the current threshold (Moss and Majerowicz, 2012).
87Bilateral aid in particular may be more effective following the end of the Cold War, if more of
it is now motivated by developmental rather than geopolitical concerns Headey (2008). Our data
are almost entirely post-Cold War.
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Note: IDA threshold is originally nominated in current international dollars. We convert it in current US dollars.
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Note: There are 1,920 country-year observations from 112 countries that were ever on the DAC list between 1987 and 2010. For each country-year observation,
we calculate the distance of the current per capita GNI (yit) from the current IDA threshold (ȳt). We restrict the distance (yit− ȳt) between -1000 and 1000.
The graph on the left is a histogram of country-year observations against (yit − ȳt), grouped in 100-dollar bins. The graph on the right shows the McCrary
density test. Epanechnikov kernel density function with bandwith of 100 US dollars. The difference in density between observations just to the left and those
just to the right is estimated by fitting two separate kernel density functions. The jump from the just left of the threshold to the just right of the threshold
is 2.909×e−4 .Bootstrapped standard error is 8.18×e−5. Choice of the kernel functional form is not important, the results are similar to a reasonable range
of bandwidths.
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Table 3.1: Sample Countries and Years of Crossing the IDA Threshold
Country Name Year of Crossing Country Name Year of Crossing
Albania 1999 India 2010
Angola 2005 Indonesia 1994
Armenia 2003 2004
Azerbaijan 2005 Kiribati 1988
Bhutan 2004 1992
Bolivia 1997 Moldova 2007
2005 Mongolia 2006
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997 Nigeria 2008
Cameroon 2008 Papua New Guinea 2009
China 2000 Peru 1990
Congo, Rep. 2006 Philippines 1994
Djibouti 2007 Samoa 1995
Egypt 1995 Solomon Islands 1997
Equatorial Guinea 1998 Sri Lanka 2003
2000 Sudan 2008
Georgia 2003 Syrian Arab Republic 1998
Ghana 2009 Timor-Leste 2006
Guyana 1999 Turkmenistan 2002
2005 Ukriane 2003
Honduras 2000 Uzbekistan 2010
Note: Countries that crossed the IDA threshold from below between 1987 and 2010.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable N mean s.d. 25th 50th 75th
real GDP per capita growth 247 .029 .054 .007 .028 .048
log real GDP per capita 4 years earlire 247 6.635 .551 6.274 6.666 6.988
lag of log(ODA/GNI) 247 -3.282 1.472 -4.473 -2.910 -2.184
lag of log(IDA/GNI) 247 -3.282 1.472 -4.473 -2.91 -2.184
lag of log(DAC/GNI) 247 -10.618 8.022 -21.043 -6.256 -4.689
lag of log(NDAC/GNI) 247 -3.774 1.574 -4.941 -3.356 -2.697
lag of log(Other MLA/GNI) 247 -11.281 6.073 -13.267 -9.246 -6.641
lag of ODA/GNI 247 .081 .094 .011 .054 .113
lag of IDA/GNI 247 .007 .012 0 .002 .009
lag of DAC/GNI 247 .054 .068 .007 .035 .067
lag of NDAC/GNI 247 .002 .005 0 0 .001
lag of other MLA/GNI 247 .019 .027 .002 .009 .024
crossed IDA threshold 2 periods earlier 247 .2308 .4222 0 0 0
lag of Investment/GDP 231 0.253 0.119 0.187 0.235 0.297
log population 247 15.950 2.259 14.765 15.874 17.108
lag of terms of trade (year 2000=100) 167 100.548 15.894 92.328 99.983 104.495
CPIA z-score 238 -.214 .934 -.876 .0192 .439
civil liberty 247 4.306 1.604 3 4 6
political rights 247 4.273 1.981 2 4 6
primary school enrollment 224 97.508 19.290 91.358 101.563 110.337
merchandized trade as % of GDP 247 64.469 31.215 41.355 60.568 83.855
broad money as % of GDP 225 37.383 25.520 18.216 31.825 50.164
inflation (%) 247 94.608 537.018 5.107 8.726 18.506
bank crisis (dummy) 247 .052 .224 0 0 0
currency crisis (dummy) 247 .109 0.313 0 0 0
debt crisis (dummy) 247 .202 .141 0 0 0
Note: Each observation is a country-period. For each variable, the mean, standard deviation, median, 25thpercentile,
and 75th percentile are reported. Missing values for ODA and ODA by donor are treated as zeros, following the
precedent of Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) (Page 14). In this sample there are no missing values in total ODA. Zero
values in aid by donor are replaced with 1 dollar before taking logarithm. See Appendix Table 3.16 for more details in
construction and sources of these variables.
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Table 3.3: IDA Threshold and Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IDA DAC NDAC MLA ODA
Crossingis−2 -2.485 -0.961 -2.222 -0.750 -0.876
(1.371)* (0.238)*** (1.776) (0.302)** (0.216)***
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.058 0.000 0.192 0.004 0.000
yis−1 -8.587 -1.443 -4.739 -2.508 -1.535
(1.691)*** (0.420)*** (1.964)** (0.865)*** (0.324)***
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.000 0.004 0.018 0.024 0.000
Country FE X X X X X
Period FE X X X X X
N 247 247 247 247 247
N countries 35 35 35 35 35
Note: Each observation is a country-period. Dependent variables are the log average share of aid in GNI by donor in the last period and share of total aid
in GNI in the last period. There are 35 countries in the sample. Country fixed effects, period fixed effects, and log population in the last period are
controlled in all columns. Crossingis−2 is a dummy variable indicating whether the country crossed the IDA cutoff at least two periods earlier. yis−1 is the
log real GDP per capita in the second year of the last period, yit−4. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are reported.
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Table 3.4: IDA Threshold and Aid - Placebo Threshold at 50% of the True Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IDA DAC NDAC MLA ODA
Crossingis−2 3.068 0.404 2.565 -0.118 0.299
(1.867) (0.661) (2.396) (0.383) (0.514)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.006 0.672 0.042 0.712 0.708
yis−1 -12.29 -2.251 -8.808 -4.622 -2.245
(3.778)*** (0.859)** (4.367)* (1.507)*** (0.657)***
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.004
Period FE X X X X X
Country FE X X X X X
N 162 162 162 162 162
N countries 34 34 34 34 34
F-statistics on Crossingis−2 0.57
Note: Each observation is a country-period from countries that crossed the IDA threshold between 1987 and 2010. Country-period observations included in
the sample are prior to the period of crossing the real threshold. There are 34 countries and 162 observations in the regression. Dependent variables are one
period lag of average shares of ODA in GNI by donor. Country and period fixed effects, and log population in the last period are controlled in each column.
F-statistic on Crossingis−2 is reported in Column 5. yis−1 is log per capita real GDP in the second year of the last period, yit−4. Standard errors clustered
at the country level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are reported.
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Table 3.5: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Main Specification OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aidis−1 0.0105 0.0133 0.0281 0.0352 0.0475 0.0485 0.0552
(0.00455)** (0.00615)** (0.0100)*** (0.0147)** (0.0239)** (0.0177)*** (0.0190)***
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.020 0.032 0.006 0.008 0.052 0.000 0.000
yis−1 -0.0675 -0.161 -0.0371 -0.0249 -0.0976 -0.0957 -0.0835
(0.0246)*** (0.0231)*** (0.0256) (0.0322) (0.0516)* (0.0387)** (0.0415)**
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.090 0.000 0.298 0.496 0.082 0.000 0.140
Period FE X X X X X X X
Country FE X X X
First differenced X X X X
IV X X X X X
IV from predicted income X X
IV first differenced X
N 247 212 247 247 212 212 212
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
First atage F statistic (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 16.50 7.385 19.52 16.16 24.06
AR(2) p-value 0.729 0.830 0.824
Note: Each observation is a country-period. The dependent variable is the period average real per capita GDP growth rate. Standard errors clustered at
the country level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are reported. See
text for more details.
116
Table 3.6: Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Main Specification 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aidis−1 0.0258 0.0312 0.0427 0.0298 0.0308 0.0198 0.0229 0.0205 0.0331 0.0359 0.0377
(0.00966)*** (0.0138)** (0.0182)** (0.0122)** (0.0133)** (0.00984)** (0.0101)** (0.00909)** (0.0149)** (0.0152)** (0.0155)**
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-val 0.008 0.010 0.018 0.042 0.020 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000
yis−1 -0.0525 -0.0431 -0.137 -0.128 -0.136 -0.0540 -0.0543 -0.0518 -0.0326 -0.0334 -0.0245
(0.0226)** (0.0290) (0.0679)** (0.0554)** (0.0529)*** (0.0184)*** (0.0217)** (0.0201)** (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0261)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-val 0.054 0.158 0.026 0.012 0.020 0.020 0.874 0.844 0.916
Period FE X X X X X X X X X X X
Country FE X X X X X X X X
First differenced X X X
IV for yis−1 X X X X X X X X X X X
Predicted crossing X X X X X
lagged dependent variables 1 2 1,2 1 2 1,2
N 247 247 212 212 212 245 229 229 245 229 229
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
First stage F stat (K-P Wald) 8.098 3.601 11.46 4.453 6.164 5.951 6.520 6.448 3.263 4.083 4.103
Number of IVs 12 12
Hansen test for over-id (p-val) 0.330 0.174
Sargan test for over-id (p-val) 0.275 0.106
AR(2) p-value 0.950 0.849
Note: Each observation is a country-period. The dependent variable is the period average real per capita GDP growth rate. Instrumental variable for yis−1
is yit−5 all columns except for Columns 3, 4, 5. yis−1 is instrumented by yit−8in Column 3, and is instrumented by yit−8, yit−9, and yit−10 in Columns 5
and 6. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster
bootstrap-t procedure are reported. See text for more details.
117
Table 3.7: Narrowing Periods
Panel A: OLS - first differenced (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of maximal periods around the crossings 7 6 5 4 3 2
Aidis−1 0.0133 0.0133 0.0137 0.0142 0.0154 0.0201
(0.00615)** (0.00615)** (0.00640)** (0.00631)** (0.00814)* (0.00946)**
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.032 0.032 0.040 0.026 0.142 0.098
yis−1 -0.161 -0.161 -0.162 -0.163 -0.161 -0.157
(0.0231)*** (0.0232)*** (0.0232)*** (0.0235)*** (0.0256)*** (0.0298)***
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period FE X X X X X X
N 212 211 203 188 165 133
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
Test for Aidis−1 ((6)-(1), p− value) 0.069
Panel B: 2SLS - first differenced (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of maximal periods around the crossings 7 6 5 4 3 2
Aidis−1 0.0485 0.0481 0.0460 0.0442 0.0427 0.0527
(0.0177)*** (0.0177)*** (0.0181)** (0.0157)*** (0.0192)** (0.0222)**
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.006
yis−1 -0.0957 -0.0969 -0.103 -0.107 -0.113 -0.104
(0.0387)** (0.0389)** (0.0397)*** (0.0369)*** (0.0441)** (0.0488)**
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.040
Period FE X X X X X X
N 212 211 203 188 165 133
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
First stage F statistics 16.159 16.353 15.741 19.946 16.577 19.971
Test for Aidis−1 ((6)-(1), p− value) 1.000
Note: Each observation is a country-period. The dependent variable is the period average real per capita GDP growth
rate. The growth equation is first differenced before estimation. IV in the first differenced equation is Crossingis−2.
Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are reported.
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Table 3.8: Adding Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
IV is Crossingis−2 IV is Crossing
synth
is−2
baseline schooling political CPIA econ cond baseline schooling political CPIA econ cond
Aidis−1 0.0281*** 0.0307*** 0.0287*** 0.0336*** 0.0308*** 0.0352** 0.0393*** 0.0368** 0.0383*** 0.0456**
(0.0100) (0.0110) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0205)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.022 0.050
yis−1 -0.0371 -0.0402 -0.0361 -0.0232 -0.0119 -0.0249 -0.0245 -0.0222 -0.0153 0.0101
(0.0256) (0.0273) (0.0262) (0.0241) (0.0269) (0.0322) (0.0332) (0.0343) (0.0321) (0.0377)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.298 0.234 0.314 0.438 0.496 0.486 0.548 0.636 0.840 0.552
log population -0.0086 -0.0149 -0.0114 0.0423 0.0133 0.0161 0.0203 0.0149 0.0584 0.0571
(0.0738) (0.0753) (0.0754) (0.0767) (0.0556) (0.0859) (0.0869) (0.0879) (0.0903) (0.0858)
primary school enrolment rate -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Freedom House civil liberty index 0.0023 -0.0036 0.0038 0.0021 -0.0045 0.0021
(0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0078) (0.0061) (0.0071)
Freedom House political rights index 0.0013 0.0004 -0.0018 0.0026 0.0011 -0.0001
(0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0041)
World Bank CPIA-Z score 0.0151* 0.0156*
(0.0082) (0.0082)
total trade as percentage of GDP 0.0007 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0005)
broad money -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006)
inflation (GDP deflator) -0.0000** -0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000)
bank crisis during the period 0.0056 0.0045
(0.0117) (0.0134)
currency crisis during the period -0.0023 0.0023
(0.0097) (0.0110)
debt crisis during the period -0.0095 -0.0080
(0.0162) (0.0154)
Period FE X X X X X X X X X X
Country FE X X X X X X X X X X
N 247 224 247 238 225 247 224 247 238 225
Number of countries 35 34 35 35 33 35 34 35 35 33
First stage F stats 16.495 14.469 16.389 16.459 13.647 7.385 7.909 6.590 7.732 5.259
Note: Each observation is a country-period. The dependent variable is the period average real per capita GDP growth rate. All columns are estimated using 2SLS.
Columns 1 through 5 use actual crossings as instrument. Columns 6 through 10 use predicted crossings as instrument. Standard errors clustered at the country
level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are reported.
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Table 3.9: Model Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV is Crossingis−2 excl. last xing excl. last 2 xing multiple crossings last crossings small islands non IDA
Aidis−1 0.0413** 0.0451** 0.0257*** 0.0241** 0.0273*** 0.0299**
(0.0172) (0.0186) (0.00991) (0.0112) (0.00929) (0.0120)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.050 0.022 0.008 0.024 0.006 0.012
yis−1 -0.0194 -0.0200 -0.0717*** -0.0440 -0.0396 -0.0194
(0.0337) (0.0366) (0.0263) (0.0320) (0.0251) (0.0259)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.642 0.712 0.016 0.350 0.250 0.510
Period FE X X X X X X
Country FE X X X X X X
N 193 151 208 247 225 220
Number of countries 28 21 30 35 32 31
First stage F stat 8.635 20.06 18.48 19.04 14.39 11.97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: IV is Crossingsynthis−2 excl. last xing excl. last 2 xing multiple crossings last crossings small islands non IDA
Aidis−1 0.0580** 0.0883 0.0248* 0.0258 0.0324*** 0.0382**
(0.0294) (0.0570) (0.0138) (0.0159) (0.0124) (0.0172)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.044 0.000 0.022 0.008 0.008 0.020
yis−1 0.00745 0.0387 -0.0736** -0.0411 -0.0308 -0.00346
(0.0493) (0.0861) (0.0332) (0.0406) (0.0289) (0.0345)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.930 0.632 0.020 0.508 0.358 0.904
Period FE X X X X X X
Country FE X X X X X X
N 193 151 208 247 225 220
Number of countries 28 21 30 35 32 31
First stage F stat 3.401 1.905 6.438 8.158 7.958 5.946
Note: Each observation is a country-period. The dependent variable is the period average real per capita GDP growth rate. Sample
restrictions are marked in the short handle in each column. All columns are estiamted using 2SLS. Panel A uses actual crossings as the
instrumental variable. Panel B uses predicted crossings as the instrumental variable. Standard errors clustered at the country level are
reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are reported.
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Table 3.10: External Validity
(1) (2) (3)
Crossing sample = 1 0.00669 0.00672
(0.00669) (0.00698)
Crossing sample = 1 ×
1st quartile of yit−1 0.03078
(0.00606)***
2nd quartile of yit−1 0.01327
(0.00868)
3rd quartile of yit−1 -0.00049
(0.01047)
4th quartile of yit−1 0.00739
(0.01018)




Year FE X X X
N 1303 1303 1303
Note: Each observation is a country-year. The dependent variable is annual log per capita real GDP growth. There are 78 countries that were
ever eligible for IDA between 1987 and 2010 as well as the 35 countries in our baseline sample. The key variable of interest is a dummy
variable indicating whether the country belongs to the crossing sample. The sample consists of country-year observations between 1987 and
2010 that have per capita GNI level below the IDA threshold. Year fixed effects are controlled. Log real GDP per capita in the last year and
its quadratic terms are included in the regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.11: IDA Threshold and Aid with Quadratic Log Initial Income Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IDA DAC NDAC MLA ODA
Crossingis−2 -2.960 -1.020 -2.747 -1.027 -0.940
(1.264)** (0.272)*** (1.725) (0.420)** (0.243)***
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.012 0.000 0.096 0.002 0.000
yis−1 -30.28 -4.133 -28.67 -15.12 -4.462
(21.24) (3.995) (17.17) (8.215)* (3.120)
y2is−1 1.562 0.194 1.724 0.909 0.211
(1.464) (0.277) (1.147) (0.555) (0.217)
Country FE X X X X X
Period FE X X X X X
N 247 247 247 247 247
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Table 3.12: First Stage - Policies as Outcome Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Freedom house Word Bank inflation Crisis
civil liberty political rights CPIA z-score broad money (GDP deflator) bank currency debt
Crossingis−2 0.1255 0.2955 0.1032 0.2007 -21.2578 0.0028 0.0482 0.0427
(0.2527) (0.4039) (0.1867) (2.6788) (100.4773) (0.0404) (0.0489) (0.0292)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-val 0.606 0.466 0.548 0.904 0.856 0.918 0.306 0.06
yis−1 -0.0573 -0.1061 -0.2203 7.7313 483.0089 0.0668 0.0229 0.0617
(0.1675) (0.2603) (0.1624) (8.6056) (385.9596) (0.0642) (0.0744) (0.0511)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-val 0.706 0.622 0.132 0.544 0.462 0.260 0.774 0.242
Country FE X X X X X X X X
Period FE X X X X X X X X
N 255 255 244 232 255 255 255 255
# of countries 35 35 35 33 35 35 35 35
Note: Each observation is a country-period. The dependent variable for each column and its source are indicated on top of the column. See Appendix Table 3.16 for description
of these variables. All columns are estimated using 2SLS. Log population one period lag is included as a covariate. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. *
p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are reported.
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Table 3.13: First Stage - Policies as Outcome Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Aidis−1 0.0281*** 0.0297*** 0.0342**
(0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0148)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.006 0.008 0.028
Polynomials of yis−1 included 1 1,2 1,2,3
Period FE X X X
Country FE X X X
Observations 247 247 247
# of Countries 35 35 35
First stage F statistic 16.495 14.935 10.560
Note: Column 1 replicates Column 3 of Table 3.5. Column 4 and Column 5 adds quadratic and cubic terms of yis−1. Standard errors
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t
procedure are reported.
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Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.044 0.060
yis−1 -0.0211 -0.0381
(0.0475) (0.0384)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.804 0.454
Period FE X X
Country FE X X
Observations 247 247
# of Countries 35 35
First Stage F statistic 8.062 4.111
Note: Aid∗is−1 =
∑5
k=3(ODAit−k/GNIit−k)/3 is the period average aid to GNI ratio in the last period. There are 212 country-period
observations from 35 countries. 2SLS estimator is used in both columns. In both columns, ∆Aid∗is−1 is instrumented with ∆Crossingis−2.
∆yis−1 is also treated as endogenous in Column 2 and yit−8 is used as an additional instrumental variable. Standard errors clustered at the
country level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure are
reported.
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Table 3.15: Effects of Aid on Investment
Dep var (Inv/GDP )is−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Main Specification OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aidis−1 -0.0166 -0.0103 0.0580* 0.0490 0.0542 0.0831 0.0719
(0.0150) (0.0158) (0.0350) (0.0333) (0.0511) (0.0624) (0.0465)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.374 0.560 0.086 0.120 0.308 0.164 0.116
yis−2 -0.0638 -0.0962*** 0.0308 0.0194 -0.0503 -0.0298 -0.0378
(0.0392) (0.0339) (0.0514) (0.0523) (0.0409) (0.0461) (0.0399)
Wild cluster bootstrap-t p-value 0.172 0.006 0.588 0.728 0.244 0.486 0.512
Period FE X X X X X X X
Country FE X X X
First differenced X X X X
IV X X X X X
IV predicted X X
IV first differenced X
Equation first differenced X X X X
N 206 171 206 206 171 171 171
Number of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
First atage F statistic (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 9.223 9.714 10.94 4.724 10.51
Note: Each observation is a country-period. The dependent variable is the period average investment to GDP ratio. Standard errors clustered
at the country level are reported in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. p−values from the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure
are reported. See text for more details.
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Table 3.16: Construction and Sources of Key Variables
Variable Notation Source∗ Description
Period τs Each period consists of 3 consecutive years. The first period is from 1987 to 1989.
IDA threshold WB Denoted in current US dollars, available since 1987.
Crossing 2 periods earlier Crossingis−2 Country i crossed the IDA cutoff for the first time in the sample at least two periods earlier.
Foreign aid Aidis WDI/DAC Aidis =
∑
s(ODA/GNI)/3. Total net Official Development Aid (ODA) in current US dollars is
from the DAC. GNI in current US dollars is from the WDI.
Initial income level yis−1 WDI Real per capita GDP in 2000 constant US dollars in the second year of the last period, yit−4.
Real per capita GDP growth gis WDI Denote real per capita GDP for country i in year t as yit, annual real per capita GDP growth
is ln(yit)− ln(yit−1). Period real pre capita GDP growth is the mathematical average of annual
real per capita GDP for years in the period.
Aid by donor Aidjis DAC Donor groups (j) include IDA, DAC countries, non- DAC countries, and multilateral agencies (MLA)
except for IDA.
Investment WDI Gross capital formation as ratio of GDP. Investment in a period arithmetic average of annual gross
capital formation as ratio of GDP.
Population+ WDI Population
Primary school enrollment+ WDI Gross primary school enrollment ratio. It is the total enrollment in primary education, regardless of
age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary education age.
Trade+ WDI Measured as merchandise trade as percentage of GDP.
Money supply+ WDI Broad money as percentage of GDP
Inflation+ WDI GDP deflator (percentage annual)
Crisis− WB Dummy variables indicating whether there is any bank, currency, or debt crisis during
the years within the period.
Bank crisis− WB Whether the country experiences a bank crisis.
Currency crisis− WB Whether the country experiences a currency crisis.
Debt crisis− WB Whether the country experiences a debt crisis.
Political rights+ FH Freedom House political rights indicator. It ranges from 0 to 7, with a higher number indicating
less political rights.
Civil liberties+ FH Civil liberties indicator. It ranges from 0 to 7, with a higher number indicating less civil liberty.
Bureaucratic quality+ ICRG 0-4, with a higher number indicating less risk in bureaucratic quality.
Corruption+ ICRG 0-6, with a higher number indicating less risk in corruption.
Rule of law+ ICRG 0-6, with a higher number indicating less risk in rule of law.
Ethnic tension+ ICRG 0-6, with a higher number indicating less risk in ethnic tension.
CPIA z-score+ WB Public sector management and institutions cluster average. 1=low to 6=high.
∗ WB is short for the World Bank; WDI is short for the the World Development Indicators from the World Bank; DAC represents the OECD Development Assistance Committee. FH
is short for the Freedom House. ICRG is short for International Country Risk Guide.
+ averaged within each period. − summed over each period.
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4 CHAPTER 3: INDUSTRIALIZATION FROM SCRATCH: THE PERSISTENT
EFFECTS OF CHINA’S “THIRD FRONT” MOVEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Industrializing from an agricultural economy is an inevitable process of modern
economic development. How industrialization takes place and whether there is a role
for active policy interventions are thus important questions facing many developing
countries.
While some theories argue that industrialization is a natural process that fol-
lows increasing productivity in the agricultural sector (Rostow, 1990; Schultz, 1953;
Lewis, 1954), others advocate the role of active development policies that aim at
fostering the nascent industrial sector. They argue that development in the agricul-
tural sector per se does not automatically lead to industrialization: an economy can
be trapped in a low-income equilibrium and fail to embark on a self-sustaining path
of industrialization which ends in a high-income equilibrium. A poverty trap may
stem from coordination failures among different sectors (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943;
Murphy et al., 1989), the lack of supply and demand linkages that support an indus-
trial system (Hirschman, 1958), or low levels of knowledge accumulation (Hausmann
and Rodrik, 2003). Subsidies to the nascent industrial sector can generate positive
externalities that benefit other economic activities. If the spillover effects are strong
enough, temporary subsidies can kick start a virtuous cycle and permanently push
an economy out of the low-income equilibrium.
The idea that temporary subsidies to the industrial sector have long-run im-
pacts on economic development has motivated various subsidies to industrialization,
in forms of investment in physical and human capital, and support in technologi-
cal adoption. While theoretically appealing, empirical tests of the efficacy of these
policies are difficult, because they are often implemented in selected places and in-
dustries with particular economic returns in mind. The selection problem makes it
difficult to identify the true causal effects of those policies.
This paper estimates the causal effects of temporary subsidies to the nascent
industrial sector on long-run economic development by evaluating a unique policy
experiment in China, known as the “Third Front Movement”. The Movement was
launched in 1964 in preparation for potential military confrontations with the United
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States and the Soviet Union. It aimed at creating self-sustaining industrial clusters
in China’s remote and mountainous hinterland, such that in the event of war, China
could still produce and thus fight.88 The scale was massive: in the heydays of the
Movement, over half of the national industrial investment, in forms of large plants
and infrastructure, was dedicated to the Third Front Region. In 1964, provinces
containing the Third Front Region accounted for about 10 percent of the nation’s
total industrial output. This number rose to 37 percent in 1978.
For national defense purposes, where a Third Front project was located had
little to do with the location’s current economic conditions or future economic po-
tentials. As airstrikes and nuclear attacks were the primary concerns, the sites for
major projects were required to follow the criteria: “Dispersed from existing in-
dustrial clusters, hidden, and close to the mountains” (fensan, yinbi, kaoshan).89
Consistent with the criteria, we show that, conditional on a set of initial conditions,
the location choices of industrial investment during the Third Front period are un-
correlated with unobservable factors that affect long-run economic performance.
The disconnect between industrial investment and economic development potential
lends us credible evaluation of the causal effects of subsidized industrialization.
The Third Front Movement lasted for a decade before it gradually shrank in
magnitude since in the mid-1970s, and eventually faded away with China’s market
reform in the urban sector in the 1980s. Since then, industrial plants established dur-
ing the Third Front Movement, along with other State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs),
were required to be responsible for their own profitability. Many of these plants
failed due to fundamental deficiencies in location choices, management, and opera-
tions.90
Yet the Movement fundamentally changed the economic landscape of some
local economies. By the time China started its market reform, some previously
agricultural local economies possessed a significant industrial presence with some
of the most sophisticated plants in the country, while some other local economies
with otherwise similar initial characteristics before the Movement remained pre-
88The area, known as the “Third Front Region”, was originally a national defense concept. It
refers to the mountain-locked areas that are far from potential war fronts.
89“Hidden” means that plants should be located in terrains such that they are hard to be found
by the enemies. The criterion was taken seriously as in some extreme cases, entire factories were
built in caves.
90Of course, this is a simplification of China’s market reform in the urban sector. Subsidies to
some SOEs continued after the reform. In the empirical section, we provide robustness checks
controlling for the post-reform growth of the SOE.
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dominantly agricultural. This gives us quasi-exogenous variation in levels of initial
industrial presence on the eve of the market reform. We compare prefectures in the
Third Front Region that had initial high levels of industrial presences with those
that had initial low levels in the two decades since the market reform. We evalu-
ate whether, and through what channels, the initial industrial presence established
during the Third Front Movement helped localities gain advantages in economic
development that persisted in the post-reform era.
The Third Front Movement provides a unique natural experiment for evaluat-
ing the effects of temporary subsidies in the industrial sector on long-run economic
development from a very low level of industrialization. First, it is a rare event in
history when large amounts of investment were made to places without particular
economic returns in mind. This enables us to disentangle the role of the investment
from the role of unobservable fundamental characteristics of the locality. Second,
the movement covers a wide range of industries, ranging from basic manufacturing
such as textile to sophisticated industries such as machinery and automobiles. This
gives us rich variation in types of industries to be subsidized, and opportunities to
disentangle different mechanisms.91 Finally, we look at a within-country setting,
which avoids omitted variable biases due to differences in institutional backgrounds
or other nationwide policies, which are prevalent in earlier empirical work based on
cross-country evidence.
We focus on a group of prefectures in the Third Front Region that were pre-
dominantly rural before the Movement. Our empirical approach boils down to
comparing similar prefectures within the Third Front Region that received large
amounts of industrial investment with those that received little. We measure the
quasi-exogenous initial industrial presence by the per capita employment from the
key industrial plants in 1985.92 The primary challenge for identifying a causal ef-
fect is that, in spite of a rich set of initial conditions we control for, there are still
91For example, one recent strand of literature has been particularly interested in the effects of
transportation infrastructure on economic development(Banerjee et al., 2012; Faber, 2014; Don-
aldson, 2012).
92The key industrial plants are the Large and Medium Sized (LMS) industrial plants listed in
the 1985 Second Industrial Census. Conditional on the urbanization rate in 1964, the size of
employment from these plants are good proxies for the magnitude of Third Front investment for
two reasons. First, Third Front industrial projects were overwhelmingly large and were considered
“key” to the national economy. So they should be included in the directory. Second, 1985 was
the year before the market reform in the urban sector. Waves of bankruptcies of SOEs and mass
layoffs did not take place until the 1990s. So the size of employment still reflects the magnitude of
investment.
130
unobservable factors about the locality that affect both the magnitude of the Third
Front investment it received and its potential economic performance in a market
economy. In particular, the concern is that the government might have additional
information about the location’s economic potential and select places to host large
industrial projects based on the information unobservable to the econometrician.
We test the validity of this concern by conducting a case study in which ad-
ditional information about the location choice regarding one particular Third Front
plant is available. By comparing historical documents on the plans for Third Front
projects and the actual locations of these projects, we find that this plant was orig-
inally planned in another location. We compare three locations to illustrate the
effect of receiving this plant and test the important of potential unobservable char-
acteristics. First, we have a treated prefecture where the plant was actually located.
Second, we have a natural comparison prefecture where the plant was originally
planned. Third, we construct a comparison prefecture based on a rich set of ob-
servable initial conditions using the synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010).
The synthetic comparison prefecture and the natural comparison prefecture contain
different sets of information. The synthetic comparison incorporates information
from all the observable initial characteristics, while the natural comparison contains
all the information available to the decision maker at the time of the Movement,
some of which may be unavailable to the econometrician. If the unobservable char-
acteristics play an important role in the location choice and these characteristics
affect long-run economic development, we would expect the synthetic comparison
to have different economic performance in the post-reform period from those of the
natural comparison. On the contrary, we find that both initial characteristics and
subsequent economic outcomes of the two comparison prefectures are very similar.
Using a permutation-like method as in Abadie et al. (2010), we find that the differ-
ences are not statistically significant either. This suggests that the rich set of initial
conditions we control for covers a sufficient portion of information available to the
decision makers. The unobservable characteristics that played a role in government’s
location-choice decisions, if any, do not matter for long-run economic development.93
The case study lends confidence in the validity of the assumption that location
choices of Third Front projects are independent of unobservable factors once we
control for initial conditions. Yet the case study may fall short on coverage and
93Unfortunately, we could find only one case such that the eventual location of the project was
different from the originally planned location.
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representativeness of the overall effect. We therefore estimate the average treatment
effect by pooling all the prefectures in the sample. To ensure the right functional
form of the covariates, we try variations of the specification. All these approaches
yield quantitatively similar results.
We find that places that had larger industrial presence on the eve market
reform persisted to have higher levels of industrialization. The effect is mainly
accounted for by a larger non-state-owned sector, which was essentially non-existent
during the command economy era but had been growing rapidly after the reform.
The effect is economically sizable and statistically significant. Our baseline result
shows that having one more worker in key industrial plants in 1985 increases 1.4 more
workers in the non-state sector in 2004. Put another way, the difference between the
75th percentile and the 25th percentile in initial per capita industrial employment
explains about 80% of the 75th-to-25th difference in employment from the non-
state industrial plants twenty years later. A prefecture with higher initial industrial
presence also had significantly higher per capita employment in the service sector,
resulting in a much higher urbanization rate. It also had a better educated workforce,
as measured by the percentage of adults with a middle school diploma or a college
degree.
We further investigate the mechanisms through which temporary subsidies
to industrialization sustained further urbanization and industrialization. Initial in-
dustrial subsidies brought in by the Third Front plants might have promoted local
economic development in the post-reform era in several ways. The first is a linkage
channel: industrial firms may generate demand for goods and services from the local
economy, and provide inputs to other related industries. The second is the human
capital channel: knowledge and human capital brought in with the industrial invest-
ment facilitates local entrepreneurs to start new businesses, and stimulate startups
in the related sectors. Third, roads and other infrastructure are needed to be built
to facilitate an industrial plant. The infrastructure in turn benefits other economic
activities in the local economy.
We test these hypotheses. Prefecture-industry level analysis shows that input-
output linkages account for about a quarter of the total effect. To check whether the
effects of initial industrial presence take place through some intermediate factors,
we control for various economic conditions in the 1980s along with the size of initial
industrial employment. We show that human capital and infrastructure can explain
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little of the effect.
Finally, we test whether the higher urbanization rates in subsidized prefec-
tures came from “pulling” local agricultural workers out of farmland, or simply from
“stealing” urban workers from other local economies. Unsurprisingly given the re-
strictive cross-region migration, we find that increased urbanization rate is mainly
accounted for by workers transitioning from the rural sector to the urban sector
within a prefecture.
This chapter contributes to the literature on evaluating the long-run effects of
industrial investment in less developed economies. The paper most closely related
to ours is Kline and Moretti (2014a), which studies the long-run effects of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States. The TVA program is a typical
case of the Big Push strategy (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy et al., 1989), which
advocates simultaneous investment in a wide range of sectors to solve the coordi-
nation failure. In contrast, the Third Front Movement involved investment in some
particular industries in scattered locations. The Third Front Movement was never
intended to promote balanced development of the local economy. Indeed, before the
market reform, many Third Front plants were isolated little societies and had little
economic interaction with the local economies around them.
This chapter is also related to papers that study the determinants of geo-
graphic distribution of economic activities. This strand of literature intends to test
whether the geographic distribution of economic activities is unique. Exploiting the
quasi-random nature of bombings during wars, Davis and Weinstein (2002), Davis
and Weinstein (2008) and Miguel and Roland (2011) suggest that locations of eco-
nomic concentrations are deterministic: even serious damages during a war could
not alter a region’s long-run growth trajectory. In contrast, Rauch and Michaels
(2013), Severnini (2012), Bleakley and Lin (2012) and Redding et al. (2011) find
evidence supporting multiple equilibria: loci of economic activities can change due
to historical events or policy interventions. By showing that the Third Front Move-
ment had long-run impacts on the spatial distribution of industries, this chapter
adds a piece of evidence supporting the existence of multiple equilibria.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is also the first to quantitatively
evaluate the long-run impacts of the Third Front Movement, adding to a rapidly
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growing literature on China’s regional development.94,95 Despite a caution on its
overall efficiency, we find that the Movement had long-run positive impacts on local
economies that received large amounts of industrial investment. Given the cost
of mobility and heterogeneous preference in locations, our findings imply potential
positive welfare gains for local residents, suggesting the relevance of the tradeoff
between equity and efficiency in regional development policies (Ziliak, 2012).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the back-
ground of the Third Front Movement. Section 4.3 describes our data and sample.
Section 4.4 presents a case study. Section 4.5 shows the baseline results. Section 4.6
investigates some possible mechanisms. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background
In 1964 China was a very poor country with a per capita annual GDP only one
fortieth of that of the United States. Its economy was predominantly agricultural:
agriculture accounted for 40% of the GDP while over 80% of the population lived
in rural areas. The country’s limited industrial capacity was concentrated in a
handful of cities in the eastern part of the county, particularly the Northeast and the
East Coast. In a command economy system, the majority of the limited industrial
investment went to existing industrial centers.
The Third Front Movement was a large-scale industrialization campaign in
the remote western China. It was motivated by national defense considerations.
National security conditions facing China deteriorated in 1964: The Gulf of Tonkin
incident in August signaled an escalation of the Vietnam War, with America’s mas-
sive bombing in North Vietnam and increasing military presence in the Taiwan
Strait threatening China’s East Coast. Since in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union
had been threatening China’s northern border. China’s leaders worried that the
concentrations of the country’s industrial capacity in the Northeast and the East
94Naughton (1988) is the first to systematically document the Third Front Movement. However,
his approach is qualitative. He concludes that the Movement was ill-designed and poorly executed,
and had resulted in great amounts of waste. While noting that the Movement is likely to be highly
inefficient, this chapter is agnostic about its overall cost-benefit analysis. Instead, we treat the
large industrial investment during the Third Front Movement as given and investigate the long-
run development paths of places receiving various amounts of investment.
95Alder et al. (2013) andWang (2012) study the regional economic growth of the special economic
zones. This paper differs in two important aspects: first, we study the long-run consequences of
temporary industrial investments initiated in the Mao Era; second, we are able to track the exact
treatment, instead of a bundle of policies. See Yao (2014) for a recent review on this literature.
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Coast were vulnerable in possible wars with the United States or the Soviet Union.
The Third Front Movement was launched later that year as a response to these
imminent threats. The name “Third Front” was first used as a national defense con-
cept, which refers to the vast area far away from possible war fronts. The purpose of
the Movement was to establish self-sustaining industrial clusters in the Third Front
Region, such that in the event of war, China could still have the industrial capacity
to support the fight even if it loses its industrial clusters in the east. The top map in
Figure 4.1 shows the ruggedness of terrains by county.96 The bottom map in Figure
4.1 shows the boundary of the Third Front Region. The Region includes the rugged
areas to the west of the Beijing-Hong Kong line encircled by mountains but avoids
Xinjiang, the Tibetan Plateau and other ethnically minority areas.
The scale of the investment was massive. In the heydays of the movement
between 1965 and 1971, it is estimated that about 140 billion yuan worth of invest-
ment went to the Third Front Region, accounting for over a half of the total national
investment during that period (Naughton, 1988). Figure 4.2 shows the investment
per capita in provinces containing the Third Front provinces between 1955 and 2008,
with the national average standardized at 1 in each year. Per capita investment in
the Third Front Region was low relative to the national average before the early
1960s. It increased dramatically after 1964 and peaked in 1970, with a level of per
capita capital formation about 1.5 times that of the national average. Investment
then gradually declined after the mid-1970s and never achieved the same relative
level to date. A decade of intensive investment changed the economic landscape in
the Third Front Region. Before the Movement, this region was among the poor-
est. In 1960, the provinces in that area, with one fifth of the nation’s population,
accounted for only 10 percent of its industrial output. This share rose to about 37
percent by 1977.97
The Movement was organized in a command system, led by a central commit-
tee in Beijing. Investment focused on the industries that produce basic industrial
materials and sophisticated manufacturing industries that produce machinery, elec-
trical equipments, and electronic devices. Different places were designated to host
96Ruggedness, or slope, measures the first gradient of the elevation. To calculate the average
ruggedness in a county, we first divide counties into small equal sized squares, and then calculate
the slope in each square as the ratio between the point with the highest elevation and the point
with the lowest elevation. Finally, we take the average of the slopes in all squares. See Nunn and
Puga (2012) and Dell (2010) for applications of slope.
97Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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different industries. For example, Panzhihua in Sichuan Province was designated
to become a large steel and non-ferrous metal production center. Counties around
Chongqing were assigned to host conventional weaponry industry. Mianyang was
made a base for nuclear industries. In haste and short of funding, many new plants
were spin-offs from existing plants in other parts of the country. For example, the
Second Auto Works in Shiyan had its initial machines and workers moved from the
First Auto Works in Changchun, in the Northeast. To minimize the damage due
to potential air strikes and nuclear attacks, the location choices of large industrial
projects followed a guiding principle which stated that the plants should be “dis-
persed, hidden, close to the mountains, and when necessary, they should be in caves”
(“fensan, yinbi, kaoshan, biyaoshi jindong”).
Table 4.1 summarizes the structural shift of industrial investment in the Third
Front Movement. The table shows the characteristics of the key industrial plants
by year of opening.98 Columns 1 through 3 compare industrial plants that started
operating between 1949 and 1964 with those started operating between 1964 and
1978, the Third Front period. The characteristics of the counties where these plants
were located differ greatly. Only 16% of the industrial plants established during
the first period were in the Third Front Region, compared with 41% of those that
were established during the second period. Plants that started operating during the
Third Front period are less likely to be located in a provincial capital city; they are
more likely to be located in less densely populated counties with higher elevation
and more rugged terrains. They are also less connected to the existing or planned
railroads. These differences are all statistically significant. The characteristics of
the plants that started operating in the two periods differ as well. Plants built in
the Third Front period are less likely to be in light industries, and more likely to be
in sophisticated manufacturing sectors. They also have higher capital per worker
but lower output per worker. This is probably due in part to the shift of new plants
to the machinery, electric, and electronic industries. Columns 4 through 6 show
that even within the Third Front region, the patterns still hold: plants established
during the Third Front period are located in geographically more difficult places.
Wars against the United States or the Soviet Union did not happen after all.
98These plants are from a directory included in China’s Second Industrial Census, conducted
in 1985. These plants in sum accounted for about half of the total industrial output in 1985.
Other industrial plants at that time included smaller SOEs and Township and Village Enterprises
(TVEs), which started to boom since in the late 1970s.
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Investment tilted towards the Third Front Region gradually faded away since in the
1970s as relations between China and the United States improved. Market reforms
of China’s SOEs started in the mid-1980s when the firms were made responsible
for their own profitability and, if they continued losing money, were allowed to
go bankrupt. Many Third Front plants did particularly badly due to their flawed
designs and irrational location choices. Nevertheless, the Third Front Movement
was the first and only wave of industrialization before the market reform in the
region. Third Front plants left some local economies with valuable stocks of phys-
ical capital, advanced technology, and skilled workers. These were scarce factors
that entrepreneurs could make good use of in early stages of the market economy,
and could help the local economy embark on a trajectory of economic development
different from the one without the Movement.
4.3 Data and Sample
4.3.1 Data Sources
We compile a unique panel dataset of Chinese prefectures over 70 years with
comprehensive information on geography, demography, and economic conditions,
especially the industrial sector.99 These variables are collected from various sources.
Whenever possible, we construct our variables from first-hand micro level data from
population and industrial censuses, or other large-scale nationally representative
surveys.100 We extract consistently defined variables from various sources. To our
knowledge, the dataset we have complied is among the most comprehensive at the
prefecture level. In this subsection we describe the sources of main variables. Ap-
pendix A lists the details of the data sources used in the chapter.
County geographic characteristics, including elevation, slope, and access to
water ways, are from GIS files available at the China Historical GIS database.101
Access to roads are from GIS maps for roads and railroads in 1962, 1980, 1990,
1995, 2005 and 2010 compiled by Baum-Snow et al. (2012). County boundaries
are available for census years in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010. County
99A prefecture is a jurisdiction that is smaller than a province but larger than a county. China
was divided into 345 prefectures in 1985. Prefecture is a natural choice to represent a local economy.
Each prefecture usually consists of one urban center and a few rural counties.
100We are aware of the concern that macro level data in China are sometimes subject to manip-
ulation of the politically motivated local officials. Manipulation of macro data may be correlated




boundaries change from time to time. In order to define variables consistently, we
convert county characteristics into 1982 county boundaries. Appendix B.1 describes
how consistent counties are defined. These characteristics are then aggregated to
the prefecture level.
Characteristics of the local industrial sector are from the National Industrial
Survey of 1936, the Second Industrial Census in 1985, and the First Economic
Census in 2004. Additional information is also extracted from county-tabulation of
population censuses in 1982 and onwards, which include counts of employment by
sector.
We construct demographic characteristics for consistently defined prefectures
from county-tabulations of all six population censuses. These characteristics include
population density, share of urban population, share of adult population with a
middle school diploma, and share of adult population with a college degree.
4.3.2 Sample and variables
The geographic boundary of this study includes prefectures in the Third Front Re-
gion as shown in the bottom map of figure 4.1. The area encompasses Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, and parts of Gansu, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Shaanxi. There
are 89 prefectures in the Third Front Region.
Some Third Front investment went to places in the Region that were already
industrial centers. Chengdu and Chongqing, two major cities in the Third Front Re-
gion, received large investment during the Third Front Movement. We exclude from
the sample prefectures that were already urban centers before the start of the Third
Front Movement. The reasons are twofold. First, the existing industrial centers may
have some unobservable characteristics such that they have different development
trajectories to begin with. Third Front investment in these existing industrial cen-
ters is more likely to be confounded with other factors. Second, this chapter focuses
on the long-run effects of subsidies at early stages of industrialization. Additional
industrialization in existing urban centers may have different effects.
We do not have direct measures for levels of industrialization at the prefecture
level on the eve of the Third Front Movement. Instead, we use the 1964 urban
population rate as a proxy.102 We drop prefectures that had urban population rate
102Urban rate is a good measure of non-agricultural economic activity. In 1958 China implemented
the hukou system, a residential registry system which essentially banned migration across regions.
The only way to transit from a rural hukou to an urban hukou was through recruitment of new
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greater than 10% in 1964.103 We are left with 63 prefectures with average urban
population rate in 1964 of about 6.3%.
We proxy the initial industrial presence due to the Third Front Movement
by the size of employment from the key industrial plants as listed in the Second
Industrial Census in 1985. Admittedly imperfect, this variable captures the quasi-
exogenous part of initial industrial presence brought in by the Third Front Move-
ment. First, the Third Front projects were overwhelmingly large-scale and were
regarded as crucial for the nation’s economy. Therefore, they are likely to be in-
cluded in the directory.104 Second, since we are using a sample of local economies
that were predominantly rural in 1964, the industrial presence from large plants
could only be added during the Third Front period. Third, 1985 provides a last
snapshot of the urban economy before the comprehensive market reform took place,
after which subsidies shrank and firms were required to be responsible for their own
profitability. Before that, independent decisions of hiring and layoffs were almost
impossible. Therefore, although large parts of the Movement ended in the 1970s, the
size of the employment in these plants gives a reasonable measure of the magnitude
of the Third Front investment.
The main outcome variables of interest include industrial employment as a
share of population, and the share of urban population in the post-reform years.
We are particularly interested in the development of the non-state industrial sector.
We also look at population density, percent of adults with a middle school diploma
and the percent of adults with a college degree.
industrial and public sector workers conducted by the government, or through marriage to a person
with urban hukou. Only industrial, government and service workers were given urban hukou. The
employment of government services (including the employees of the government and the Communist
Party organizations, employees of the public service such teachers, doctors, retailers, etc) is largely
proportional to the size of population.
103The 10% cutoff is at the 75th percentile in the distribution of urban population rate in 1964 in
the Third Front Region. We show later that our results are robust to a wide range of cutoff values
in the initial urbanization rate.
104One important limitation of the 1985 directory is that it does not include plants that were
directly established by the military or plants that were considered to be sensitive to national
security. Bachman (2013) compares the list from the 1985 industrial census with plants from
industrial census publications at the provincial level, as well as lists of industrial plants from




Table 4.9 shows the summary statistics. Panel A shows the employment from the
key industrial plants in 1985 by sector. For every 100 residents, on average there
were 0.57 industrial workers in the non-mining sector employed by the key industrial
plants in 1985. The distribution of investment to different locations had a fat tail.
The prefecture that received medium investment had 0.22 workers in the non-mining
industrial sector per 100 residents, while the prefecture at the 90th percentile has
per capita employment of 1.3. About a third of these workers were employed in sec-
tors that produce basic industrial materials such as iron, steel, petroleum, chemical
products, and electricity. About two fifths were employed in plants that produce
machinery, transportation equipments, electric and electronic devices, instrument
equipment and apparatus. These were the sophisticated manufacturing by the stan-
dard of China’s industrial development at that time. The remaining were employed
in light industries such as those produce textile and food. One thing worth pointing
out is that since industrial plants were purposefully chosen to be dispersed across
locations in the Third Front Movement, the correlations in employment across these
sectors are low. The correlation between employment in the sophisticated manufac-
turing industries and that in the materials industries is -0.04, and the correlation
between employment in the sophisticated industries and light industries, highest
among all three pairwise correlations, is 0.3.
Panel B shows the initial conditions of sample prefectures before the Third
Front Movement. The median prefecture in the sample had a population density of
90 people per square kilometer (4.5 in log value). After censoring the urban rate at
10%, the urban rates among the sample prefectures are rather evenly distributed.
The minimum is 2.8 and the maximum is 9.9, with the mean and median is 6.3.
These prefectures are in remote and rugged areas. The median distance to the
existing or planned railroads was about 55 kilometers (4 in log value), the median
distance to the nearest provincial capital is 220 kilometers (5.4 in log value).105 The
median elevation is over 1 kilometer, and the average slope is 4 degrees (the national
average is less than 1 degree). Except for a few cases, these places had no industrial
presence in 1936.
These prefectures were significantly more developed in the early 2000s. As
105For these distances we first calculate the distance between the centroid of the county to the
railway line or the centroid of the provincial capital. We then calculate the average prefecture-level
distance by using county population as weight.
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Panel C shows, population grew by an average of 60 percent over the 36 years and
the average urban rate rose to 20 percent. In 2004, there were about 2.1 non-mining
industrial workers who were employed in the non-state sector, and over 90% of them
worked in firms that did not exist in 1985. 11 percent of the adult population worked
in the tertiary sector. Middle school education was common (34 per 100 adults),
especially among the younger generations, although college education was still rare
(1.6 per 100 adults).
4.4 A Case Study of Shiyan
Ideally, we would like to compare post-reform economic development between pre-
fectures that received large amounts of industrial investment during the Third Front
to prefectures that had similar initial conditions, but received little investment. We
observe and control for a rich set of initial prefecture conditions before the Third
Front Movement, including urban rate, population density, historical industrial pres-
ence, transportation infrastructure, and geographic characteristics. In addition, the
historical background and the principles of location choices during the Third Front
Movement suggest that these observable characteristics indeed cover the factors that
were taken into consideration when location choices were made. Nevertheless, we
cannot rule out the possibility that other things may matter. In particular, gov-
ernment might have access to pieces of information about the localities that are
not observable to the econometrician, and these pieces of information were used in
deciding locations and matter for long-run economic outcomes. In that case, the
conditional independence condition does not hold and the Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression will fail to yield causal estimates.
One possible identification strategy is to take advantage of the decision process
itself. If a couple of locations were shortlisted for each Third Front project and
one was finally chosen, the runner-ups serve as good comparisons as they arguably
have similar characteristics that matter for the consideration of the government, no
matter whether they were observable to the econometrician. The final choice of
the winner is arguably determined by less important factors, and is likely not to
affect the outcomes of interest. The average differences between the treated and
the runner-ups within a case is likely to be as good as causal. This approach is
adopted by Greenstone et al. (2010) in estimating the agglomeration effect of large
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manufacturing plants in the United States.
However, by comparing the planned locations for large industrial plants in the
Third Front Movement and the locations where these plants were actually located,
we are only able to find one case where the actual location is different from the
original plan.106 So our approach is different from Greenstone et al. (2010), who pool
many cases together and estimate the average treatment effect. Instead, we conduct
a case study and use it to show that conditional on the observable characteristics
we can control for, additional local characteristics that are unobservable to the
econometrician either did not matter in government’s decision of location choices, or
did not affect outcomes of interest. After establishing the conditional independence,
in the next section, we run pooled OLS regressions with the full sample controlling
for the same set of initial conditions and estimate the average treatment effects.107
4.4.1 A Natural Comparison
The case we study here is Shiyan in Hubei Province, home to the Second Auto
Works of China. The plant was a prominent example of the scale of the Third Front
Movement and its decision process. It was the only large investment Shiyan received
during the entire Third Front Movement (and naturally, the only large investment
in the entire command economy period). In 1985, the plant employed more than
65,000 workers and was the second largest automobile manufacturer in China. It
was fair to say that Shiyan was a city built around the plant. According to the
original plan, the site was chosen in Xiangxi, a similarly remote and mountainous
prefecture in western Hunan Province. After some debate and a few inspection trips
to the region, Shiyan was finally chosen for its proximity to a planned rail road.108
Xiangxi and Shiyan had very similar geographic characteristics and economic
conditions before the Movement. They are equally far away from the coast. Shiyan
is about 500 kilometers to the north of Xiangxi. They have similar terrains, as is
shown in panel B of table 4.2, average slope is 4.7 degrees in Shiyan and 3.2 degrees
in Xiangxi. Log elevation is 6.6 versus 6.3. They had almost the same distance
106A list of planned large projects is from “The Outlines for the Third Five-Year Plan” (guanyu
disange wunian jihua anpai qingkuang de tigang), published in 1965.
107We make an important assumption here that the potential selection mechanism on the unob-
servable characteristics is the same for all cases.
108In fact, Xiangxi is also connect to a planned rail road. By 1980, both prefectures were connected
by railroads.
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to the nearest provincial capital and rail line. The population density was almost
the same (4.48 versus 4.50 in log values). Most importantly, Shiyan and Xiangxi
both had very low levels of industrialization and urbanization before the Movement:
both places had no industrial plants in 1936, and in 1964, only 5 percent of the
population in Shiyan was urban, compared with 7.9 percent in Xiangxi.109
The Third Front Movement dramatically changed this parity. In 1985, the
Second Auto Works employed thousands of industrial workers, while during the same
period Xiangxi received little investment and had remained largely agricultural. By
1985 Shiyan was significantly more industrialized than Xiangxi. According to panel
A of table 4.2, there were 2.6 workers in the key industrial plants per 100 residents in
Shiyan, compared with only 0.06 in Xiangxi. 9.2 percent of the adult population were
employed in the industrial sector in Shiyan, compared with 5 percent in Xiangxi.
The advantage of Shiyan in industrialization and urbanization persisted in the
post-reform era. Panel C compares the economic outcomes in early 2000s between
the two locations. Table 4.10 shows that Shiyan was more urbanized and had larger
shares of employment in non-agricultural sectors. Besides having a much larger
state-owned sector, Shiyan’s advantage over Xiangxi mainly came from the non-
state sector. Non-state plants accounted for about 60 percent of the total industrial
employment in Shiyan. The non-state sector in Shiyan, relative to population, was
more than twice as large as that in Xiangxi. Shiyan’s workforce was much more
skilled: its share of college-educated workers was almost twice as large as Xiangxi.
4.4.2 A Synthetic Comparison
In this subsection we construct a statistical comparison based on observed initial
conditions. The statistical comparison serves two purposes. First, by comparing
Shiyan to this statistical comparison, we can test whether the effects of having the
plant are statistically significant. Second, by comparing Xiangxi to this statistical
comparison, we can test whether there are other important unobservable conditions
that confound our results.
We use a statistical case study approach known as the synthetic control (Abadie
et al., 2010). The synthetic control of Shiyan, the treated prefecture denoted as i,
is constructed as the weighted average of potential comparison prefecture (j’s) such
109Note that we cannot evaluate the statistical difference between Shiyan and Xiangxi.
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that the distance of a vector of initial conditions (Z) between the treated prefecture
and the synthetic prefecture is minimized. The weights are restricted to be bounded







s.t., wj ∈ [0, 1], ∀j∑
i
wj = 1
We pick potential comparison prefectures whose employment to population
ratios from key industrial plants are below the 75th percentile in the distribution.
There are 40 such potential comparison prefectures.110 Z includes log distance to
existing and planned rail in 1962, log distance to the nearest provincial capital, log
average elevation, average slope, urban population rate in 1964, log population den-
sity, industrial employment in 1936 per 1964 population, and per capita employment
in the mining sector.
The effect of the treatment is therefore the difference between that of the




j , we denote
the treated effect as d = yi − y0i .
We test the importance of the unobservable factors by comparing the natural
comparison and the synthetic comparison. Since Xiangxi, the actual alternative
site for the plant, incorporates all the information relevant for the location choice,
both observable and unobservable to the econometrician, if the synthetic control and
Xiangxi exhibit similar economic performance both before and after the Movement,
it will be a compelling evidence that whatever confounding unobservable factors
there might be, they are unlikely to bias our results. More formally, denote the
economic condition in Xiangxi as ys, we test whether the difference between Xiangxi
and synthetic Shiyan, denoted as d0 = ys − y0i , is statistically different from zero.
Statistical inference for both d and d0 are obtained by permutation-like tests
(Abadie et al., 2010). Specifically, among the group of potential comparison prefec-
110These potential comparison prefectures are called the “donor pool”. We also exclude Xiangxi
from the donor pool. If Xiangxi is included, it only contributes a small fraction to synthetic
Shiyan, and the results are not changed. The reason that Xiangxi only contributes a small fraction
to synthetic Shiyan, we speculate, is that there are potentially other prefectures that serve as
better comparison to Shiyan than Xiangxi. Indeed, since all the potential comparison prefectures
were underdeveloped in 1964, many had very similar attributes. Consistent with this argument,
the results are also robust to a wide range of selections of the donor pool.
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tures, we assign a placebo treatment to each of the potential comparison prefecture,
and construct the synthetic control from the remaining comparison units in the
same way as we construct synthetic Shiyan. Denote the synthetic control for each
prefecture b from the donor pool as ybi , we calculate differences parallel to d and d0
as db = yi− ybi (and db0 = ys− ybi ). With all the db’s (db0’s), we rank them along with
the original estimate, d (d0), and use the percentile of d (d0) in the distribution as
the p−value of d (d0).
4.4.3 Comparing Shiyan and Xiangxi with Synthetic Shiyan
Column 3 of table 4.2 shows the characteristics of synthetic Shiyan before the Third
Front Movement (panel B), after the Third Front Movement but before the market
reform (panel A), and after the reform (panel C). Shiyan and synthetic Shiyan had
very similar characteristics before the Third Front Movement, but differences were
obvious in the two later periods. Column 4 reports the p−values of these differences.
For characteristics in 1964, the p−values are often close to 1, and never below 0.05.
Synthetic Shiyan had little industrial presence in 1985. According to panel C of
table 4.2, the difference in non-state non-mining industry employment per capita
between Shiyan and Synthetic Shiyan is large and statistically significantly at 5%
level. Table 4.10 shows that Shiyan and its synthetic control exhibit substantial
differences in most economic conditions in early 2000s, except for population density.
The differences are economically large as well. For example, the urban population
rate in Shiyan is 10 percentage points higher than that in its synthetic control.
In contrast, the economic conditions for synthetic Shiyan are very close to
those of Xiangxi throughout the periods. Column 5 of table 4.2 and Column 5
of table 4.10 report the p−values of the differences between Xiangxi and synthetic
Shiyan. These differences are small and statistically insignificant.111
For a set of consistently defined outcomes, we investigate how Shiyan developed
over time compared with Xiangxi and synthetic Shiyan. Figure 4.3 shows these
evolutionary paths for rate of urbanization, log population density, and share of
adult population with a college degree. For each outcome variable, the top graph
shows the evolution of the values for Shiyan (in solid blue lines), Xiangxi (in solid red
111The only exception is that Xiangxi is a little farther away from the nearest provincial capital
city than synthetic Shiyan.
145
lines), and synthetic Shiyan (in blue dashes). The lower graph shows the associated
p−values of the differences between Shiyan and synthetic Shiyan (in blue dots), and
the associated p−values of the differences between Xiangxi and synthetic Shiyan (in
red diamonds). Starting in 1982, Shiyan began to have higher urban rate and college
rate than synthetic Shiyan. The difference is statistically significant, and remains at
around the same magnitude over time. We find no statistically significant effect on
log population density. In contrast, the differences between Xiangxi and synthetic
Shiyan in essentially every dimension remained small and statistically insignificant
throughout the whole period.
4.5 Long-Run Effects of Temporary Subsidies to Industrialization
4.5.1 Baseline Specification
In this section we estimate the effects using the full sample of 63 prefectures in the
Third Front Region that had small urban sectors before the Movement. The econo-
metric approach we adopt is a simple OLS regression controlling for prefectures’
initial conditions before the Movement:
yit = β0t + Xi · γt + β1tempi + εit, (4.2)
where yit is some outcome of interest of prefecture i in year t. X is a vector of
initial geographic and economic conditions. empi is the size of employment from
key industrial plants in non-mining sectors in 1985, divided by 1982 population. Xi
includes the same set of initial conditions used in constructing the synthetic control.
We estimate equation 4.2 separately for each outcome variable yit, so each regression
is cross-sectional and each observation is a prefecture. The years of the outcomes
include 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010, all of which are years a population census was
conducted, and 2004, the year when the first economic census was conducted. To
facilitate our discussion, we focus on two key outcome variables: the prefecture’s
urban population in 2000 and the size of non-mining industrial employment from
the non-state sector in 2004, both variables are divided by 1982 population. We
loosely call the two outcome variables “urban rate” and “non-state employment per
capita”. Other outcomes of interest include log population density, the share of adult
population with a college degree, and the share of adult population with a middle
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school degree.
The identification assumption is that, conditional on the observable initial
characteristics, Xi, the assignment of the Third Front investment across locations is
uncorrelated with unobservable factors, εit. Although the identification assumption
is not directly testable, there is evidence that it is likely to hold. First, in the case
study in the previous section, we show that the synthetic comparison prefecture
based on the observable initial conditions exhibits very similar outcomes in the post-
reform period with those of the comparison prefecture chosen by the government
back in the 1960s, which presumably incorporates information both observable and
unobservable to the econometrician. This means that our control variables cover
most important factors that determined the location choices of the Third Front
industrial projects. Second, the documentation of the Movement indicates that
location choices of investment were largely based on national defense considerations.
We are able to control for characteristics that were key determinants according to
the criteria for location choices. Third, we focus on a sample of prefectures that were
poor and rural at the time of the Movement so they were homogeneous in terms of
the stage of economic development.
We estimate three versions of equation 4.2. The purpose of trying various
versions is to make sure that we specify the functional form of X correctly such that
the conditional independence assumption is satisfied, yet not controlling for so many
covariates as to lose power given our fairly small sample. In the first approach, we
include X in linear forms. In the second model we also include the quadratic forms
of these covariates to control for residual variation. The second approach involves
more than a dozen covariates, a sizable number compared to our sample size of 63.
Another concern is that even with many covariates, there is still no guarantee
that the covariates will be balanced between those that received large amounts of
investment versus those received little. The third model uses a reweighing approach.
We divide the sample into two groups. The first group includes 15 prefectures
that had the highest industrial presence as measured by per capita non-mining
employment in key industrial plants in 1985, and the second group includes the
remaining prefectures in the sample. We assign those in the first group each has a
weight equal to 1 and reweight the second group following a decomposition estimator
as in Kline (2011). The weights are constructed such that the two groups have the
same distribution of covariates. We then estimate equation 4.2 using Weighted Least
147
Squares without any controls.
4.5.2 Local Economic Outcomes in the Post-Reform Years
Industrial development in the non-state sector
Table 4.3 reports the results on per capita non-state non-mining industrial
employment in 2004. The first three columns in panel A report the results of es-
timating equation 4.2 using three different functional forms of X. All yield very
similar results. In general, the estimates show that one additional industrial worker
from the key industrial plants in 1985 leads to 1.3-1.4 more industrial workers in
the non-state non-mining sector in 2004. The coefficient is statistically significant
at the 1% level. The effect seems to be linear: in column 4, where we include the
quadratic form of the per capita industrial employment in 1985, we find a small
and statistically insignificant coefficient associated with the quadratic term while
the coefficient associated with the linear term is unchanged.112
The effect is meaningfully large. The 25th and the 75th percentiles in the
distribution of per capita employment from key industrial plants are 0.06 and 0.67,
respectively. So the 25th-to-75th percentile difference in initial industrial presence
in 1985 predicts a difference in per capita non-state non-mining employment twenty
years later by (0.67−0.06)×1.3 = 0.79, which is about a 50% increase from the mean
of the dependent variable (1.57), or 70% of the 25th-to-75th percentile difference
in the outcome variable (0.67 to 1.81). Since the non-state sector was essentially
non-existent in 1985, this result can be interpreted as the causal effect of having a
larger industrial presence on the eve of the market reform on the growth of the non-
state sector. Although the state sector had been in relative decline since the market
reform, prefectures that received large industrial investment during the Third Front
remained their advantage in industrialization more than two decades since the end
of the Movement.
Over the years of reform, some SOEs were privatized. One concern is that the
higher levels of non-state sector industrial employment in prefectures with histori-
cally high SOE concentrations are a mechanical result of privatization. To alleviate
this concern, in panel B we focus our attention on non-state firms that were estab-
112If an economy is mired in a low-income equilibrium and only large-scale investment can push
it out of the poverty trap, we would expect the effect to be convex in the size of the investment.
The largely linear effect suggest the absence of poverty traps.
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lished after 1985. Presumably, when a firm changes ownership it does not change
its first year of operation, thus focusing on firms that started after 1985 rules out
privatized SOEs. The effects become smaller as the mean dependent variable be-
comes smaller, but the key message remains strong: higher initial industrial presence
leads to higher levels of industrial development in the non-state sector twenty years
later.113
Other post-reform economic outcomes
Table 4.4 reports other economic outcomes in 2000. Table 4.4 only reports
one specification, that with initial conditions entering linearly. Other specifications
yield similar results, as reported in table 4.11.
We find that higher industrial presence on the eve of market reform resulted in
higher urbanization, higher human capital stock, and higher population density. One
percentage increase in per capita industrial employment from key industrial plants
in 1985 results in a 5.4 percentage point increase in urbanization rate (with a mean of
20% in 2000). This increase in urbanization rate can be roughly decomposed into 2.3
percentage points higher in industrial employment and 2 percentage points higher
in the service sector employment. Population density is about 6 percent higher.
The share of adult population with a middle school diploma was 5 percentage point
higher (15 percent higher than the mean), and the share that had a college diploma
was 0.6 percentage higher (39 percent higher than the mean).
Robustness
The baseline sample includes prefectures in the Third Front Region with a
1964 urban population rate lower than 10 percent. The cutoff rate, which excludes
about a quarter of the prefectures in the region, is arbitrary. There is a tradeoff
in deciding the cutoff level of the urban population rate. On the one hand, we
worry that investment that went to the existing industrial centers are more likely
to be endogenous, so we want to focus on prefectures that had a small urban sector
before the Movement. On the other hand, restricting our attention to a sample of
113One may still be concerned that firms may report a new first-year-of-operation once they are
privatized or restructured. We alternatively focus on the non-state firms that were established
after 2001, because by then the vast majority of the SOE privatization had completed. The results
(not reported) remain economically meaningful and statistically significant.
149
prefectures with very low urban population ratio reduces sample size and weakens
statistical power.
We test the robustness of our results with regard to samples using different
cutoff values of initial urban rate. We use cutoff values in urban population ratio
ranging from 6 percent to 30 percent with a step of 1 percentage point, and repeat
the baseline estimation for each cutoff value. If the endogeneity problem is correlated
with initial urban population ratio, we would see estimates change with the cutoff
values. Robust results to the different cutoff values within a reasonable range will
be evidence that endogeneity is not a serious concern.
Figure 4.4 summarizes the results for selected outcomes reported in table 4.4
and table 4.11. The blue solid line shows the coefficients associated with initial
industrial employment as a function of the cutoff value. The blue dotted lines show
the 95% confidence intervals. The red dotted line (with scale on the right) shows
the number of observations in the sample for each cutoff. There were 45 prefectures
in the Third Front Region with urban population rate below 8 percent in 1964, and
only 8 prefectures had urban rate above 30 percent. The point estimate becomes
less precise as the cutoff value gets lower and the sample size gets smaller, but
the magnitude is relatively stable throughout the space of the cutoff values. This
pattern is universal for all eight outcome variables we investigate. There is also no
discernible changes in the size of confidence intervals as we increase the cutoff value,
probably because the sample size grows more slowly with higher cutoff values. These
findings lend us more confidence that bias in estimation due to potential omitted
variables is not a serious concern.114
Effects over time
So far we have shown that investment in the Third Front period had long-run
effects on the local economy’s performance more than two decades after the end of
the subsidy. But those results do not indicate whether the differences between the
local economies receiving different levels of subsidized industrialization were growing
or converging over time.
114We did a host of other robustness checks. First, we repeat the analysis using a sample of
counties. With many more observations in the sample and many received no investment, we are
able conduct a matching estimator. The disadvantage with the county sample is that a county is
too small to be regarded as a self-sustaining local economy. Second, we drop prefectures that have
large reservations of natural resources. Third, we drop prefectures where large military plants were
located. Results are robust throughout.
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To look at the effects over time, we extract from population censuses consis-
tently defined outcomes in population density, urban population rate, and share of
adult population with a college degree. We estimate the baseline regression for each
outcome variable in each census year, report the coefficient associated with initial
industrial employment in 1985, and connect these dots over time to see the effects
over time.
Figure 4.5 shows the results. In each graph, the solid line shows the coefficients.
The dotted lines show the 95 percent confidence intervals. The advantages of local
economies that had higher initial industrial presences remained strong.115 China’s
economy grew more than fourfold between 1980 and 2010, and the persistent effects
suggest that that temporary industrialization subsidies helped set local economies
onto a self-sustaining development path.
The continuing role of the SOEs
We have interpreted the long-run effects of the employment in key industrial
plants in 1985 as the effect of the “initial condition” at the start of the market
reform. However, as these plants did not immediately disappear right after the
market reform, it is not clear whether the effect is due to the initial condition on
the eve of market reform, or is simply driven by the fact that these plants continued
to receive subsides from the government, and some of the subsidies trickled down to
the non-state sector in the local economy.116
To distinguish between these two alternative explanations, we divide our sam-
ple prefectures into two groups, one group includes prefectures that had their state-
owned sector growing relatively fast (or declining relatively slowly) relative to the
other group. If the second explanation is correct, we would expect the effect of initial
industrial presence to be greater in the group of prefectures where the state-owned
sector grew relatively fast.
In the baseline specification we include a dummy indicating whether the pre-
fecture has its SOE sector growth between 1985 and 2004 above sample median,
115The trend, if any, shows that the effects became stronger. Although since the average levels of
these outcome variables increased substantially over this period, the advantage in relative terms
had been stable or in slight decline.
116In fact, a small number of the Third Front plants remained sizable, state-owned, and relevant
for the local economies to date.
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and an interactive term of this dummy and the per capita initial industrial employ-
ment in 1985. For brevity, we only report the effects on per capita non-state sector
employment in 2004 (and that from new plants that opened after 1985). Table
4.5 reports the results. We find that the interactive term is small and statistically
insignificant, and the coefficient associated with initial employment is unchanged.
This finding is inconsistent with the explanation that the effects were driven by the
government’s continued support of the remaining SOE sector.
4.6 Mechanisms
Temporary industrial subsidies may promote long-run local economic development
in several ways. First, knowledge and human capital brought in with the industrial
investment facilitates local entrepreneurs to start new businesses in related sectors.
Second, the Third Front investment may have also brought in investment that im-
proved local infrastructure, which benefits other economic activities in the local
economy. Third, the industrial firms may generate demand for goods and services
from the local economy, and provide inputs to other related industries.
We investigate these channels here. First, we test whether there are some
intermediate factors that drive the results. In other words, we control for higher
initial industrial presence itself does not affect long-run economic development. It
takes effect by improving some other conditions that in turn have significant impacts.
Second, we test the idea of forward and backward inductions of industrial production
(Hirschman, 1958). Third, we investigate where the newly urbanized people came
from. If the increasing urban population was simply due to migration of urbanized
workers from other prefectures, the Third Front investment simply affected the
distribution of urban population. As Gottlieb and Glaeser (2008) has argued, if the
positive effects of a location based policy is obtained at the cost of other locations,
the net effect at the national level may well be negative, as government inventions
distort the efficient allocation of businesses.117
117That does not mean, however, if the positive effects of the Third Front investment were all
captured by the local economy, the Movement is efficient at the national level. National welfare
might well have been higher if the investment went to places with better economic development
potentials. However, the discussion of efficiency at the national level is beyond the scope of the
current version of this paper.
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Intermediate factors
If the effect of initial industrial presence is mediated through some intermediate
factors, we would expect that the effect of initial industrial presence to shrink once
we control for potential intermediate factors in the 1980s along with the size of
initial industrial employment. In table 4.6 we report results from specifications
where include as control various economic conditions in the 1980s. The outcome
variable in all columns is the per capita employment in 2004 from non-mining non-
state industrial plants that were established after 1985. Column 1 replicates the
result in column 2 of table 4.4. Column 2 includes province dummies and the
estimate does not budge. It suggests that province-level policies are not driving
the results. Column 3 shows that the estimate remains the same after accounting
for log distance to the railway. It suggests that improved infrastructure does not
explain much of the effect, either. Column 4 includes variables capturing the human
capital of the local economy, including the share of adult population with a college
degree and the share with a middle school diploma. The coefficient associated with
initial industrial presence dropped by about 10%. Column 5 includes log population
density in 1982 and the estimate is the same as that in column 1. Column 6 adds
all the covariates from column 1 to column 5, the coefficient still remains similar.118
Finally, in column 7, we divide employment in the key industrial plants in
1985 into three broad industries: sophisticated manufacturing industries, material
industries, and light industries. All three sectors have positive and significant effects
on the post-reform employment levels, and it seems that employment in the material
industries generate the largest spillovers.
Industrial linkages
The original idea of Hirschman (1958) on unbalanced economic growth is that
firms generate demand for upstream industries and provide input for downstream
industries. Certain industries generate more such input-output linkages than oth-
ers, so temporary subsidies on these industries have positive effects on the overall
economy. Fostering an advanced industry generates spillovers of knowhow in the
118Some intermediate factors may only take effect in complement with initial industrial presence.
For example, both transportation infrastructure and spillovers from existing firms are important.
To test potential complementary effects, we interact initial industrial presence with these interme-
diate factors, we find small and statistically insignificant coefficients.
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economy, and prepares specially trained labor. At early stages of development, the
positive spillover effects from the tradable sector are likely to dominate the local con-
gestion effects. We quantify how much effects we find can be explained by industrial
linkages, both within the same industry and through input-output linkages.
Specifically, input linkages refer to spillover effects in which industry j′ uses
the products of industry j as inputs. Similarly, an output linkages refer to the
spillover effect in which the products of industry j′ are used as inputs for industry
j. Let matrix IN be a J × J lower matrix with element ρinputjj′ , where ρ
input
jj′ is the
share of industry j′’s purchase in industry j’s total sale. Let matrix OUT be a J×J
lower matrix with element ρoutputjj′ . ρ
output
jj′ is the share of industry j
′’s sales that is
bought by industry j. The pairwise input share, ρinputjj′ , and the pairwise output
share, ρoutputjj′ are both from 1995 input-output tables published by the National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS).119 Let R be a I × J matrix with element Rij′ . Rij′
is the 1985 output from key industrial firms in industry j′ in prefecture i, divided
by 1982 population. Let I be an J × J identity matrix. Define the I × J input-
linkage matrix INLINK = (I − IN)−1 · R with element inlinkij capturing the
input linkages to industry j in prefecture i. Similarly, define the I × J output-
linkage matrix OUTLINK = (I−OUT )−1 ·R with element outlinkij capturing the
output linkages to industry j in prefecture i.
To estimate the effect due to input-output linkages, we estimate the follow-
ing equation. Each observation is a prefecture-industry. We estimate the effects of
input-output linkages on non-state sector employment using the following specifica-
tion:
yijt = β0t + X · γt + β1tinlinkij + β2toutlinkij + εijt, (4.3)
Estimating the effects on non-mining employment from non-state firms estab-
lished after 1985, columns 1 of table 4.7 replicates the baseline results using the
prefecture level sample. Column 2 shows the result using the prefecture-industry
level sample. Adding one industrial worker from the key industrial plants in 1985
raises 0.142 more workers in 2004 in the non-mining non-state sector from newly
established firms. This effect is statistically significant at 10% level, and the size of
the effect is about 15 percent of that in the first column. Column 3 shows that input
119The NBS input-output tables provide output flows between any pair of 24 2-digit industries.
We group them to 19 industries to match the 1985 data. The results are similar when using any
input-output table (available for 1987, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2002).
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and output linkages also explain variations in employment by industry. A simple
back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that input-output linkages collectively ex-
plain about 25 percent of the total effect.
Urbanization or migration
A natural question given our results so far is where did the newly urbanized
workers come from. One explanation is that the initial industrial presence stimulated
other non-agricultural businesses, generating labor demand in the urban sector, such
that local peasants, lured by higher wages and better living standard in the city,
acquired human capital and started working in the local urban center. Another
explanation is simply that the Third Front industrial plants attracted higher quality
workers from nearby regions. As we have discussed earlier, distinguishing the two
channels has important policy implications.
To gauge the contribution of cross-prefecture migration in accounting for the
results, we use micro-level data of the 2000 census, which has some information on
migration. Specifically, the 2000 census asked respondents whether they were born
in the current county of residence or the current province of residence. It also asked
respondents’ residence 5 years ago (in 1995). If the former residence was not in this
community, a followup question specifies whether it was outside the current county
of residence, or outside the current province of residence. Unfortunately, in both
situations, we do not know whether a person had moved from a different prefecture.
Nevertheless, since a prefecture is a jurisdiction between a county and a province,
we can construct cross-county migration rates and cross-province migration rates
that jointly give a bound for cross-prefecture migration rates.
We construct two sets of variables for urban residents in 2000: the first set
indicates whether an urban resident was originally from a different county (or a
different province); the second set indicates whether an urban resident migrated
from a different county (or a different province) within the past 5 years. Therefore,
the percentage of urban residents who were originally from a different prefecture
is bounded between the percentage of urban residents who were originally from
a different county (upper bound), and the percentage who were originally from
a different province (lower bound). Similarly, the percentage of urban residents
who migrated from a different prefecture within the past 5 years is between the
percentage of urban residents who migrated from a different county within 5 years
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(upper bound), and the percentage who migrated from a different province within
5 years (lower bound).
We focus on urban population growth between 1982 and 2000. The percentage
of urban residents who migrated from a different prefecture between 1982 and 2000
are bounded between the percentage of urban residents who were originally from
a different prefecture (which includes cross-prefecture migration in all years up to
2000, thus the upper bound), and the percentage of urban residents who migrated
from a different prefecture in the past 5 years (between 1995 and 2000, a subset of
years between 1982 and 2000, thus the lower bound).
We first calculate the urban population growth rate between 1982 and 2000.
We divide the changes in total urban population between the two years by 1982
population (×100). Column 1 of table 4.8 shows that increasing per capita key
industrial employment in 1985 by one percentage point increases the urban popula-
tion growth by 4.3 percentage points. Columns 2 to 5 report the effect of per capita
industrial employment from key industrial plants in 1985 on migration. With a one
percentage point increase in per capita industrial employment in 1985, the percent-
age of urban residents who were originally from a different prefecture is bounded
between 0.53 and 0.96 (denote m1 ∈ [0.53, 0.96]). The percentage of urban residents
who migrated from a different prefecture in the past 5 years is bounded between 0.1
percent and 0.18 percent (denote m2 ∈ [0.1, 0.18]). The percentage of urban resi-
dents that migrated from a different prefecture is thus m3 ∈ [min{m2},max{m1}],
which in turn is a subset of [0.1, 0.96]. Notice that the maximal possible value m3
can take is less than a quarter of the total urban growth rate estimated in column 1.
Therefore, we can conclude that increased urban population is mainly driven by the
urbanization of local rural workers.120 This conclusion, after all, is not surprising
due to the strict migration restrictions across jurisdictions.
120It is possible that an urban resident who migrated from other prefectures earlier has a larger
effect on urban rate due to natural population growth: the offsprings of urban residents auto-
matically have urban hukou. National population grew 26% between 1982 and 2000. The natural
growth rate of the urban population is also lower than that of the rural population. Even multiply-
ing the national average population with m1 and m2 gives a bound for the value of m3 that is still
a small fraction of the urban growth rate found in Column 1. We are working on an alternative
accounting of migration rate based on a formal demographic model taking into consideration of
birth rate and death rate.
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4.7 Conclusions
How to transform an agricultural economy into an urbanized and industrial-
ized economy has been an important question facing development economists and
policymakers. Previous studies on the effect of industrial investment on long-run
economic growth suffer from the endogeneity of investment. This chapter studies the
long-run effects of temporary subsidies to industrialization in predominantly agri-
cultural local economies by exploiting a unique policy design known as the Third
Front Movement. The design of the Movement allows us to separate the effects of
locational fundamentals from the effects of temporary subsidies. Combining evi-
dence from a case study, the synthetic control approach, pooled OLS and Weighted
Least Squares estimates, we find consistent evidence that more than two decades
after the subsidies had ended, prefectures that had received large-scale industrial
investment persisted to have higher rates of urbanization and industrialization, and
better educated workforce. In particular, these results are mainly driven by a fast
growing non-state sector economy.
We explore a few possible channels through which an initial advantage in
industrialization reinforces itself over time. We first show that the results cannot be
explained by the lingering effects of the state-owned sector: neither the privatization
of some SOEs nor the continued subsidies to the remaining SOEs could explain a
faster industrial development in the local non-state sector. The results cannot be
explained solely by factors such as human capital, infrastructure, or population
density. We find some evidence of industrial linkages, which are able to explain
about a quarter of the effect. Finally, we provide evidence that increased urban rate
mainly comes from workers transitioning from the rural sector to the urban sector
within the local economy, not from people migrating from other jurisdictions.
Our results have strong policy implications. On the one hand, we show that
a government can permanently transform a rural local economy into an industri-
alized one by providing temporary subsidies to the nascent industrial sector. On
the other hand, these policy interventions are likely to to be inefficient since the
local fundamentals may not be suited for particular industries. In fact, we find in
our data that firms in the Third Front Region are consistently less efficient than
those in other parts of the country.121 However, as mobility is costly, place-based
subsidies to industrialization in remote rural areas can transform the local economy
121Our next step is to evaluate the effect on the total factor productivity (TFP) of the firms.
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and promote living standards. This helps reduce regional inequality. When trade
costs and migration costs are high, these subsidized local economies, though ineffi-
cient at the national level, serve as local magnets for production and consumption.
Thus the effect on overall welfare compared to a scenario in which firms are located
in places with the highest productivity will be unclear if we factor in the tradeoff
between efficiency and equity. Evaluating the overall welfare impact of the Third
Front Movement in the long-run is part of our ongoing work.
4.8 Appendices
4.8.1 Appendix A. Sources of Data
Data sources that we use in this chapter include:
1. 1936 Industry Survey. The 1936 industry survey is a firm level dataset con-
ducted by the the Nationals Party (Kuomingdang) and is the only existing
national industry survey prior to the Third Front Movement.122 The 1936
industry survey includes summary characteristics of capital, worker, product,
machinery and output for each firm. The survey includes data on 146 cities
(counties) that have significant industry presence, which covers all of China.123
We aggregate the firm level data to get city (county) level industrial output
and employment.
2. 1985 Industry Census. We use the statistics from the 1985 Industry Census
published by the National Bureau Statistics. Industry is defined in all surveys
here to include mining, manufacturing and public utilities. We use mainly
two volumes of the publication. The first volume lists all key (large and
medium sized, LMS) industrial firms in 1985. Virtually all of them are state-
owned. For each LMS firm, we observe its name, address, 2-digit industry,
employment, output, capital, year of opening and main products. We use the
year of opening and the location to determine whether a plant belongs to the
Third Front Movement. The second volume we use lists county level number
of establishment, industrial output, and employment for years 1980, 1984, and
1985. We use this second volume to construct the overall conditions of the
122There is a census of industrial plants in 1950. However, disaggregated data at the county or
industry level are not available to the public.
123Except for the 3 provinces in the Northeast, which were controlled by the Japanese. These
provinces are not in our sample either.
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industrial sector right before the market reform.
3. County tabulation of population censuses in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, 2000 and
2010. These include all population censuses conducted in China after the
establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. All county level tabulations
include population. The availability of other information varies by censuses.
Size of urban population is available in 1964, 1990, 2000, and 2010. Employ-
ment in the industrial sector in available since 1982. Population by education
level is available since 1982. We also use the 1/1000 micro sample of the 2000
census for information on migration.
4. Firm level panel data for “above scale” manufacturing firms from National
Bureau of Statistics, 1998-2007. “Above scale” is defined as annual sales above
5 million yuan. The data have comprehensive information on firms’ ownership,
labor and capital input, industry, output, and financial conditions.
5. 2004 Economic Census. It includes the firm-level data on all 1.4 million indus-
trial firms in China. For each firm, we observe its ownership, labor, capital,
output, industry, and location.
6. GIS maps of county boundaries from China Historical GIS project. The GIS
maps include boundaries of county-level jurisdictions in each year when pop-
ulation census is conducted. Area covered by each county is calculated from
the polygons. Overlaying these polygons, we define counties with consistently
defined boundaries.
7. Digital Elevation Model (DEM) data for China’s geographic characteristics.
The DEM map is overlaid with GIS maps with county boundaries to calculate
a county’s average elevation and ruggedness.
8. GIS maps for roads, railroads, and highways in 1962, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2005
and 2010. This dataset is collected in Baum-Snow et al. (2012) and is gener-
ously provided by the University of Toronto library.
A list of key variables used in the study and their sources are listed in Table
A.
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4.8.2 Appendix B. Details of Variable Construction
B.1 Consistently Defined Counties
County boundaries have changed over the decades. We create a geographically
consistently defined counties defined by 1982 county boundary by overlapping GIS
maps of county boundaries accompanied in population censuses in 1953, 1964, 1982,
1990, and 2000. We currently do not have GIS map for county boundaries in 2010.
We manually match 2010 county characteristics to 1982 county boundaries.
County geographic characteristics are directly calculated for the consistently
defined county boundaries since geographic characteristics, such as elevation, rugged-
ness, distance to river, etc, are all continuous across locations. County characteris-
tics from industry and population censuses are based on current county boundaries.
We match counties to the nearest year when a GIS map of county boundaries is
available, and then convert it to the 1982 boundary using a weighted average of
intersecting counties. For example, say we have a 1982 county A whose territory
belongs to county A1 and county A2 in 1990. If α share of the territory of county A is
in A1 and (1−α) share of the territory of county A is in A2, then the characteristics
of county A in 1990 are calculated as the weighted average of the characteristics of
A1 and A2, with the share of overlapping territory serving as weights.
B.2 Geographic Characteristics
We construct two main variables for county geographic characteristics. The
first variable is county average elevation. The second variable is county average
slope. Both variables are constructed from a DEM (Digital Elevation Model) file.
A DEM file contains elevation information of a point in space with fine resolutions.
We first overlap the DEM file with the shape file containing county boundaries. The
average elevation is calculated as the average elevation all points in the DEM data
that fall within the boundaries of the county. To calculate the county average slope,
the county polygon is first divided by 1 km by 1 km grids. For each grid, the slope
is calculated as the maximal elevation divided by the minimal elevation from the
points in the DEM file that fall in the grid. Slope for each grid is then averaged
across all grids that fall in the polygon of the county. If a grid only partly falls within
the county polygon, the slope of that grid is given the weight proportional to the
percent of its area that intersects with the county polygon. Slope thus measures the
ruggedness of the terrain. See Dell (2010) and Nunn and Puga (2012) for discussion
160
and application of the slope.
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Figure 4.1: Third Front Region
Note: The top map shows the average slope by county. Ruggedness of terrain increases from green to red. The
source data for this map is from the China Historical GIS Database. The bottom map shows the boundaries of
the Third Front Region, as is shown in Naughton (1988).
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year
Third Front Other
Capital formation by region
Note: Provincial investment and population data are from 60-year Statistical Summary constructed by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China. The measure of investment intensity is the region’s share of national
investment divided by its share of national population.
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p−value: Shiyan−synth p−value: Xiangxi − Shiyan synth
Note: Graphs in the top panel depict trajectories of outcomes in Shiyan (solid blue), Xiangxi (solid red), and Synthetic Shiyan (dotted blue)
from 1964 to 2010. Graphs in the bottom panel show the p−values for the differences between Shiyan and the synthetic Shiyan (blue dots),
and the differences between Xiangxi and and the synthetic Shiyan (red diamonds). The outcomes are urban rate (Column 1), log population
density (Column 2), and rate of population with college degrees (Column 3)
164














































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff
















































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff
# of prefs (right axis)












































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff













































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff
















































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff


















































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff














































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff














































6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
urban rate 64 cutoff
coeff
# of prefs (right axis)
college rate
Note: The baseline regressions are repeated with varying cutoff values of 1964 urban rate. Graphs show the
coefficient with each cutoff value and its 95% confidence interval for indicated outcome variables.
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Note: Coefficients associated with non-mining LMS employment in 1985 per 1982 population (×100) over the years.
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of Firms by Year of Opening
nationwide Third Front Region
year of opening 1949-1964 1965-1978 diff. 1949-1964 1965-1978 diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
County characteristics
in Third-Front region .164 .411 .247
(.37) (.492) (.012)
in provincial capital city .442 .208 -.235 .336 .154 -.182
(.497) (.406) (.011) (.473) (.362) (.021)
average slope (ruggedness) 1.229 1.917 .689 2.399 2.824 .425
(1.418) (1.76) (.044) (1.966) (1.976) (.097)
mean elevation (meters) 276.489 515.985 239.496 856.154 933.513 77.359
(464.138) (629.93) (15.406) (737.519) (715.589) (35.784)
density (persons per km2, ’64) 2317.995 810.062 -1507.932 603.113 327.713 -275.4
(4326.287) (2029.033) (76.21) (525.61) (334.777) (21.785)
distance provincial capital (km) 91.293 138.886 47.593 125.172 156.042 30.87
(114.448) (122.196) (3.154) (114.271) (110.561) (5.537)
distance to 1962 rail (km) 8.325 23.628 15.303 17.945 32.723 14.778
(35.506) (57.762) (1.373) (49.031) (66.079) (2.856)
log industrial output in ’36 8.677 4.28 -4.397 5.9 2.18 -3.72
(8.542) (7.027) (.197) (7.038) (5.035) (.302)
Firm characteristics
capital per worker (10k ’80 yuan) 1.854 2.571 .718 2.446 2.747 .301
(3.107) (4.442) (.108) (5.056) (5.083) (.25)
output per worker (10k ’80 yuan) 2.344 2.061 -.283 2.097 1.736 -.361
(3.834) (2.583) (.079) (4.499) (2.404) (.179)
mining .057 .041 -.016 .087 .034 -.052
(.233) (.198) (.005) (.281) (.182) (.012)
light industries .299 .222 -.077 .278 .216 -.062
(.458) (.416) (.011) (.448) (.412) (.021)
power/Water .068 .061 -.007 .103 .05 -.053
(.251) (.239) (.006) (.304) (.218) (.013)
chemical .138 .155 .016 .106 .106 -.001
(.345) (.362) (.009) (.308) (.308) (.015)
ferrous and non-ferrous metal .099 .064 -.035 .094 .064 -.03
(.298) (.245) (.007) (.292) (.245) (.013)
machinery .251 .293 .042 .252 .343 .091
(.434) (.455) (.012) (.435) (.475) (.022)
electric and electronic .088 .164 .077 .08 .186 .106
(.283) (.371) (.009) (.272) (.39) (.016)
number of plants 4927 2049 809 842
Note: Data from the large and medium-sized manufacturing plants from the Manufacturing Census of 1985.
Year range indicates years in which the plant started operating. County characteristics are from various
population censuses and manufacturing censuses. In column 1 and column 2, standard deviations are in
parentheses. In column 3, standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4.2: Shiyan and Its Comparisons
(1) (2) (3) (1)-(3) (2)-(3)
Shiyan Xiangxi Synth p−value p−value
Panel A: Emp from key industrial plants per 100 1982 residents
non-mining industries 2.586 0.057 0.132 0.000 0.512
Panel B: Initial conditions
log population density 1964 (count per sqkm) 4.484 4.502 4.583 0.878 0.878
urban rate 1964 (%) 5.261 7.934 5.328 0.463 0.073
log distance to existing and planned railway 1962 (km) 5.230 4.296 4.981 0.268 0.854
log distance to nearest provincial capital (km) 5.560 5.785 5.578 0.780 0.000
log average elevation (meters) 6.599 6.304 6.640 0.780 0.951
average slope (degrees) 4.669 3.216 4.678 0.512 0.976
industrial employment in 1936 per 10k 1964 resident 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.854 0.854
Panel C: Post-reform industrial outcomes (2000s)
non-state non-mining industry emp per 100 1982 residents 3.052 1.291 0.971 0.024 0.220
from firms established after 1985 1.925 0.805 0.659 0.049 0.293
Note: Conditions for Shiyan are reported in Column 1. Xiangxi is the natural comparison for Shiyan, the prefecture that
received the Second Auto Works during the Third Front Movement. Its conditions are reported in Column 2. Conditions
for the synthetic control of Shiyan are reported in Column 3. Column 4 reports the p−values of the differences between
Shiyan and synthetic Shiyan. Column 5 reports the p−values of the differences between Xiangxi and synthetic Shiyan.
The p−values are obtained using the permutation-like method. Panels A, B, C report conditions in 1964, 2000, and
industrial composition in 2004.
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Table 4.3: Post-Reform Industrial Employment in the Non-State Sector (2004)
non-state employ
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
non-mining emp 1.441*** 1.307*** 1.315*** 1.426***
(0.188) (0.277) (0.217) (0.384)
non-mining emp squared 0.003
(0.053)
initial conditions X X
initial conditions polynomial X
weights X
mean dep var 1.568 1.568 1.568 1.568
from firms established after 1985
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
non-mining emp 0.936*** 0.728*** 0.881*** 0.671***
(0.141) (0.169) (0.169) (0.238)
non-mining emp squared 0.058*
(0.029)
initial conditions X X
initial conditions polynomial X
weights X
mean dep var 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916
N 63 63 63 63
Note: The sample includes prefectures in the Third Front Region with an urban population rate lower than 10 percent in
1964. The dependent variable in Panel A is the non-mining industrial employment in the non-state sector in 2004 per
1982 population (×100); the dependent variable in Panel B is the part of employment from firms that started operating
after 1985. The key explanatory variable is non-mining employment from the key industrial plants in 1985 in the
prefecture divided by its 1982 population (×100). Column 1 and Column 4 include prefecture initial conditions. Column
2 includes the linear and quadratic forms of these initial conditions. Column 3 uses a weighted least squares estimation
with the weights constructed such that the initial conditions balances a group of prefectures that had the largest
non-mining industrial employment per capita, and the remaining prefectures in the sample. See the text for details.
Initial conditions include: (1) urban rate in 1964, (2) log population density in 1964, (3) industrial population ratio in
1936 divided by 1964 population, (4) log distance to existing and planned railways in 1962, (5) log distance the nearest
provincial capital, (6) log mean elevation, (7) log average slope, (8) per capita mining employment. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 4.4: Prefecture-Level Outcomes in 2000
urban ind emp ser emp ln pop den mid sch college
% % % # per sqkm % %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
non-mining emp 5.360*** 2.303*** 2.002*** 0.057** 5.169*** 0.606***
(0.845) (0.484) (0.300) (0.023) (1.172) (0.101)
initial conditions X X X X X X
mean dep var 19.824 6.134 11.466 5.117 33.650 1.557
N 63 63 63 63 63 63
Note: Outcome variables are indicated in the shorthand on top of each column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 4.5: Initial Conditions versus Continuing Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dep var: non-state ind emp from all firms new firms all firms new firms
non-mining emp 1.441*** 0.936*** 1.506*** 0.973***
(0.188) (0.141) (0.196) (0.135)
non-mining emp× high SOE sector growth -0.217 0.088
(0.594) (0.356)
high SOE sector growth = 1 0.468 0.279*
(0.315) (0.161)
initial conditions X X X X
N 63 63 63 63
Note: Unit of observation is a prefecture. The dependent variables are non-state sector industrial employment from all
firms (Columns 1 and 3) or from firms that were established after 1985 (Columns 2 and 4), divided by 1982 population
(×100), measured in 2004 Economic Census. State-Owned Sector (SOE) growth is defined as changes in levels of SOE
employment between 1985 and 2004, divided by 1982 population (Columns 3 and 4). “High SOE sector growth” is a
dummy which is equal to one if the SOE sector growth is above median. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 4.6: Mechanism - Conditional on Early 1980s Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8)
non-mining emp 0.936*** 0.952*** 0.929*** 0.784*** 0.980*** 0.941***
(0.141) (0.157) (0.135) (0.173) (0.149) (0.282)
sophisticated manu emp 0.714***
(0.233)
material manu emp 1.136***
(0.134)
light manu emp 0.962*
(0.524)
conditions in early 1980s none prov transport human capital pop den all none
initial conditions X X X X X X X
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Note: Outcome variable is the non-mining non-state industrial employment in 2004 from firms established after 1985, divided by 1982 population (×100).
All columns control for prefecture initial conditions. Each column controls for additional prefecture conditions in the 1980s. Column 1 includes no
additional covariates, thus it replicates the baseline result. Column 2 includes dummy variables for provinces. Column 3 adds transportation conditions in
early 1980s, which is measured by log distance to railroad in 1980. Column 4 controls for human capital characteristics, which includes in percent of adult
population with middle school diploma, and percent of adult population with college diploma in 1982. Column 5 includes log population density in 1982.
Column 6 includes all the covariates from Column 2 to Column 5. Column 7 uses the same set of baseline controls as in Column 1, but breaks the 1985
industrial employment into sophisticated manufacturing (including machinery, transportation equipment, electric devices, electronic products, and
instruments), raw material manufacturing (including ferrous and non-ferrous metal products, oil refinery, electricity, etc), and light manufacturing
(including textile, paper, etc). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 4.7: Within-Sector and Input-Output Spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
emp emp emp






industry dummies X X
’64 conditions X X X
unit of obs pref pref-ind pref-ind
standard error robust cluster cluster
N 63 945 945
Note: The dependent variable is non-state non-mining industrial employment in 2004 from firms established after 1985
in the prefecture (Column 1), and in each industry (Column 2 and Column 3). 3-digit manufacturing firms except for
mining industries are included in the sample. Prefecture-industry pairs with zero output in 2004 are dropped from
prefecture-industry level regressions. Robust standard errors are reported for Column 1. For Columns 2 and 3, the
standard errors are two-way clustered at the industry and prefecture level. Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 ,
*** p < 0.01 .
173
Table 4.8: Migration and Urbanization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
urban pop due to migration
urban pop grth other county other province
82-00 before 00 95-00 before 00 95-00
non-mining employment 4.273*** 0.962*** 0.179** 0.529*** 0.103***
(1.288) (0.335) (0.078) (0.157) (0.024)
initial conditions X X X X X
mean dep var 15.871 3.490 0.939 1.000 0.206
N 63 63 63 63 63
Note: Unit of observation is a prefecture. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the increase in urban population
between 1982 and 2000, divided by 1982 population (×100). The dependent variable in Column 2 is the number of
urban residents in 2000 that were born in a county that is different from the current county of residence, divided by 1982
population (×100). The dependent variable in Column 3 is the number of urban residents in 2000 that migrated from a
county that is different from the current county of residence between 1995 and 2000, divided by 1982 population (×100).
The dependent variable in Column 4 is the number of urban residents in 2000 that were born in a province that is
different from the current province of residence, divided by 1982 population (×100). The dependent variable in Column
5 is the number of urban residents in 2000 that migrated from a province that is different from the current province of
residence between 1995 and 2000, divided by 1982 population (×100). Sample mean of the dependent variables are
reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 4.9: Summary Statistics
mean s.d. p10 median p90
Panel A: Emp from 1985 key industrial plants per 100 residents
non-mining sector .567 1.015 0 .222 1.282
sophisticated-manufacturing sector .223 .388 0 .051 .581
material-manufacturing sector .196 .879 0 0 .245
light-industries sector .149 .206 0 .082 .355
Panel B: Initial conditions
log population density 1964 (count per sqkm) 4.487 .849 3.418 4.502 5.687
urban rate 1964 (%) 6.303 1.762 3.955 6.361 8.693
log distance to existing and planned railway 1962 (km) 3.808 1.26 2.351 4.023 5.299
log distance to nearest provincial capital (km) 5.345 .466 4.636 5.378 5.894
log average elevation (meters) 7.007 .556 6.284 7.05 7.704
average slope (degrees) 4.308 2.381 1.713 4.019 7.009
industrial employment in 1936 per 10k 1964 resident .182 1.224 0 0 0
Panel C: Post-reform outcomes (2000s)
urban rate (%) 19.824 7.437 10.632 18.836 30.152
non-state non-mining industry emp per 100 residents 2.104 1.86 .791 1.535 4.023
from firms established after 1985 1.944 1.764 .759 1.362 3.635
service emp per 100 1982 resident 11.466 3.202 7.778 10.956 15.659
log population density (# per sqkm) 5.117 .771 4.099 5.116 6.182
percent middle school and above (%) 33.65 8.823 21.657 33.623 43.889
percent college (%) 1.557 .621 .956 1.461 2.362
Note: There are 63 prefectures in the sample. These are the prefectures in the Third Front Region with 1964 urban rate
less than 10 percent. Key industrial plants are the large and medium sized plants that appear in the 1985 Industrial
Census. Industries here do not include the mining sector.
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Table 4.10: Shiyan and Its Comparisons (More Results)
(1) (2) (3) (1)-(3) (2)-(3)
Shiyan Xiangxi Synth p−value p−value
Panel A: Employment from 1985 key industrial plants per 100 resident by industry
sophisticated manufacturing industries 2.219 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.463
material manufacturing industries 0.195 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.488
light industries 0.172 0.057 0.113 0.195 0.610
Panel B: Post-reform Outcomes (2000s)
non-state non-mining industry emp per 100 1982 residents
from sophisticated manufacturing industries 1.534 0.020 0.031 0.000 0.439
from material manufacturing industries 0.285 0.624 0.283 0.341 0.098
from light industries 1.232 0.646 0.657 0.098 0.439
urban rate (%) 32.780 19.776 22.334 0.024 0.659
service emp per 100 1982 resident 19.927 17.184 15.016 0.049 0.122
log population density (# per sqkm) 5.016 5.149 5.034 0.561 0.268
percent middle school and above (%) 44.002 36.337 36.394 0.098 0.341
percent college (%) 3.597 1.914 1.681 0.000 0.268
Note: Conditions for Shiyan are reported in Column 1. Xiangxi is the natural comparison for Shiyan, the prefecture that
received the Second Auto Works during the Third Front Movement. Its conditions are reported in Column 2. Conditions
for synthetic Shiyan are reported in Column 3. Column 4 reports the p−values of the differences between Shiyan and
synthetic Shiyan. Column 5 reports the p−values of the differences between Xiangxi and the synthetic Shiyan. The
p−values are obtained using the permutation-like method.
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Table 4.11: Prefecture-Level Outcomes in 2000 - Robustness
urban ind emp ser emp ln pop den mid sch college
% % % # per sqkm % %
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (7) (4) (6)
non-mining emp 5.990*** 2.907*** 2.033*** 0.019 7.034*** 0.799***
(1.122) (0.469) (0.427) (0.027) (2.031) (0.096)
initial conditions X X X X X X
initial conditions sqr X X X X X X
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (7) (4) (6)
non-mining emp 5.223*** 2.038*** 1.692*** 0.134 5.268*** 0.572***
(0.943) (0.550) (0.626) (0.136) (1.286) (0.117)
reweighing X X X X X X
mean dep var 19.824 6.134 11.466 5.117 33.650 1.557
N 63 63 63 63 63 63
Note: Outcome variables are as indicated in shorthand on top of each column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
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Table 4.12: Data Sources
Category Variable Source
1.Industry
Third Front Firms by industry Directory of large and medium sized plants from 1985 manufacturing census
County industrial output 1985 manufacturing census
County industrial agricultural income 1982 population census
County industrial output by 
ownership and industry manufacturing part of 2004 economic census
County employment by industry 1990, 2000, 2010 population censuses
County average productivity for 
manufacturing firms manufacturing part of 2004 economic census
County average productivity for 
scale-and-up manufacturing firms scale-and-up manufacturing firms survey
County industrial employment and 
output 1936 manufacturing survey
2.Geography
County boundaries population censuses
County average alevation and 
ruggedness China DEM file
County area GIS maps accompanying population censuses
3.Other social and economic characteristics
County population population censuses
Urban population population censuses
Education level of county residents population censuses
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